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E.U. Employment and Social Affairs Directorate-General 
and U.S. Department of Labor 
Labor Market Integration Seminar 
 
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, President  
Migration Policy Institute 
 
 
Executive Summary of Seminar Discussions 
 
On June 28th and 29th of 2004, the Employment and Social Affairs Directorate-General 
(DG EMPL) of the European Commission and the United States Department of Labor 
(DOL) convened a joint seminar to discuss labor-market-related migration issues.  
Papers provided an overview of the labor market activity of immigrants in the EU and 
the US, as well as in Canada. The discussion expanded on these themes and also turned 
to policy measures affecting the economic contributions of immigrants.  The seminar 
also considered immigrant integration practices and strategies with the goal of 
identifying major challenges and good and interesting practices across the relevant 
countries.  Participants included: officials from DG EMPL, officials from DOL and 
various other US agencies, representatives from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the Canadian Government, the European 
Employment Committee Chairman, and EU representatives from the Irish and Dutch 
EU Presidencies. 
The papers presented at the conference sparked a lively discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of data and knowledge regarding migration and the labor market. From 
discussion of the papers there naturally emerged a rich discussion of the commonalities 
and differences in what is known—and not known—about immigrants in the labor 
markets of North America and Europe. Finally, the conversation turned to issues of 
policy, where European and North American countries face strikingly similar 
challenges.  
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Knowledge About Migration: The Potential for Data to be 
Misleading 
Aggregate figures give the impression of greater differences between the immigrant 
populations of the United States and European Union than may actually be the case, 
due to differences in how data are traditionally compiled and reported. The United 
States reports that slightly less than 12 percent of US residents are foreign born.  This 
figure includes many long-term temporary residents as well as a large proportion (it is 
estimated at three-quarters or more) of the unauthorized immigrant population.  If these 
numbers are subtracted from the US total number of foreign-born persons, the United 
States is a middle-level immigrant destination among advanced industrial societies, 
with a per capita foreign-born population much lower than those of Canada or 
Australia, lower than several EU Member States, and comparable to most other ones.  
Of particular note in this regard were the extremely valuable estimates by Rainer Münz, 
who put the EU’s foreign-born population at about 9 percent.   This figure, in contrast 
to the analytical conclusion that many “official” sources of data about immigrants in 
Europe generate (because of measurement peculiarities), does not include second-
generation migrants born in the EU who do not hold citizenship in an EU member state.   
Once each EU country’s data collection idiosyncrasies are evened out, and estimates of 
illegal immigrants and temporary workers are aligned, key similarities and differences 
between the nations are revealed.   Both the EU and the US have admitted about one 
million immigrants a year in recent years.  (These are gross admissions.)  At the same 
time, several hundred thousand illegal immigrants also enter and/or remain in each 
space every year.  “Both political systems” have gates of entry that are sensitive to 
protection and humanitarian issues, as well as to family reunification.  In both systems, 
in fact, family reunification migration is the largest migration “stream.” While the EU 
admits labor market and economic stream migrants more tentatively than either the US 
or Canada, the opening for migrants is nevertheless getting larger in the immigration 
systems of both North America and Europe. Interest in high-skill (but also low-skill!) 
labor migration in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the EU, and for low-skill labor 
in Italy, Greece, Spain, and for that matter, Norway and other European countries, are 
examples of such openings in Europe.  In both geographic areas, immigrants are 
overrepresented relative to natives at both the high- and low-end of the skills and 
education spectrum. 
 
Employment of Immigrants: Common Knowledge Gaps, 
Differences in Experience 
Immigration contributes about twice as large a proportion of the US’s workforce 
growth as it does in the EU, but immigration still accounts for between a fifth and a 
third of the employment growth of the EU.  Official labor force data probably 
understate the true level of US unemployment, since they do not count “discouraged 
workers” among the unemployed.  In addition, persons employed in the underground 
economy are omitted from official counts of the employed, with foreign-born workers 
disproportionately represented in this invisible workforce.  On balance, the United 
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States official labor force data probably understate the size of the foreign-born labor 
force and overstate the rate of foreign-born unemployment.   
In the EU, it is natives rather than foreign workers who are disproportionately 
represented in the uncounted underground economy.  As a result, the official EU labor 
force data probably understate the size of the native labor force and overstate the rate of 
native unemployment. 
Even so, far less information than needed is available on topics such as wage effects, 
displacement, and effects of unemployment that can be attributed to immigration in 
both the US and the EU.  There is also a need to do further research to identify who the 
immigrants are and how to improve national immigration systems – issues which are 
barely in the embryonic stage in the EU.  Finally, there is also disagreement both on 
what knowledge is available and on what topics are most important to address.  This 
paucity in knowledge makes it crucial that states consider both the context and accuracy 
of aggregate data, especially when seeking to formulate policy responses to changing 
demographic realities. 
A parallel set of issues is also demanding attention.  On either side of the Atlantic, there 
is a clear need to broaden the methodological approaches used to produce knowledge 
about immigrants in the labor market. In terms of the methodologies used to collect and 
analyze large immigration data sets, the most frequently used techniques – such as 
cross sectional, longitudinal, and synthetic cohort analyses – are useful, but limited.  
Too often they produce rather “sterile” outcomes that provide little insight into the 
processes that matter most to policy. By stretching our analytical imagination to use 
additional techniques, such as iterative case studies, theoretical case studies, 
ethnographic research, and, of particular relevance to labor market research, 
sectoral/industry research and surveys, we can create truly useful and dynamic 
composites of immigrant populations and their behavior. 
 
The Elements of Successful Immigrant Integration 
A number of factors contribute to the success of immigrant incorporation.  These 
include the following:  
a. Education.  The returns to education, skills, and experience vary by type and 
place in which they were obtained.  More information about skills and education 
transferability could help governments develop policies that help immigrants use 
their human capital to the fullest. 
b. Language Skills.  While the need for skills in the native language of the host 
country varies by one’s placement in the labor market, a location’s immigrant 
density, the presence of an enclave economy, and the host country’s interest in the 
economic integration and advancement of immigrants, there is no doubt that 
language skills are key predictors of long-term labor market and socio-economic 
incorporation. 
c. Host Country Reference Point.  The identification of what labor market and 
social integration are expected to achieve is important for program design and 
evaluation. 
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d. National Circumstances.  The political, economic, and social milieu in each 
country can affect the direction and depth of integration. 
e. Age at Arrival.  The age of the immigrant and length of time in the new culture 
typically affect both the speed and depth of integration. 
f. Household Composition. The number of household wage earners affects the 
integration process in very significant ways. 
g. The Entry Class and Legal Status of the Immigrant.  The way an immigrant is 
admitted—selected, really, either by design or de facto policy—is an element that 
affects immigrant integration in important, if complicated, ways. Legal status—
legal or unauthorized, temporary or permanent—has a more obvious and direct, if 
poorly examined, effect on integration.  
h. Immigration and Citizenship Policies.  The ability for the immigrant to obtain 
citizenship can affect the integration process deeply. The paper by Rainer Münz 
shows that in the EU, as has been long recognized in the US, naturalized citizens 
have greater levels of economic success and score higher on other commonly used 
integration measures than do other immigrants. However, Münz also points out 
that this result does not hold true for all national origin groups (immigrants from 
rich countries are one major exception).  Therefore, the observation must be 
accompanied by the caveat that citizenship status also serves as a proxy for 
factors such as language, education, economic status, and length of time in the 
country. 
i. Country of Origin and Networks.  While cultural and political circumstances 
associated with the country of origin can affect both the immigrant’s departure 
and the networks they build in the host country, researchers must be careful to 
avoid the fallacy of attributing the characteristics of the aggregate to the 
individual – and vice versa.  
 
The Challenge of Designing and Implementing Effective 
Immigration and Integration Policy 
Several participants called for more attention to the structure of policy-making on 
migration-related issues, calling especially for greater “horizontal” coordination on 
policy matters. Immigration and integration are influenced by a host of policy-making 
bodies, cutting across all levels of government and several policy portfolios.  
Policymakers must also consider the levels of government (local, regional, national, 
and international) where policy can be most effective, in addition to making policy 
decisions that bring migration discussions into the policy making and governance 
mainstream.  (The importance of local government is deeply under-recognized on both 
sides of the Atlantic.) Finally, the feedback loop between research and policy formation 
must be understood better and made ever more efficient if institutional divisions are to 
be bridged and policies are to be informed more systematically by sound data and 
research.  
Beyond these “structural” issues of policy formation, there are also several additional 
specific elements that are critical to making better immigration and immigration-
integration policy. 
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 Governments must use selection mechanisms that consciously balance the three 
main streams of immigrant admissions – those intended to accomplish economic 
goals, allow family reunification, and meet humanitarian obligations and needs– 
while building robust coalitions in support of immigration and immigrant 
integration. 
 Policymakers must make strategic investments of both financial and political 
capital in all aspects of migration policy, whether with regard to admissions, 
integration, program delivery image, or data collection and analysis. Such 
investment can make the difference between migrants being (or being perceived as 
being) net users of public goods or they’re being (and being recognized as) net 
contributors to the commonwealth. In particular, investments in the recognition of 
skills and qualifications, and in fighting discrimination, can help maximize the 
benefits from the human capital immigrants possess. 
 The importance of local government and private sector partners in forming and 
executing good immigrant integration (and even immigration) policy cannot be 
emphasized enough.  The local level is where integration happens, and the degree 
to which major public and private institutions, the NGO sector, and stakeholders of 
all types “buy into” immigrant integration is a critical factor in societies succeeding 
with immigration. Thus, the government has an important role to play in building 
coalitions, spreading better knowledge and information, and in otherwise 
facilitating efforts that extend beyond its exclusive reach. 
 One of the less tangible factors that affect the integration and economic success of 
immigrants is that of political climate. The importance of the government’s “body 
language” toward immigration and immigrants has not been sufficiently explored 
in this seminar or more generally in the research literature. Overall social and 
political attitudes toward immigrants help determine to what extent immigrants 
seek out services and opportunities.  Furthermore, setting social as well as legal 
standards for the appropriate treatment of immigrants by employers help shape 
whether native workers view immigrants as competitors or allies, and create the 
backdrop for good and mature social interactions. In part, policy shapes this 
societal “body language”: many of the factors cited as having an as yet often 
unquantifiable effect on integration, such as access to citizenship or thoughtful 
admission policies and regulation, are implicated in this, as are the existence and 
enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation and access to social support systems. 
Beyond concrete policies, the effect of how politicians and opinion-shapers speak 
of immigrants and integration must also be better recognized as a crucial piece of 
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Immigration is at once the history and the destiny of the United States. Every new 
immigration wave revives the perennial questions: How well do immigrants fare once 
in the United States? Do they attain economic self-sufficiency? How do the “new” 
immigrants fare in comparison with the “old”? How are immigrants doing over time? 
There are few simple answers to these questions, even when there is agreement on what 
constitutes success, because available data are often incomplete; and because measures 
of success continue to expand beyond yesterday’s concern with simple wage parity to 
the achievement of higher education and homeownership, as well as to movement out 
of poverty and welfare. So too the magnitude and composition of immigration has been 
continually changing over time, as has the community context in which integration 
plays itself out. 
Over the decades, different theories, concepts, and terms have been used to explain the 
American immigrant experience, including: (1) assimilation theory, (2) ethnic-
disadvantage perspective and the (3) segmented assimilation model. Regardless of the 
theoretical starting point; however, limitations to the full understanding of immigrant 
integration in the United States stem from the type of data used to examine immigrant 
integration outcomes.  With few exceptions, most quantitative research on immigrant 
integration in the United States has been based on the U.S. Census data. The Census 
data, however, are by no means longitudinal in nature. Researchers have been 
discussing the need for longitudinal data to study immigrant integration for a long time. 
For example, Appleyard brought up the topic of longitudinal research on immigrant 
integration as early as 1964, and later in 1972. Research conducted using a longitudinal 
and multivariate approach will provide very useful insights into the integration process 
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in order to inform both immigration and integration policies. A panel of experts 
concludes that “To learn whether immigrants indeed integrate economically, ‘we must 
follow individual immigrants or groups of immigrants over their careers and compare 
their outcomes with those of comparable native-born workers as their careers progress.”  
While foreign-born men earned as much as natives in the 1970 Census, a wage gap 
opened up during the 1970s and has persisted. “Currently, immigrant men’s hourly 
wages are about 20 percent lower than natives’, while immigrant women’s wages are 
about 10 percent lower.” This finding is not surprising given the differences in levels of 
education between the foreign- and the native-born and considering the importance of 
education in the U.S. wage structure. There is a considerable body of literature on the 
question whether the earning gap between immigrants and natives narrows with time. 
Limited evidence from true longitudinal data indicate that immigrant earnings increase 
with time in the U.S., though the gains (about 10-15 percent during the first 20 years in 
the country) are not enough to offset the 35-40 percent immigrant-native earning gap at 
arrival. Cross-sectional data also suggest that wage convergence over time varies 
greatly among different groups of immigrants. For example, Mexican immigrants, 
“who have very high initial wage gaps with native-born workers, experience no wage 
convergence with natives during their time in the United States. In contrast, immigrant 
groups from Europe and Asia experienced significant wage convergence with native 
workers.” 
Patterns of labor force participation and employment can be explained by a variety of 
factors, including the demographics of the immigrant population (including gender and 
age); background characteristics; household size and composition; public assistance 
policies and practices; the general economy; and especially their length of time in the 
United States. There is evidence that immigrants who migrated as children and/or were 
educated in the United States have labor force experiences that resemble those of 
natives. The same is not necessarily true about immigrants who migrated as adults. 
Comparing the migration experiences, including economic integration, of women and 
men, researchers have found that as difficult as the immigration experience was, it was 
often far more positive for women than for men. Immigration to the U.S allowed 
women to break with traditional roles and patterns of dependence and assert a 
newfound freedom. Research indicates that the education and language differences 
between immigrants and natives, rather than discrimination, tend to explain the 
differential in wages between the foreign- and native-born. In other words, once 
adjustments are made for the characteristics immigrants bring with them, there is little 
difference in economic performance.  
English language proficiency plays a key role in labor market success; however, 
immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries report lower levels of English proficiency 
on arrival than immigrants from other non-English language countries. Despite the 
importance of housing, some U.S. populations find it more difficult than others to 
obtain good housing, have lower homeownership rates, and live in poorer and more 
crowded housing. The growing research on homeownership among Hispanics suggests 
that housing conditions of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban-origin groups in the U.S. 
are inferior to those for comparable Anglos. A study conducted by Meyers and Lee is 
longitudinal and takes into consideration the effects of income, education, English 
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proficiency, and marital status on the likelihood of an immigrant purchasing a home. 
Their findings indicate that marital status is the strongest determinant of 
homeownership; married men had odds of homeownership that were 2.8 to 3.9 times 
greater than the odds of never-married men. Household income had a predictably large 
effect on homeownership attainment, as did educational attainment. These results are 
similar to research using cross sectional data. 
Today’s new immigrants continue to experience economic integration into the U.S. 
labor market. Unlike the other major immigration countries (Canada and Australia), the 
United States has no explicit immigrant integration policies or programs supported by 
government, with the exception of a limited number of programs for refugees. Almost 
all immigrants to the United States are sponsored by family members or employers who 
take a principal role in ensuring their adaptation to the new country. Their work is  
facilitated by a flexible labour market that makes it relatively easy for immigrants to 
find employment. However, immigrants with low levels of education continue to fall 
into the category of the ‘working poor,’ with earnings that fail to bring them to parity 
with most natives. Access to educational opportunities is hence key to long-term 
economic integration. 
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Elżbieta M. Goździak and Susan F. Martin 
Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) 
Georgetown University 
 
Immigration is at once the history and the destiny of the United States. As a 
consequence, immigration scholarship and immigration policy are part and parcel of the 
academic and public debate. Every new immigration wave revives the perennial 
questions: How well do immigrants fare once in the United States?  Do they attain 
economic self-sufficiency? How do the “new” immigrants fare in comparison with the 
“old”? How are immigrants doing over time? There are few simple answers to these 
questions, even when there is agreement on what constitutes success, because available 
data are often incomplete; and because measures of success continue to expand beyond 
yesterday’s concern with simple wage parity to the achievement of higher education 
and homeownership, as well as to movement out of poverty and welfare. So too the 
magnitude and composition of immigration has been continually changing over time, as 
has the community context in which integration plays itself out. 
The latter 1960s marked the start of a “fourth” wave of immigration to the United 
States that has grown ever since and that reached historic proportions in the 1990s. 
Approximately one million people per year were part of that decade’s migration flow: 
nearly two-and-a-half times the number two decades earlier. In 2002, 12.5 percent of 
the U.S. population or 32.5 million persons were foreign-born (Schmidley 2003). 
Today the majority of the foreign born (52.5 percent) is from Latin America. The 
majority of the Latin American foreign-born comes from Central America and Mexico. 
In fact, Central Americans and Mexicans account for more than two-thirds of the 
foreign-born from Latin America. The remaining foreign-born populations are from 
Asia (25.5 percent), Europe (14.0 percent), and various other regions (8.3 percent). 
Mexico is the largest migrant source country (30 percent of all immigrants), followed 
by the Philippines (4 percent), India (3 percent), Vietnam (3 percent), Korea (3 
percent), El Salvador (3 percent), and Germany (2 percent). 
Legal permanent immigration was the most significant component for the migration 
flow and averaged 966,536 immigrants annually (Papademetriou and Ray 2004). Never 
a large part of the overall flow of migrants to the United States, refugees and asylum 
seekers nevertheless constitute another component of the permanent migration flow to 
this country. The number of refugees and persons granted asylum has been declining in 
the past decade from a high of 109,593 in 1994 declining to 68,925 in 2001 and 
continuing to decline in the aftermath of 9/11.  The 1990s also saw an increase of 
illegal migrants in the U.S.  Estimates for 2000 range from 6.9 million (INS 2003) to 
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8.5 million (Fix and Passel 2001) undocumented migrants living in the United States, 
and it is estimated that up to 5 million of these people came during the 1990s.1 
In a break from prior decades, many immigrants journeyed to new destinations. 
Immigrants still remain highly concentrated: 70 percent of immigrants in 2000 lived in 
just six states: California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. Over 
one-fourth of all immigrants lived in California alone.  Yet the growth rate of 
immigrants in these six states has slowed considerably, from 60 percent in 1970s to 
only 28 percent in the 1990s.  While many immigrants still settled in traditional 
gateway cities—such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago-- significant numbers of 
immigrants moved to localities that have seen few foreign-born since the late 19th 
century. These “new settlement” destinations form a belt stretching from the southeast 
in Georgia and North Carolina, then across the Great Plains to Nevada in the west, and 
Minnesota in the north. As noted by William Frey, a leading demographer of the 
geography of immigration, “some minorities are migrating to parts of the country where 
most residents have never heard Spanish or Chinese being spoken” (Frey 1998).  And 
in another break from tradition, immigrants are moving to suburbs, smaller 
metropolitan areas, and rural towns.  
Integration is an extraordinarily complex process that is conditioned by such changes—
compare today’s concerns about growing populations of immigrants in small, rural 
communities with yesterday’s focus on immigrants concentrated in inner-city 
enclaves—and it is shaped by factors including immigrants’ human and social capital; 
and the characteristics of sending and receiving communities. Answers to the questions 
about immigrants’ success are further complicated because they often depend on the 
theoretical framework used to study immigrant integration and “the various kinds of 
factors [those theories] postulate as influencing economic and socio-cultural mobility” 
(Bean and Stevens 2003: 96).  
The New Immigrants and Integration Theories 
Over the decades, different theories, concepts, and terms have been used to explain the 
American immigrant experience, including: 
(1) assimilation theory, represented in the early work of Robert Park (1926), William 
Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1927), Oscar Handiln (1951), Irving Child (1943), 
Milton Gordon (1964), and more contemporary writings of Herbert Gans (1979, 1988) 
and Richard Alba and Victor Nee (1997, 2003);  
(2) ethnic-disadvantage perspective, found in the texts of Andrew Greeley (1971), 
Gerald Suttles (1968), Nathan Glazier and Daniel Moynihan (1963), Alejandro Portes 
and Robert Bach (1985), Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou (1993), and Alejandro Portes 
and Rubén Rumbaut (2001); and the 
(3) segmented assimilation model promoted by Portes, Rumbaut, and Zhou (Portes and 
Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou 1999), to name a few.  
                                                 
1 We do not explicitly include temporary or “non-immigrant” admissions in our discussion, but they are 
part of the flow as a significant percentage of new permanent immigrants have prior experience as legal 
temporary workers or students (and even as unauthorized persons; see Massey and Malone, 2002).  
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A comprehensive analysis of the different integration theories is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  It is, however, important to stress that recent literature on the immigrant 
experience in America calls for revision of our ideas about immigrant integration if 
they are to fit the experiences of many of the new immigrant groups (Bean and Stevens 
2003).   
The early narratives of immigrant assimilation were based on three assumptions: that a 
“clean break” from the country of origin was needed before the process of 
Americanization could begin; that immigrants would eventually join the mainstream 
dominated by a homogeneous middle-class society of European ancestry; and that this 
transition was inherently good for the immigrants. The basic theme in the assimilation 
and acculturation theories often appeared to be that immigration sets in motion a 
process of change that is “directional, indeed unilinear, nonreversible, and continuous” 
(Suarez-Orozco 2000: 1).  In addition, the earlier theories tended to assume that socio-
cultural assimilation preceded or occurred simultaneously with economic assimilation, 
and in some circumstances acted as a prerequisite for economic integration (Gordon 
1964). 
Recent research implies that socio-cultural assimilation is becoming less likely to 
represent a prerequisite for economic assimilation.  Indeed, research suggests that 
increased English language acquisition and familiarity with the culture and customs of 
the host society do not necessarily lead to increased structural assimilation. 
Discrimination and structural and institutional barriers to equal access to employment 
opportunities constitute obstacles to complete assimilation (Bean and Stevens 2003).  
Furthermore, economic assimilation may sometimes affect socio-cultural assimilation, 
indicating the dynamic interplay between the two (Alba and Nee 2003; Gans 1999a, 
1999b).  
In the case of the new immigrants, the question of racial and ethnic identity—one of the 
key measures of socio-cultural integration—often seems to be shaped by immigrants’ 
experiences with economic integration rather than the other way around (Bean and 
Stevens 2003). Some immigrants seem to “rediscover” their ethnicity after they achieve 
economic success, while others maintain a strong ethnic identity as a strategy for 
maximizing economic incorporation (Zhou and Bankston 1998; Waters 1999).  
The inadequacy of the assimilation or ethnic-disadvantage perspective is exemplified 
by the growing importance of the Mexican-origin population in the United States and 
points out the different types of data used to analyze economic integration of immigrant 
groups.  Despite the diversity of the Mexican-origin groups, their experiences are often 
viewed as if they resembled those of either European immigrants (the assimilation 
perspective) or African Americans (the ethnic-disadvantage perspective). 
Consequently, scholars representing these two frameworks organize their data 
differently to explain the economic integration of Mexicans in the United States.   
As Bean and Stevens (2003) point out, researchers looking at the economic integration 
of Mexican-origin populations through the ethnic-disadvantage lens use data on income 
and jobs for the entire national-origin group, irrespective of nativity status. On the other 
hand, analysts who “treat Mexican-origin persons as members of an immigrant group 
tend to distinguish the foreign-born from the native-born on the grounds that the 
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experience of Mexican-origin persons varies so much by nativity that data on this group 
must be disaggregated” (Bean and Stevens 2003: 102). Instead of arguing that 
discrimination shapes immigrants’ experiences in the labor market, they posit that 
immigrant wages and employment are affected by English-language proficiency, 
human capital variables, and work experience in the U.S. 
The proponents of the segmented assimilation perspective argue that some national-
origin groups are more vulnerable than others to the kind of outcomes experienced by 
disadvantaged blacks. In order to assess economic progress among immigrant groups, 
there is a need to desegregate racial and ethnic groups by nativity.  In addition, 
comprehensive understanding of immigrant integration needs to account for the fact 
that while certain immigrant groups may be making progress toward economic 
integration, they may at the same time be moving in the opposite direction in regard to 
certain socio-cultural factors.  
Data Limitations and Integration Research 
Limitations to the full understanding of immigrant integration in the United States stem 
from the type of data used to examine immigrant integration outcomes.  We have 
already alluded to the difficulty in presenting an adequate portrait of immigrant 
integration when studies combine data on foreign-born and native-born populations. 
Bean and Stevens assert that this strategy is “likely to yield misleading assessments of 
the economic achievements of many members of immigrant groups, especially 
Mexican-origin persons” (Bean and Stevens 2003: 103; see also Bean, Berg, and Van 
Hook 1996; Trejo 1996, 1997). 
Researchers have been discussing the need for longitudinal data to study immigrant 
integration for a long time. For example, Appleyard (1964 and 1972) brought up the 
topic of longitudinal research on immigrant integration as early as 1964, and later in 
1972. Goldlust and Richmond (1974) concurred, but went further to argue for a 
multivariate approach that “recognizes that human behavior is the complex outcome of 
many different determinants” (Goldhust and Richmond 1974:194) and provides “a 
more realistic and sophisticated basis of explanation for any aspect of human behavior, 
and for immigrant adaptation particularly, than one which considers the effect of only 
one variable at a time, or which endeavors to reduce all aspects of the immigrant 
experience to a single dimension of ‘assimilation’” (Goldhust and Richmond 
1974:195). 
In other words, research conducted using a longitudinal and multivariate approach will 
provide very useful insights into the integration process in order to inform both 
immigration and integration policies. To learn whether immigrants indeed integrate 
economically, “we must follow individual immigrants or groups of immigrants over 
their careers and compare their outcomes with those of comparable native-born workers 
as their careers progress” (NRC 1997: 197).  
With few exceptions, most quantitative research on immigrant integration in the United 
States has been based on the U.S. Census data.  The Census data, however, are by no 
means longitudinal in nature.  The U.S. Census Bureau does not collect longitudinal 
data on immigrants (i.e., does not follow the same group of immigrants over a period of 
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time and collect data on integration outcomes), rather it takes a snap shot of different 
immigrant groups at certain intervals and paints a statistical picture of immigrants 
arriving at different times and draws conclusions about how immigrants fare in the 
United States. Because the “limitations of existing data prevent any truly longitudinal 
analysis” (Alba and Nee 2003: 237), the debate on the rate of economic integration has 
been largely inconclusive.  
Immigrant Economic Integration 
Economic integration is not the only benchmark of success, but it is a core measure of 
equity and opportunity that characterizes immigrant success.  Without jobs, immigrants 
place a burden on governments and on their own communities. Without equitable pay, 
immigrants foster undesirable sub-economies. Economic self-sufficiency—measured 
by labor force participation and employment rates, earnings and income levels, and use 
of public assistance—affects not only the newcomers, but also the impact of 
immigrants on the U.S. labor market and on mainstream programs, and ultimately the 
perception of the host society as to the costs and benefits of newcomers.   
Most immigrants in the United States find jobs.  In 2002, the foreign-born had only a 
slightly higher unemployment rate than the native population, 6.9 and 6.1 percent, 
respectively (Schmidley 2003). However, many immigrants have low earnings, making 
poverty an issue. According to U.S. Census, slightly more than 30 percent of foreign-
born full-time, year-round workers earned less than $20,000 in 2001.  In contrast, only 
17.4 percent of native workers earned less than $20,000. The earnings of the foreign-
born differed by nativity; 47.4 percent of those earning less than $20,000 were from 
Central America, 14.9 percent from Europe, and 17.9 percent from Asia. In 2001, 16.1 
percent of the foreign-born were living below poverty level, compared with 11.1 
percent of natives. Foreign-born non-citizens were twice as likely to be poor (19.7 
percent) as foreign-born naturalized citizens (9.9 percent) whose poverty rate was 
similar to that of the native population (11.1 percent). 
Types of Employment 
There is a broad array of available jobs in the United States, but which jobs immigrants 
secure depends heavily on their education and transferable skills. Immigrants, relative 
to natives, are overrepresented at both ends of the educational spectrum and as a result 
this concentration is reflected in the jobs they hold (NRC 1997; Card 2004).  
Immigrants are disproportionately included in some very low-education, low skilled, 
and low-paying jobs and some very high-education, high-skilled, and high-paying 
occupations.  
Compared with natives, immigrant men are found in some occupations requiring high 
levels of education (foreign-language college teachers and medical scientists) as well as 
in some occupations requiring little formal schooling (tailors, waiters’ and waitresses’ 
assistants, housekeepers, and butlers).  The picture is very similar for immigrant 
women, who are disproportionately employed in some high-education occupations 
(foreign-language teachers and physicians), but they also make a large share of 
employment that requires very little formal schooling (tailors, gardeners, sorters of 
agricultural products, and domestic service). 
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Immigrants are also overwhelmingly concentrated in some industrial sectors. Latinos, 
for example, have historically been concentrated in agriculture, organized labor, the 
garment industry, domestic service, and ethnic enterprise.  Gouvereis and Stull’s (1995) 
analysis of the changes in the meatpacking industry has shown that the industry has 
consistently relied on immigrant workers: from Eastern Europeans, to Mexicans, and 
more recently on Central Americans, and that this shift accompanied a complete 
reorganization of the industry, including greater mechanization of the labor process, a 
decline in unionization, and lower wages for employees. 
Research conducted by the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University 
revealed that an above average share of jobs held by immigrants who arrived in the 
U.S. in the 1990s were private sector, wage and salary positions, with new immigrants 
under-represented in government jobs and among self-employed (Suim et.al 2003). 
Similar findings apply to more recent immigrants. Ninety two percent of employed 
immigrants in 2003 held wage and salary jobs in the non-farm sector, with nearly seven 
out of eight new immigrants working in the private sector in wage and salary positions.  
Of course, not all of these jobs will appear on payrolls reported to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics since a relatively high proportion of immigrant workers are employed as 
contract workers or work in the informal labor market, often paid in cash on a daily 
basis (Suim et al. 2003). 
The occupational distribution of the foreign-born population differs by State. The 
foreign born in new settlement States are substantially more likely to work in primary 
industries and non-durable manufacturing than are immigrants in traditional destination 
States. Construction is also a greater employer for the foreign-born in new settlement 
States, many of which are high growth areas.  In contrast, the foreign-born in new 
settlement States are much less likely to work in professional industries, especially as 
compared to immigrants in more traditional receiving areas (Bump et al. forthcoming). 
Wages and Income 
While foreign-born men earned as much as natives in the 1970 Census, a wage gap 
opened up during the 1970s and has persisted.  ‘Currently, immigrant men’s hourly 
wages are about 20 percent lower than natives’, while immigrant women’s wages are 
about 10 percent lower’ (Card 2004:17).  This finding is not surprising given the 
differences in levels of education between the foreign- and the native-born and 
considering the importance of education in the U.S. wage structure.  
There is a considerable body of literature (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985, 1995) on the 
question whether the earning gap between immigrants and natives narrows with time. 
Limited evidence from true longitudinal data (Lubotsky 2000) indicates that immigrant 
earnings increase with time in the U.S., though the gains (about 10-15 percent during 
the first 20 years in the country) are not enough to offset the 35-40 percent immigrant-
native earning gap at arrival. Cross-sectional data also suggest that wage convergence 
over time varies greatly among different groups of immigrants.  For example, Mexican 
immigrants, “who have very high initial wage gaps with native-born workers; 
experience no wage convergence with natives during their time in the United States. In 
contrast, immigrant groups from Europe and Asia experienced significant wage 
convergence with native workers” (NRC 1997: 202). 
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As David Card predicts, “while the precise magnitude of immigrant earning 
assimilation will probably be debated for many years (see Duleep and Regets 2002 for 
a recent analysis) it seems safe to conclude that the large fraction of immigrants who 
arrive in the U.S. as adults with very low levels of schooling will never earn as much as 
average natives” Card (2004: 18).   However, after controlling for education, which 
explains about 11 percent of the gap in immigrants’ earnings for men and women, the 
gaps are under 10 percent, which is comparable with wages of blacks and native 
Hispanics (Card 2004: 20). 
The income of foreign-born households also tends to be lower than that of native-born 
households (Schmidley 2001). There are variations by nationality, however. 
Households headed by a foreign born Asian have higher incomes than natives, whereas 
those headed by foreign born Central Americans and Mexicans have far lower incomes.  
The lower household income tends to translate into higher rates of poverty. 
While some immigrants are clearly economically disadvantaged, for reasons to be 
discussed below, a more important question is how well the U.S.-born children of 
immigrants are doing. Card’s research shows that “the children of immigrants are doing 
well, on average, with most of their wage advantage relative to natives attributable to 
higher education. Despite the lower education of their parents, children born to 
immigrant parents seem to catch up and even surpass the levels of children born to U.S. 
natives” (Card 2004: 20).  
Factors Influencing Economic Integration 
Patterns of labor force participation and employment can be explained by a variety of 
factors, including the demographics of the immigrant population (including gender and 
age); background characteristics; household size and composition; public assistance 
policies and practices; the general economy; and especially their length of time in the 
United States. 
Demographic Characteristics 
Labor force participation varies by age. New immigrants in the United States have 
always been disproportionately young adults, a pattern that continues to hold (NRC 
1997). In 2002, 44.7 percent of the foreign-born were between 25 and 44 years of age, 
whereas only 27.4 percent of the native population was within this age category.  The 
concentration of immigrants among young working adults has fundamental 
implications for economic integration.  Immigrants are more likely to be workers, and 
they make fewer demands on social programs geared towards the elderly.  Current 
immigrants are more likely than natives to be paying into the Social Security system 
and less likely to be receiving public benefits (NCR 1997).  
There is evidence that immigrants who migrated as children and/or were educated in 
the United States have labor force experiences that resemble those of natives.  The 
same is not necessarily true about immigrants who migrated as adults. Studies that 
controlled for age-at-arrival found that earning trajectories of earlier and more recent 
immigrants are somewhat similar. For example, Friedberg (1992) found that once age-
at-arrival is taken into consideration there is no evidence of a decline in the earning 
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trajectories of immigrants from Mexico or East Asia, but there is some evidence of 
decreasing earnings among other Hispanic and European cohorts. 
Because most studies focused on labor migration, for the longest time the implicit 
model of an immigrant was that of a male pauper. “Yet, in every year since 1930, 
women consistently outnumbered men among migrants to the United states, with the 
exception of the few years following the passage of IRCA (Immigration Reform and 
Control Act) in 1986 that granted amnesty to illegal immigrants, among whom, given 
the risks, men predominate” (Pedraza 2000: 714). Studies that focused on women, 
quickly pointed out differences in labor force experience of immigrant women and 
men.  
Immigrant women, for instance, enter a much narrower range of occupations, salient 
among which are the garment industry and domestic service.  The literature observes a 
long historical trend of immigrant women working in the garment industry. However, 
as Silvia Pedraza (2000) observes, the apparent similarities of the labor force 
experiences of Jewish and Italian women working in the garment industry in New York 
at the turn of the 19th and the experiences of women newly arrived from Latin America 
and Asia mask profound differences.   
Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and Anna Garcia (1991) compared Mexican and Cuban 
immigrant women working in the garment industry in Los Angeles and Miami, 
respectively, and discovered that two very different social processes were at stake. It is 
well known that Mexican immigration to the United States has been a migration of 
unskilled or semiskilled labor, while Cuban migration was the migration of skilled 
political refugees. Thus, the Mexican women worked in the garment industry as a result 
of their husbands’ inadequate earnings or because they lost their husbands due to death 
or abandonment. On the other hand, the Cuban women’s labor experience in the 
garment industry was transitory; they worked to help their husbands to open businesses 
and recover the family’s middle-class level of living. 
Studies such as Grassmuck and Pessar’s (1991) analysis of Dominican migration to 
New York City demonstrated that gender is central to the decision making process:  
whether a family will migrate, who in the family will migrate, what resources will be 
allocated to the migration, what remittances or household members will be expected to 
return, and whether the migration will be temporary or permanent. Women were very 
reluctant to return.  They struggled to retain the gains that migration and wage 
employment brought them.  Men, on the other hand, were eager to return.  Men lived 
very frugally and tried to accumulate savings, while women were buying large items 
such as refrigerators and sofas that would ground their families in New York. They 
realized that returning would mean retirement from paid labor and loss of freedoms.  As 
a result, tensions developed over finances and the question of return revolved around 
traditional gender roles.  
Comparing the migration experiences, including economic integration, of women and 
men, researchers have found that as difficult as the immigration experience was, it was 
often far more positive for women than for men.  Immigration to the U.S allowed 
women to break with traditional roles and patterns of dependence and assert a 
newfound freedom.  
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Length of Time in the United States  
The proportion of immigrants in the labor force and employed differs markedly by 
length of time in the United States. As discussed above, much of the data on economic 
integration is cross-sectional, not longitudinal, making it difficult to determine if the 
variation reflects differences in immigration cohorts or time in country itself. However, 
Census data indicate that: “The median earnings of foreign born male workers in 1999 
were $21,600 for those living in the United States less than 10 years and $35,778 for 
those living in the United States 20 years or more. The corresponding figures for 
foreign-born female workers were $17,330 and $27,221 (Schmidley 2001).” Similarly, 
“Among foreign-born households, median income in 1999 ranged from $40,178 when 
the householder’s length of residence in the United States was 20 years or more to 
$30,604 when the householder’s length of residence was less than 10 years (Schmidley 
2001).”  
Background Characteristics  
An immigrant’s experiences prior to entering the United States have a profound effect 
on later economic and social integration.  Education in the immigrants’ countries of 
origin is among the most important predictors of labor force participation, after 
controlling for all other factors (e.g. usage proficiency, age, gender, and length of time 
in the United States (Forbes 1985).  
Education. According to the 2000 Census, two out of three of the foreign-born have 
graduated from high school. However, those aged 25 and over were less likely to have 
graduated from high school than natives of the same ages, 67.2 percent and 86.9 
percent, respectively.  Naturalized citizens were more likely to have a high school 
diploma than non-citizens, 77.4 and 59.6 percent, respectively. More than one-fifth of 
the foreign-born had less than a ninth-grade education, compared to about one-
twentieth of the native-born population. Educational attainment of the foreign born 
varies according to the region of birth. Immigrants from Asia (86.8 percent), Europe 
(84 percent), and other regions including Canada, Australia and Africa (82 percent) had 
a much higher percentage of high school education than their counterparts from Latin 
America (49.1 percent).   
Evidence on the intergenerational progress of immigrant children is slowly becoming 
available and points to above average educational attainment. Conditional on their 
parents’ human capital, the U.S.-born children of the post-1965 immigrants have done 
exceptionally well. According to Card (2004), of the 39 largest country-of-origin 
groups, sons from 33 groups and daughters from 32 groups have higher average 
educational attainment than the children of natives. For example, sons of Mexican 
immigrants whose fathers had 5.5 years of schooling less than native-born fathers in 
1980—7.3 years versus 12.8 years for native fathers—ended up with 12.2 years of 
education, closing 80 percent of the education gap faced by their fathers (Card 2004: 
21) 
English Language.  English language ability affects long-term economic integration.  
Individuals with poor English language skills tend to be confined to the lowest levels of 
the U.S. job market. Research supports the thesis that English language proficiency 
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plays a key role in labor market success; however, research findings indicate that 
English-speaking ability affects some foreign-born groups more than others.  For 
example, English language proficiency increases the wages of Hispanics and Asians 
proportionately more than is true for the European-origin populations (DOL).  Reading 
comprehension has also been found to improve the earnings of young immigrant adults.  
Recent censuses have gathered information on English language proficiency for 
persons who reported speaking a foreign language at home.  In 2000, approximately 80 
percent of the 31 million foreign-born persons over the age of five reported speaking a 
foreign language at home. Furthermore, of persons who did not speak English at home, 
not quite half reported that they failed to speak English “very well”. Time in the United 
States sees an improvement, as the percent of immigrants who do not speak English 
“very well” is much higher for immigrants who have just arrived in the United States. 
Immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries report lower levels of English proficiency 
on arrival than immigrants from other non-English language countries. Studies also 
indicate that immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries are less likely to be highly 
proficient in English than immigrants from other non-English countries.  Bean and 
Stevens (2003) suggest that there are different explanations for this phenomenon. They 
speculate that perhaps Spanish-speaking immigrants have fewer opportunities to learn 
English; and perhaps lower levels of English fluency among Spanish-speaking 
immigrants reflect a higher proportion of unauthorized immigrants from Spanish-
speaking countries than from other non-English-speaking states. Illegal migrants may 
lack both the motivation to learn English, because they anticipate a short sojourn in the 
U.S., and resources (including appropriate documentation) to participate in English-
language training programs.  Growing numbers of Spanish-speaking immigrants, large 
numbers of native-born populations fluent in Spanish, as well as large geographic 
concentration of Spanish-speakers in California, the Southwest, Florida, and the 
Washington metropolitan area, to name a few, means that Spanish-speaking immigrants 
may not have as many incentives and as much pressure to learn English as other 
newcomers. 
Immigrants increase their skills in English over time.  In fact there is a lot of pressure 
and there are many incentives to improve one’s English language ability. Numerous 
researchers have investigated acquisition of English as a second or higher-order 
language among immigrants. The most important finding is that immigrants who have 
lived in the U.S. for longer periods of time have higher levels of English proficiency 
than those who resided in the U. S. for shorter periods of time (Carliner 2000; 
Espenshade and Fu 19 1997; Espinoza and Masey 1997; Jasso and Rozenzweig 1990; 
Stevens 1992). 
Research indicates that the education and language differences between immigrants and 
natives, rather than discrimination, tend to explain the differential in wages between the 
foreign- and native-born.  In other words, once adjustments are made for the 
characteristics immigrants bring with them, there is little difference in economic 
performance (Martin 1999). The National Research Panel (NRC) concluded: “The 
evidence… is not consistent with the hypothesis that widespread labor market 
discrimination results in substantially reduced wages for immigrant Hispanics and 
Asian groups” (Smith and Edmondson 1997) 
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Household size composition.  The foreign-born live in households larger than those of 
natives. In 2002, 25.5 percent of the households with a foreign-born householder 
included five or more people. In contrast, only 12.5 percent of family households with a 
native householder were that large. Large households may indicate more earning 
power, particularly if families adopt multiple wage-earner strategies, but they also 
require larger incomes to adequately support all of their members.  Prevalence of mix-
status families, where parents may be legal immigrants or unauthorized migrants and 
children are U.S.-born citizens, is another interesting characteristic of immigrant 
households 
Public Assistance 
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PREWORA) sharply curtailed non-citizens’ eligibility for welfare and other federal 
benefits.  In fact, “the immigration provisions of the law were intended to discourage 
immigration of those likely to use benefits, and to save money—half of the budget 
savings from PREWORA were attributable to the original immigration restrictions in 
the law” (Congressional Budget Office 1996: 27 in Tumlin and Zimmerman 2003). 
Numerous studies evaluated PREWORA’s immigrant restrictions (Borjas 2000; Capps 
et.al. 2002; Singer and Gilbertson 2000; Zimmerman and Tumlin 1999). Some research 
examined the impact of welfare reform on immigrants’ duration of welfare receipt, 
specifically the program for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF; 
Fremstad 2003). A recent report prepared by Karen Tumlin and Wendy Zimmerman of 
the Urban Institute “focuses on the experiences of immigrants and those who are 
Limited English Proficient (LEPs on TANF in three major U.S. cities: Houston, Los 
Angeles, and New York City). One-quarter of the country’s immigrants call these three 
cities home. Over half of the foreign-born population lives in Texas, California, and 
New York” (Tumlin and Zimmerman 2003:1). The report makes several key 
observations: 1) despite declining use of welfare nationally, immigrants and LEPs make 
up a significant proportion of welfare recipients; immigrants constitute about one-third 
of the TANF caseload in California and New York and nearly one-fifth in Texas; 2) 
immigrant TANF recipients are less likely to be working than natives and more likely 
to be working in occupations that provide limited opportunity to speak English, acquire 
new skills, and achieve economic self-sufficiency; and 3) proposed  TANF reforms 
increasing the number of required hours of work and limiting the types of activities that 
count as work will make it even more difficult for immigrants and LEPs to receive 
language and vocational training. 
Several national studies based on census data indicate that, except for refugees who are 
automatically eligible for Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance, working-age 
immigrants were less likely than natives of similar socio-economic backgrounds to 
receive public assistance even before the passage of PREWORA (Bean et. al. 1997; Fix 
and Passel 1994; Tienda and Jensen 1986; Trejo 1992).   
There are, however, significant differences in welfare usage among different age and 
national-origin groups. Recent studies reveal that Central American and Asian 
immigrants resort to public assistance at higher rates than other immigrant groups (Lee 
and Angel 2002). Additionally, older immigrants—regardless of their national origin—
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use Supplementary Security Income (SSI) at higher rates than native-born individuals 
(Bean et. al. 1997, Van Hook et. al. 1999).   
A close examination of citizenship status and national origin of SSI recipients reveals 
important differences that are lost when different nationalities are combined and when 
distinction between naturalized citizens and non-citizens is ignored. A comparative 
study by Lee and Angel (2002) that examined living arrangements and receipt of SSI 
among older adults in five Asian and three Hispanic-origin groups reveals some 
striking differences among groups in their propensity to receive SSI as a function of 
citizenship status.  
Among the three Hispanic groups, married naturalized citizens are no different than 
native-born individuals in their tendency to receive SSI once other factors are 
controlled.  On the other hand, married non-citizens in all three Hispanic groups are 
more likely to receive SSI than native-born.  Among the unmarried, Mexican 
Americans are less likely than native-born to receive SSI, regardless of their citizenship 
status. Non-citizen and naturalized Cubans, however, are more likely to receive SSI 
than native-born. 
Among the five Asian groups, there is a greater variety and in some cases an elevated 
probability of receiving SSI. Among married immigrants, Chinese, Filipino, and 
Korean elderly are more likely than native-born to be on SSI, regardless of citizenship. 
Among the unmarried, immigrants in all Asian groups except for the Vietnamese are 
more likely than the native-born to receive SSI. 
Homeownership 
Housing is an important source of social and economic well-being and homeownership 
is a significant measure of both current and long-term financial security and economic 
integration. Unlike labor force earnings, homeownership reflects the broader issue of 
immigrants’ improved standard of living and economic success:  “Unlike the personal 
wage rate, which is a transitory measure of labor value, homeownership reflects 
cumulative, life-long achievement and may be said to represent attainment of a middle-
class standard of living” (Myers and Lee 1998:619).   It is also an expression of 
investment.  
Despite the importance of housing, some U.S. populations find it more difficult than 
others to obtain good housing, have lower homeownership rates, and live in poorer and 
more crowded housing (Krivo 1995).  The growing research on homeownership among 
Hispanics suggests that housing conditions of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban-origin 
groups in the U.S. are inferior to those for comparable Anglos. Hispanics are less likely 
than Anglos to own homes (Hansen and James 1987; James, McCummings, and Tynan 
1985; Krivo 1986a) and live in smaller and poorer quality dwellings than non-Hispanic 
whites (Hansen and James 1987; James et. al. 1984; Moore and Pachon 1985). 
However, the conclusions regarding housing and homeownership among Hispanics are 
not very definitive. Analyses used to arrive at these conclusions often do not take into 
account variables that are unique to immigrant-origin populations and do not include 
features of the local housing market.  Studies that did take into account immigrant 
characteristics and local market attributes show that English-language ability, for 
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example, is a potent determinant of homeownership (Alba and Logan 1991, 1992; 
Logan et.al. 1996; Krivo 1995). Krivo’s research on Hispanic-Anglo housing inequality 
included an expanded set of immigrant characteristics (role of foreign birth, Spanish-
language use, and length of time in the U.S.) and local housing market attributes 
(housing quality, cost, and availability). The research demonstrates that “in all four 
large Hispanic populations [Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and “other Spanish”], 
native households live in housing that is almost as likely to be owned as among 
comparable Anglos, and is less crowded. Hispanics also pay less for housing than non-
Hispanic whites” (Krivo 1995: 612).  
Using data from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census, Dávila and colleagues (Dávila, 
Méndez and Mora 2003) investigated the effects of English-only legislation at the state 
level on housing acquisition among foreign-born Hispanics. Their research suggests 
that both limited-English-proficient (LEP) and English-fluent Hispanics who resided in 
states that passed English-only legislation were less likely to acquire a home during the 
1980s compared to their counterparts in other states. “A further analysis focusing on 
sub-cohorts defined by age and U.S.-tenure indicates that this finding was strongest 
among older and tenured LEP residents” (Dávila et. al. 2003: 57). 
In a recent study on immigrants and homeownership in urban America, Papademetriou 
and Ray (2004) used the 2000 Census 1-Percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 
and applied two basic models to the data set. The first model included both U.S. and 
foreign-born households and the probability of being a homeowner was treated as a 
function of a series of independent variables, including marital status, level of 
education, gender, number of children under the age of 18, linguistic isolation, and 
ethnicity/race by nativity. The second model included only immigrant households and 
examined the effects of a series of independent variables, including time of arrival and 
place of birth on homeownership levels.  
The first model indicates that being single lowers the odds of being a homeowner, as 
does being a woman. On the other hand, the older the household head and the higher 
his/her education, the greater are the odds of being a homeowner. Ethnicity/race by 
nativity was more influential than linguistic isolation in determining homeownership. 
With the exception of U.S.-born Asians, all ethnicity/race categories, whether born in 
the United States or abroad, were found to have lower odds of homeownership than 
U.S.-born whites. A striking finding in this analysis is the strong influence of location 
on homeownership. The odds of homeownership were at least two times greater in 
cities outside the traditional large immigrant gateways. 
The second model indicates that ethnicity/race affect homeownership among 
immigrants in much the same way as for the population as a whole. Black and Latino 
immigrants were found to have lower odds of homeownership relative to white 
immigrant heads of households, while the odds of Asians were on par with those of 
whites. Not surprisingly, length of time in the U.S. was a key variable in explaining 
homeownership differences.  
As indicated earlier, there is relatively little longitudinal research on immigrant 
integration, including homeownership. A study conducted by Meyers and Lee (1998) 
seems to be a rare exception.  Their research is longitudinal and takes into consideration 
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the effects of income, education, English proficiency, and marital status on the 
likelihood of an immigrant purchasing a home.  Their findings indicate that marital 
status is the strongest determinant of homeownership; married men had odds of 
homeownership that were 2.8 to 3.9 times greater than the odds of never-married men. 
Household income had a predictably large effect on homeownership attainment, as did 
educational attainment. However, the effects of educational attainment on 
homeownership differed by race and ethnicity. For Hispanics, educational attainment is 
less relevant in terms of propensity to buy homes; those with high school or college 
education were as likely to purchase a home as those without a high school diploma. 
However for Asians and whites, the possession of a college degree (versus just a high 
school diploma), substantially increased the likelihood of homeownership. On the other 
hand, the effect of English language ability on home buying was inconsistent, 
suggesting a nonlinear effect on integration. Whites and Hispanics with limited English 
proficiency were less likely to be homeowners.  The same, however, was not true about 
Asians.  
Myers and Lee have also investigated geographic distribution of homeownership 
among immigrant groups. They found that “immigrants in southern California 
demonstrate a remarkable degree of advancement into homeownership, an achievement 
that follows two different models.  Among Asians, and to a lesser extent whites, the 
new immigrants achieve remarkably high levels of homeownership soon after arrival, 
even exceeding that for native-born residents of the same age.  In contrast, among 
Hispanics, immigrants begin their U.S. housing careers with very low levels of 
homeownership, followed by rapid advancement sustained over two decades” (Myers 
and Lee 1998: 620).   
Conclusions 
Today’s new immigrants continue to experience economic integration into the U.S. 
labor market.  Unlike the other major immigration countries (Canada and Australia), 
the United States has no explicit immigrant integration policies or programs supported 
by government, with the exception of a limited number of programs for refugees. 
Rather, integration largely occurs within the civil and private spheres. Almost all 
immigrants to the United States are sponsored by family members or employers who 
take a principal role in ensuring their adaptation to the new country.  Their work is 
facilitated by a flexible labour market that makes it relatively easy for immigrants to 
find employment. Although many positions are low paid, upward mobility is possible 
and immigrants can own their own businesses. For more highly skilled immigrants, 
economic rewards can be particularly attractive. Given the high levels of employment, 
immigrants often tend to be characterised as hard-working individuals who contribute 
to the nation’s economy—a reputation that also eases the integration process. Certainly, 
immigrant integration is facilitated by the very history that makes the United States a 
nation of immigrants. 
Although the federal government tends not to provide direct support for immigrant 
integration programmes, integration is aided by several broad government policies. 
Perhaps most important is birthright citizenship. By definition, being a “foreigner” lasts 
for only one generation. The children of immigrants are automatically citizens if they 
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are born on US territory. This provision applies even to the children of unauthorized 
migrants. Also important are the policies that protect both citizens and immigrants from 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality and, in some cases, citizenship. 
There are even laws that protect persons from “immigration-related unfair employment 
practices.”  Should an employer refuse to hire a foreign-sounding or foreign-looking 
person because s/he fears the applicant is working illegally, or require an applicant to 
show additional or different documents to verify work authorisation, the employer may 
be penalised for inappropriate discriminatory practices. Further, the federal government 
provides funds to school systems to help them teach English to children with limited 
proficiency in the language. And, while there is a limited federal role, integration 
largely takes place at the local level; particularly via programs to help newcomers learn 
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Immigrant Labor Market Assimilation 
In the United States: 
A Critique of Census Data and  
Longitudinal Outcomes∗ 
 
B. Lindsay Lowell, Director of Policy Studies 






How well do immigrants assimilate to the U.S. job market? That is a question with a 
variety of technical caveats, which are the focus of this paper. Research still relies 
heavily on cross-sectional sampling of individuals such as the decennial U.S. Census. 
Much of today’s research looks beyond wages to labor force attachment, the incidence 
of poverty, the use of welfare, homeownership, and wealth differences. However, 
researchers often face certain basic problems inherent in cross-sectional data and even 
synthetic cohort analysis. Assimilation suggests that, even if immigrants start out with 
lower wages than natives, their earnings increase faster than those of natives. However, 
a substantial body of research finds that recent cohorts earn relatively less on arrival 
than did prior cohorts, so comparing cohorts in a cross-section does not tell us whether 
the new cohort will ever catch up with natives. Since cross-sectional samples compare 
these cohorts with different initial labor market experiences, they overstate the actual 
earnings growth, a problem that does not occur when using longitudinal data, which 
tracks actual outcomes for the same individuals.  
So longitudinal data are preferable, but one should also acknowledge that they are not a 
panacea: 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Shirley Smith and Robert Bednarzik for their comments on the initial draft of this 
paper.  I would also like to thank Mark Regets for a discussion of the technical merits of the assimilation 
literature.  All conclusions, of course, remain my own. 
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 Immigrant specific surveys offer a great advantage because they resolve problems 
in cross-section data and because they explore such important questions as 
pathways to migration and retrospective information; however,  
 Immigrant-specific longitudinal data often have limited sample size and include 
no comparative sample of natives; 
 Attrition rates are extremely high for reasons of emigration but also because of 
inability to track such a highly mobile population; and 
 Given what we know about the pace of assimilation, without as much as 20 years 
of information fundamental debates cannot be resolved. 
Longitudinal data may be the gold standard for understanding immigrant assimilation, 
but for the reasons mentioned above, longitudinal data will not effectively cancel out 
the use of cross-sectional samples or even well designed administrative data. Perhaps 
the single most important need for longitudinal data is to clarify the otherwise 
indeterminate results of cross-sectional surveys and resolve the endless rounds of 
statistical dueling by academics.  
To further complicate matters there is tremendous diversity in the rate of economic 
progress across cohorts. There is also tremendous diversity within cohorts due to the 
pathways of entry admission. Although these pathways are little studied, other than 
broad approximations of family versus skill/employment, they are crucial to informed 
policy making. And if there are shifts in the outcomes of different entry cohorts they 
can seriously confound prognostication for the very same reasons that make 
longitudinal data superior to cross-sectional data, yet even longitudinal data face 
serious problems if cohort outcomes change significantly.  
The diversity of pathways to admission is also confounded by the tremendous diversity 
in rates of economic progress across sending countries and education levels. Most 
Europeans enter the U.S. with skills and wages commensurate with natives, as do many 
Asians. Indeed, some researchers conclude that some origin groups do not experience 
classical wage assimilation precisely because they are comparable to natives and, 
therefore, experience no catch up. On the other hand, some Latino immigrants, many of 
whom enter on unauthorized pathways, enter with low wages and are unlikely ever to 
significantly close the gap with natives.  
So answers to the question of assimilation vary from the cheerily optimistic to the 
rather pessimistic, even when researchers are confronted with exactly the same results. 
Consider too that limited comparisons of cross-sectional and longitudinal data 
substantially agree and so embolden those who use synthetic cohort methods, which do 
more closely approximate longitudinal results. Yet, the most consistent findings of 
longitudinal datasets are that cross-sectional data, and even synthetic cohort approaches 
to some extent, very much overestimate the ultimate wage trajectories of the cohorts of 
immigrants from developing countries who have arrived in the U.S., Canada, and most 
European nations.  
Indeed, cross-sectional data can be overly optimistic by 50 to 90 percent in terms of 
actual outcomes. The accumulating research base that uses longitudinal data in the 
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United States largely tends to support that conclusion. In a very real way then, the 
longitudinal data reaffirm that: 
 Most immigrants do not and will not ever reach earnings parity with the average 
and otherwise similar native-born U.S. worker; although the magnitude of the gap 
is between 10 to 20 percent (with 10 percent being similar to white and native 
minority differentials). 
 However, immigrants do reach earnings parity with otherwise similar same ethnic 
group native-born workers after 10 to 16 years.  
Under the circumstances the fairest conclusion seems to be that most European and 
many Asian immigrants will approach the earnings of natives in the U.S. labor market 
during their working lives and before their retirement. Their children will, likewise, do 
rather well in pursuing higher education and will succeed, often better than natives. 
There is a range of success among Latinos, with Mexican immigrants showing the least 
evidence of labor market assimilation. However, even these Latino immigrants 
experience relatively rapid wage growth during their first 10 years in the United States, 
and their (second-generation) children are making advances beyond their parents. This 
is the stuff of upward mobility and sheds an optimistic light on an otherwise gloomy 
prognosis. Mobility generates hope and militates against the “racialization” of 
immigrants’ future. Even if it may take a couple of generations, upward mobility does 
appear possible and immigrants (and their children) do not appear to be stuck forever in 
the low-end jobs that they first take in the United States. 
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Immigrant Labor Market Assimilation 
In the United States: A Critique of Census Data  
and Longitudinal Outcomes 
 
B. Lindsay Lowell, Director of Policy Studies 
Institute For the Study of International Migration (ISIM) 
Georgetown University 
 
The concept of immigrant assimilation makes some uneasy with its connotation of the 
elimination of immigrant and native differences. However, when it comes to integration 
into the labor market, assimilation is precisely what we are interested in. In the labor 
market successful integration has everything to do with immigrants’ ability to achieve 
the same rate of employment and earnings as that of natives—that is to become 
statistically indistinguishable (or even better off). A significant gap in earnings reflects 
poorly on either admission or integration policy; and it will create significant 
challenges for immigrants and natives alike. Of the various benchmarks of integration 
that can be thought of, success in matching natives in the labor market is a fundamental 
test of opportunity. Mobility to better paying jobs is basic to immigrants’ ability to 
support their families and to be fully contributing members of their communities. 
How well do immigrants assimilate to the U.S. labor market? That is a question with a 
variety of technical caveats that are the focus of this paper. But there are also rather 
simple answers that can be summarized at the outset. Firstly, the complications in 
firmly establishing how well immigrants do in the U.S. labor market have to do with 
problems with existing data, especially attempts to predict future assimilation by 
analyzing cross-sectional samples that include immigrants who have been in the U.S. 
for varying lengths of time. The nature of those problems concerns us because they 
strongly influence our empirical estimation of whether or not immigrants are going to 
make it. Successive cohorts of new immigrants have begun their stay in the U.S. with 
ever less education and lower earnings relative to natives, while all the while the 
structure of the economy has changed and many previous immigrants are choosing to 
leave. These changes create statistical problems that are adequately addressed only 
using longitudinal data. And the longitudinal data, even while shedding light on 
surprising immigrant mobility, reaffirm that most European and many Asian 
immigrants will achieve a degree of labor market parity with natives, but most 
immigrants from Latin America will not be as successful.  
Table 1 demonstrates in an over-simplistic fashion why such a conclusion appears to be 
warranted; however, the balance of the paper makes clear why it would be hasty to 
jump to that conclusion. The table considers only workers in the prime working ages 
and their median hourly earnings. What is immediately apparent is that immigrants who 
have been in the country only 0-5 years earn much less than immigrants who have been 
in the country for 21 years. Recent immigrants also earn less than natives, be they 
natives of the same race/ethnicity or European or non-Latino white natives. At the same 
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time, long-term immigrants with 21 years or more of U.S. experience tend to earn more 
than natives of the same ethnicity, especially when workers with either high school or 
college education are considered. But Table 1 is a classic example of a “cross-
sectional” examination of the growth in immigrant wages with time in the United 
States. Each immigrant cohort, defined according to their period of entry into the U.S., 
has its own unique wage trajectory and it is difficult to presume that recently arrived 
immigrants will actually attain the same earnings relative to natives as have long-term 
immigrants. 
 
Yet, almost all studies on immigrant integration in the United States have relied on 
Census data and a substantial number still rely on simple cross-sectional analyses of 
immigrant wage trajectories. More sophisticated analyses attempt to track the same 
entry cohort by pooling decennial Census, but these too have some problems. Not only 
have these been one of the historic few sources of data that consistently include 
immigrant information, they also are one of the few sources of data that provide a 
sufficient sample size to study immigrants, particularly immigrants with a diverse set of 
characteristics. The existing longitudinal U.S. datasets all too often do not include 
enough critical immigration variables, much less the sample size, to conduct useful 
analyses. This should not be surprising since most large scale U.S longitudinal datasets 
were conceived of primarily to study U.S. natives and/or race/ethnic outcomes—but not 
immigrant status per se. Only in the past several years have researchers made the 
Table 1: Median Hourly Wage of Persons Ages 30 to 55 with by  
Nativity, Years in the United States, and Completed 
Years in the United States 
Regional Place of Birth 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21+ 
Native 
Born 
Less then High School: 
 European Immigrants  
 Asian Immigrants 
 Latin American 
Immigrants 
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 Asian Immigrants 
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Immigrants  
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Immigrants 
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attempt to analyze longitudinal data sets, often having to construct them by matching 
different data sources.  
This paper reviews the literature on economic assimilation, with its major focus on 
wage assimilation, and does so by way of a critique of Census data and cross-sectional 
analyses. While of great value for a number of purposes, Census data cannot concretely 
answer some of the most pressing questions about immigrant assimilation. Nonetheless, 
as we shall see, appropriate analyses of Census data are sometimes a good 
approximation of longitudinal research. First, after a review of the methodological 
reasons why cross-sectional analyses yield biased results, the results of the available 
longitudinal studies are reviewed. Next is a further discussion of some of the other 
important facets of immigrant assimilation that are not captured by Census data. That 
leads to a discussion of generational assimilation, i.e., the progress of the children of 
immigrants, and the conclusions.  
The Debate Over the Assimilation of Recent Immigrants 
Today’s debate over immigrant integration has its genesis in Chiswick’s study (1978) 
that analyzed 1970 Census micro data — a single cross-section — and the number of 
years that immigrants reported they had been in the United States. He found that, even 
if immigrants start out with lower wages than natives upon arrival, their earnings 
increased faster than those of natives, so much so that after 10-15 years immigrants 
earned as much and even more than similar natives. When immigrants first arrive in the 
United States they lack U.S.-specific experience in terms of how well their education 
prepares them, or their knowledge of U.S. work mores, or in their ability to speak 
English, etc. Over time, of course, immigrants learn these necessary U.S.-specific skills 
and there also seems to be some unobserved “quality” or individual drive that 
immigrants possess that enables them to boost their earnings very rapidly. Immigrants 
must take risks to travel to a new country and may be selected for certain traits that lead 
them to learn faster and work more productively than similar natives. Hence, 
immigrants’ earnings start low but converge relatively rapidly with natives. 
Cohort and Vintage Effects  
Borjas (1985) correctly pointed out that a single cross-section of data might confound 
what is really happening. Cross-sections of data cannot separate out the effect of age 
and immigrant arrival cohort. One can think of immigrants who arrive in the same 
period of time — a cohort — as being of a certain vintage. A single cross-section 
measures the success not of individuals, but rather that of different cohorts with 
different lengths of stay. So if older persons (cohorts) were a particularly good vintage, 
which is to say they exhibited Chiswick’s rapid increase in earnings, but recent cohorts 
were not, the cross-sectional analysis would overstate earnings growth. If recent 
immigrants have been starting out worse off than did earlier cohorts, and they were to 
actually have slower wage growth, then it would be wrong to assume that their earnings 
trajectory over time would match that implied by immigrants with different lengths of 
stay in the cross-section. In fact, it may be the case that not only do recent immigrants 
start out at a bigger disadvantage relative to natives; they may never catch up with 
natives as did the older vintage cohorts. 
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A good deal of literature now establishes that immigrants who have arrived in the 
United States since the 1960s have become increasingly less well educated relative to 
natives, and their starting wages in the United States relative to natives have dropped. 
The emphasis here is on relative to natives because recently arrived immigrants are, in 
fact, better educated today than were immigrants from the same countries three decades 
ago. Although the average educational levels of both US natives and arriving 
immigrants have increased in recent decades, the educational differential between the 
two has widened.   Most sending countries have been unable to keep pace with 
educational improvements in the United States, placing new immigrants at a growing 
disadvantage relative to U.S. natives. The average education of U.S. natives was not 
notably high in 1970, but high school completion has become fairly universal and 
enrolment in higher education is much greater in the U.S. than most other nations. On 
the other hand, most sending countries in the developing world are still struggling to 
achieve universal secondary or even primary education. And since the 1970s most 
immigrants to the United States, as well as to other countries, have come from the 
developing world. So new vintage cohorts start out with increasingly large educational 
and earnings disadvantages relative to natives; and cross-sectional studies are unable to 
get around the problem this creates for understanding the earnings trajectory of a given 
cohort.  
A body of work by Borjas (1995) using decennial Census data addresses many of the 
limitations of a single cross-section of data. He constructs “synthetic cohorts” by 
tracking the wages of immigrants who arrived in given time period across successive 
Censuses. These are not the same individuals because a Census is by definition a cross-
sectional and random sample of the population. So a synthetic cohort would track a 
random sample of immigrants who arrived, for example, in the five years prior to 1970 
(the 1966/70 cohort) over time to the 1980 Census (resident ten years in the U.S.) and 
then to 1990 (twenty years) and even on to 2000 (thirty years). Using this approach it 
can be shown that older pre-1970 immigrant cohorts appear to have experienced more 
rapid wage growth than successive cohorts. This decline in earnings growth has been 
referred to as reflecting a decline in the “quality” of recent immigrant cohorts to the 
United States.1 Based on his analysis of synthetic cohorts in the 1970, 1980, and 1990 
Censuses Borjas (1995: 239) concludes that “it is likely that the relative wages of post-
1970 immigrants will remain about 15-20 percentage points below those of natives 
throughout much of their working life.”  
Selective Emigration and Bias in Census Data 
Emigration can cause similar mis-measurement in a cross-section of immigrant wage 
trajectories. Most immigrants who tend to leave or return home do so within a decade 
after first arriving in the United States. If the emigrants are not representative of the 
                                                 
1 On the one hand, this refers to differential education, but it also implies a selectivity effect having to do 
with hard to measure aspects of individual productivity. Fry (1996) uses Census data to detail the labor 
market activities of working-age immigrants and natives throughout the postwar period. The data reveal 
that, after the same number of years in the United States, 1980’s immigrants are more likely to be 
institutionalized (that is, be incarcerated or in a drug treatment or mental health facility), relative to natives, 
than immigrants that arrived in the 1950’s. In addition, 1980’s immigrants are more likely to be remaining 
persistently outside the labor market than earlier immigrant arrivals. 
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original arrival cohort, that is if they differ in systematic or selected ways, then the 
cross-section that measures wage growth for different cohorts at different points in time 
may also misrepresent true wage growth.2 Consider the situation where the least 
successful individuals choose to return home, and then over time the remaining 
members of a given cohort will be the most able or skilled workers. But recently 
arrived cohorts will not yet have experienced much emigration so their average 
earnings will be lowered by inclusion of the less able but would-be emigrants. 
Comparing recent immigrants to older immigrants then would overstate the apparent 
earnings trajectory of a given cohort. In most cases this means that recent cohorts will 
not experience the wage growth implied in such a cross-sectional analysis. And rates of 
emigration can be significant leading to the emigration of about one third to more than 
one half of a cohort.3 
Synthetic cohort data cannot resolve this problem because they do not track individuals 
but only a random sample of the same cohort over time. At best, the synthetic cohort 
fairly reflects the bias introduced by selective emigration. Ascertaining the nature of 
emigration would at least give us a best guess as to the nature of the bias introduced by 
emigration. Borjas (1988) argues that who returns depends on the market conditions 
and inequality in the immigrant-sending country and that; generally speaking, the least 
skilled are more likely to return. That would tend to bias cross-sectional estimates of 
wage assimilation in the manner noted above. Others (Stark 1994) argue that more 
skilled persons will tend to emigrate because they are best able to fulfill preferences for 
consumption in their home country. The empirical nature of return selectivity is not 
known with great precision and, obviously, will vary for different countries. For 
example, there is some evidence that Mexican emigrants from the U.S. tend to be the 
least able (Chiquiar and Hanson 2002). However, the only satisfactory way to deal with 
this problem is to use a method that circumvents the bias introduced by selective 
emigration. 
Edin et al. (2000) use longitudinal data for Sweden from 1970 to 1990 and find that 
more than one quarter of immigrants left the country within 5 years of arrival. 
Economic migrants have higher emigration rates than do humanitarian, but for both it is 
the least successful migrants who choose to leave. Thus, in cross-sectional data there is 
an over representation of the most successful migrants, while the least successful and 
yet to leave are over-represented among recent arrivals. Hence, emigration causes over-
optimistic estimates of assimilation based on cross-sectional data. There is a truly 
significant effect of selective emigration. However, neither U.S. administrative data nor 
government surveys have any information on emigration and it has been difficult to 
parse this problem. One study of Mexican immigrants that incorporated information 
about emigrants found no significant bias caused by selective emigration in a single 
cross-section of 1990 Census data (Lindstrom and Massey 1994). Likewise, research on 
U.S. data that has attempted to control for the effects of emigration by comparing 
                                                 
2 Of course, in-migration selectivity can have similar effects on cross-cohort changes (see prior section). 
There has been debate on whether or not immigrants are positively or negatively selected from their 
countries of origin. See Liebig, Thomas and Alfonso Sousa-Poza (2004) whose research makes a 
compelling case for traditional expectations of positive selection of incoming or newly arriving immigrants. 
3 Zeng (2003) uses longitudinal data on U.S. college graduates and finds that as much as two-thirds of 
Asian immigrants emigrate. 
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cohorts estimated to have high or low emigration has found little difference in 
outcomes (Duleep and Regets 2002). But these are incomplete tests of emigration 
effects on the integration of U.S. immigrants and other methods are required to resolve 
the issue. 
Declining Skill Transferability but Faster Wage Growth 
Changes in the structure of the U.S. economy and manner of immigrant adjustment can 
also confound conclusions based on cross-sectional data, as well as straightforward 
extrapolations from synthetic cohorts. While the gap has been increasing between the 
earnings of immigrants and natives, the gap may have less to do with the 
simultaneously increasing gap in education and more to do with the transferability of 
immigrants’ skills to the U.S. labor market. In fact, through the 1980s the decline in 
immigrants’ average education turned around, at least for European and Asian 
immigrants if not for Latin American immigrants (Cohen et al. 1997). While lagging 
that of natives, the average education of Latin American immigrants has increased in 
the 1990s (Lowell 2002). Nevertheless, the U.S. labor market has changed over the past 
thirty years with a more unequal distribution of poorly and well paid jobs and there has 
been a greater demand for highly skilled workers. Then too a greater number of 
immigrants are employed in the service sector than in the past. Perhaps this suggests 
that, while immigrants’ existing skills have never been optimally rewarded when they 
first arrive, over time their existing skills have been rewarded less and less.  
Yet, it need not be the case that newly arrived immigrants are constrained to a slow 
increase in their wages. Immigrants with low relative wages may even have more 
incentive to invest in the skills needed to improve their earnings and to a greater degree 
than do immigrants with better earnings. Relatively well-paid immigrants may both be 
somewhat more satisfied with their earnings and, therefore, less willing to pay the costs 
of investing in education or skill acquisition. Low-paid immigrants have little to loose, 
their opportunity cost is low, and they are therefore more motivated to invest in 
upgrading their skills from which they stand to gain significantly. Statistically what this 
implies is that there is an inverse relation between the entry wages of new immigrants 
and the speed or rate with which their subsequent earnings increase. While there has 
some disagreement on when this occurs (Duleep and Regets 1999; Borjas 1998),4 
evidence has accumulated that tends to support the likelihood that low wage workers do 
invest and experience rapid increases in earnings. For example, Longva and Raaum 
(2003), using longitudinal Norwegian data, find that non-OECD migrants start out with 
a wage gap but their wages increase at a much faster rate than natives. They found a 
negative relationship between earnings differential at arrival and rate of growth. Still, 
substantial differences exist between immigrant cohorts in the pace of assimilation that 
they experience. Research supports the expectation that workers are not remunerated as 
well for the education they gain abroad, although U.S. education is readily transferable 
                                                 
4 Borjas (1998) argues that entry wage subsequent wage growth depends on the substitution / 
complementarities of pre-immigration skills and post-migration investments. Using 1970 to 1990 Census 
data he finds a positive correlation between entry wage and subsequent wage growth, although the 
correlation was weaker for immigrants whose earnings at entry were closer to native wages. Further, the 
same source characteristics that lead to entry with high wages are also those who have faster wage growth. 
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to the U.S. labor market (Schoeni 1996; Bratsberg and Ragan n.d.; Zeng 2003; Jasso et 
al. 2002).5 
Research also suggests that the transferability of skills of each entry cohort may be 
affected by macroeconomic conditions. For example Barth et al. (2001) find in Norway, 
and they believe other European countries, immigrants’ earnings profiles are affected 
by business cycle and unemployment. Recessions affect all workers adversely, but 
immigrants are more adversely affected than natives by high rates of unemployment. 
Non-OECD migrant workers in Norway suffer accordingly during high unemployment, 
but wage growth may be yet faster during periods of low unemployment. Adjusting for 
unemployment effects generates better earnings trajectories than might otherwise be 
estimated with standard assimilation models. Similar variation in cohorts’ earnings 
trajectories conditioned by macroeconomic conditions can be found in the United 
States, Canada, and elsewhere, although the strength of the unemployment effect is not 
as great in the United States. 
Duleep and Regets (1999) have developed the most convincing argument for this 
analytic approach. They suggest that low-wage immigrants, more so than high-wage 
immigrants (relative to natives) will invest in U.S. specific capital, i.e., training, 
education, and language skills, because they face rather little costs for doing so and 
such investments can reap more rapid increase in earnings. They employ some unique 
analytic approaches based on this argument and the corollary that individual cohorts 
experience different skill transferability issues and their own unique earnings 
trajectories. Duleep and Regets (2002) use 1970 to 1990 U.S. Census data and a 
synthetic cohort approach, analyzing cohorts separately, and using parametric 
regression. They include all workers, not just full time employees as is typically done, 
and they demonstrate a fair amount of movement by immigrants into and out of full 
time status to pursue further education. Their findings support the expectation that 
immigrant wages grow rapidly after arrival. They argue that a key assimilation issue is 
not the quality of immigrants, rather it is the degree to which skills are transferable to 
the U.S. and, hence, the degree to which U.S.-specific skills are sought. Indeed, older 
European immigrant cohorts may have had slower rates of wage growth because they 
entered with higher wages and, partly as a result, cross-sectional data might even 
dampen impressions of wage growth across cohorts. 
Further Complications in Census Data 
There are a number of other factors that have not always been dealt with when 
analyzing Census data, and these too can generate different assessments of the speed 
and degree to which immigrants’ earnings increase. Some of these can be more or less 
readily dealt with; others may introduce significant problems. 
Which Comparison Group? 
Most research has generally compared immigrants with native whites or with natives of 
the same race/ethnic group. There is debate about which standard should be used to 
                                                 
5 These more recent studies appear to refute earlier studies that found little or no wage differences by place 
of education (Kossoudji, 1989 and Reimers, 1984). 
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compare immigrant earnings. Naturally, an appropriate comparison requires that 
immigrants and the base group be similarly affected by changes in the larger economy. 
And it is well known that relative wage growth since the 1970’s have favored better-
educated workers in the United States. It can be argued that comparing the wage gains 
of immigrants to the “average native” creates too many problems in differential labor 
market processes and, instead, that comparisons should be made to the same native-
born ethnic group. Research involving comparisons to base groups with relatively 
stable earnings indicate that there has been little change in immigrant quality since the 
1960’s (LaLonde and Topel 1992; LaLonde 1997). Further, Census analyses find that 
immigrants assimilate or catch up to the earnings of same-ethnic group natives after 
about 10 to 16 years. 
Age-at-Arrival 
There is evidence that immigrants who migrate as children or receive U.S. education 
have a labor market experience more like that of U.S. natives than do adult immigrants. 
Thus, failing to account for age-at-arrival may lead to biased observations. Friedberg 
(1992) finds that, controlling for age-at-arrival; the earnings trajectories of earlier and 
more recent immigrant cohorts are less dissimilar. Once age-at-arrival is taken into 
account, Friedberg finds no evidence of a decline in the earnings trajectory of 
immigrant cohorts from Mexico or East Asia, but some evidence of decreasing cohort 
earnings by other Hispanics and Europeans. 
Changing Rates of Census Coverage 
The comparability of data collected under different censuses, particularly in the U.S., 
may be problematic due to changes in the immigrants included. Specifically, research 
indicates that the illegally resident population was not well counted in 1970, but by 
1980 and even today estimates suggest that two thirds to three quarters are included in 
Census counts. Research by Lindstrom and Massey (1994) finds that comparisons of 
earlier data (under-representing illegal migrants) with later data (including more illegal 
migrants) misrepresent the true earnings trajectory of legal Mexican immigrants who 
are much better educated. 
The Findings of Longitudinal Research 
Synthetic cohort analyses, while addressing many of the problems inherent in cross-
sectional data, cannot fully address the problems of selective emigration; they also lose 
precision in capturing changes in cohort earnings trajectories. Longitudinal data 
(individual level panel data) track the same person from entry through several years of 
post-entry labor market experience. Longitudinal data are not biased by emigration 
because they track the experience of individuals in a given cohort—they do not 
measure “immigrant” wage growth by comparing random samples of a given cohort at 
different points in time as do both the cross-sectional and synthetic cohort methods. 
Again, a random sample is a snapshot of the remaining cohort and as such, may only 
include the least (most) successful of those who originally immigrated. A longitudinal 
survey includes the same individuals in a given cohort and tracks only these over time 
so there is no similar bias in the measured wage growth. 
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The use of longitudinal data outside of the U.S. demonstrates problems with 
extrapolating from Census data. For example, as mentioned above Edin et al. (2000) 
using Swedish longitudinal data report that emigration significantly biases the results 
from cross-sectional data. Indeed, emigration causes over-optimistic estimates of 
assimilation based on cross-sectional data that generates rates of wage growth that are 
as much as 90 percent greater than that actually demonstrated with longitudinal data. 
Longva and Raaum (2003) use longitudinal Norwegian data and find there are 
substantial differences between immigrant cohorts in the pace of assimilation that they 
experience. Unobserved cohort heterogeneity appears to bias cross-sectional estimates 
upward. Indeed, the rate of wage growth estimated with the longitudinal data is about 
half that estimated with cross-sectional data (6 percent versus 11 percent). Using U.S. 
data, Lubotsky (2000) finds a similar result. He matches longitudinal Social Security 
earnings records with cross-sections of the Current Population Survey, as well as the 
longitudinal Survey of Income and Program Participation. He finds that immigrants' 
wages grow 10 to 13 percent during their first twenty years in the U.S. relative to the 
earnings of natives with similar labor market experience. But this is substantially less 
than earnings growth estimates from Census cross-sections.  
Nevertheless, while there is a sizable research literature on U.S. assimilation using 
cross-sectional and synthetic cohort approaches (Edmonston and Smith 1997), research 
using longitudinal data is more recent and oftentimes suggests a somewhat more 
optimistic reading of immigrant integration. Duleep and Regets (1997) match rotating 
cohorts across different surveys one year apart using the U.S.’s premier labor force 
survey, the Current Population Survey. They find that immigrants experience faster 
wage growth than natives. Duleep and Dowhan (2002) construct a longitudinal 
database by combining years’ worth of social security records with the 1994 Current 
Population Survey. They introduce a number of methodological innovations including 
the use of aggregated cohort statistics and non-parametric standardizing of performance 
using natives’ human capital characteristics. They also argue, and demonstrate, 
substantial differences in the earnings’ profile of individual cohorts and they argue 
against the standard practice of pooling cohorts. They find that immigrant males 
experience a faster rate of wage growth after entry than do similar natives and that the 
relative rate of immigrant wage growth increased with each entry cohort from 1965 to 
1983. The rate of wage increase is particularly rapid in the first 5 to 10 years after 
which it lessens. Duleep and Dowhan (2002) also use their longitudinal data to analyze 
the family investment model of female earnings growth that hypothesizes a rapid 
increase in earnings to support male investments in human capital, followed by a tailing 
off of female wage growth as the husband reaps higher returns. Different cross-
sectional studies find conflicting results that the longitudinal analysis attributes to 
changes in the earnings trajectory of pre-1980 female cohorts, who followed the 
original hypothesis, and post-1980 arrivals that follow a continued steep earnings 
trajectory over time. This latter finding demonstrates as much as anything else the 
researchers’ contention that individual cohorts change over time and have unique 
trajectories. 
It is worthwhile to study a couple of figures drawn from the more extensive analyses 
provided by Duleep and Dowhan (2002). Figure 1 shows changes in successive cohorts 
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and the rate at which immigrant wages increase over a 10-year period as compared with 
natives wage growth.  
 
The 1960/64-entry cohort experienced wage increases that were no more than what the 
average native experienced. Over time, newer cohorts experience more rapid wage 
growth relative to natives so that the 1982/83-entry cohort experienced a 10-year wage 
increase that was over 2.5 times greater than that of natives. Figure 2 dramatically 
demonstrates the growth pattern of successive and more recent entry cohorts.  
The 1984 immigrant entrants started out earning a little less than 30 percent of natives’ 
wage, but after five years their relative earnings tripled to a little over 90 percent that of 
 
Figure 1. Ratio of Successive Cohorts of Immigrant to Native 
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Source: Duleep and Dowhan 2002. 
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natives (although it appears to drop a little thereafter). In contrast, the 1990 entry cohort 
starts out earning a wage that is less than 20 percent that of the average native, but after 
just three years they have doubled their relative earnings and are earning over half as 
much as natives. It is the nature of these rapid wage increases that at once confirms the 
consensus that recent immigrants start out earning less relative to natives, while also 
showing that the increasing immigrant/native education and wage gap will not 
necessarily mean that new arrivals make no progress in the labor market. 
Bratsberg and Ragan (n.d.) undertake an analysis of longitudinal data that supports the 
expectations about skill transferability and subsequent rates of investment in human 
capital and rapid earnings growth. They analyze the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) data and find that education abroad is not remunerated as well as U.S. 
education. However, the completion of any education in the U.S. generates returns to 
education similar to natives and even has the same effect on the portion of education 
gotten abroad (English ability, etc., does not account for these effects). They find that 
assumptions of linear wage growth are wrong as there is a significant jump in wage 
growth upon completion of education in the U.S. and the majority of immigrants do 
complete further education in the U.S.  
In a somewhat similar vein, Zeng (2003) analyses longitudinal data from the 1993-1999 
National Survey of College Graduates on the earnings outcomes of Asian graduates 
from U.S. colleges. He finds that the low-wage catch up story apparently applies only 
to foreign educated immigrants; U.S. educated Asian immigrants have the same 
earnings trajectory as U.S. natives. So the effects of place of education matter and, Zen 
argues, affect measured assimilation and even the meaning of assimilation itself. Asians 
immigrants who are educated in the U.S. experience little difficulty in transferring their 
skills to the U.S. labor market and so they start with wages commensurate to those of 
natives and they experience earnings growth that is similar to native wage growth. In 
this sense, they do not “assimilate” because they do not start at a disadvantage and so 
there is no catching up to do with natives. Rather, he finds that only foreign-born 
Asians experience classic assimilation starting out with low wages relative to natives 
but experiencing rapid wage growth over time with the accumulation of U.S. 
experience. 
Hu (1999, 2000) uses the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that has Social 
Security earnings histories for 1951 through 1991, as well as the 1970, 1980, and 1990 
Census public use data samples. He finds that the Census-based estimates of 
immigrants’ earnings trajectories dramatically overstate true growth as measured with 
his longitudinal data. And he finds that the decline in the relative earnings of recent 
cohorts is even greater than has been found using Census data. Further, the likelihood 
that immigrants will reach parity with natives is less than previously estimated. 
Interestingly, he also finds that the rate of wage growth for non-Latino whites is less 
than has been previously estimated due to selective out migration not captured with 
Census data. The relatively high earnings of non-Latino immigrants compared with 
natives has less to do with rapid wage growth than it has to do with the fact that they 
started out with high wages (and selective out migration of less able non-Latino whites 
generates over estimates of earnings growth in Census data). However, the rate of 
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growth of Latino immigrants is not shown to be substantially different with his 
longitudinal data than with cross-sectional analysis.  
Other Immigrant Characteristics  
There are yet other immigrant characteristics that impact the assimilation of immigrants 
and which are too often not completely accounted for in Census data. These include the 
more obvious ones of admission status, such as family- or employment-based; English 
ability; and less obvious factors, such as community characteristics.  
Pathways to Permanent Residence 
Immigrants are admitted to the U.S. under a large variety of visa types for various 
purposes. Because they vary greatly in the purpose, the human capital characteristics of 
each class are very different. In turn, one might anticipate significantly different 
patterns of assimilation. Unfortunately, U.S. Census data has no explicit information 
about an immigrant’s visa status. Foreign nationals are generally: 
 Family-based immigrants reuniting with relatives.  
 Employment-based immigrants admitted for skills or employer petition.  
 Refugees or asylees fleeing persecution.  
 Illegal aliens with no official status. 
 Temporary workers who, in principle, will not be long-term residents. 
In Census data, all of these statuses are initially grouped under non-citizen aliens, until 
such time as individuals become naturalized U.S. citizens. However, the skills of 
individuals in one admission status can vary markedly from those in the next. In 
particular, refugees and unauthorized migrants often have fewer skills and earn less 
than other entry groups. Temporary workers or “non-immigrants” are typically not 
expected to stay in the United States, which makes a discussion of their integration 
problematic. 
Combining these various classes together, as the Census does, can lead to rather 
confusing and simply incorrect policy conclusions. The widespread assumption that 
legal employment-based immigrants have greater success than family-based 
immigrants has received remarkably little study. Consider that the family stream has 
family and ethnic networks that give them “social capital” (Lowell 1996). Canadian 
research, indeed, finds that the earnings of family immigrants catch up to those of 
Canadian independent (skilled) immigrants (DeSilva 1997). Limited and dated U.S. 
research also suggests that employment-based immigrants’ initial earnings advantage is 
small and diminishes over time. A study linking Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) records with Social Security earnings records as of 1980 found that the 
occupational and earnings advantages of employment-based individuals are not 
particularly sizable (Sorensen et. al. 1992). A study in the early 1990s using indirect 
measures found that the initial earnings disadvantage of family-based immigration is 
overcome because of faster earnings growth (Duleep and Regets 1992; see also Jasso 
and Rosenzweig 1995). These results point, once again, to the possibility that 
immigrants with relatively lower wages at entry are more motivated to improve their 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Immigrant Labor Market Assimilation In the United States:  A Critique of Census Data and Longitudinal Outcomes Lowell 
 
 III-13
economic outcomes. For example, refugees are considered to be non-economic 
migrants who flee persecution and whose motivation has little to do with rational 
calculations of improved earnings. Indeed, they begin their experience in the labor 
market with markedly lower earnings than economic migrants. Yet, research suggests 
that refugees also experience a wage catch up that is very steep and that their earnings 
converge and even surpass those of economic migrants (Cortes 2001, DeVoretz et al. 
2004). This seemingly counterintuitive result has to do with refugees’ greater 
investment in education and finds some support in other research.  
Otherwise, the most obvious pathway not captured in Census data is that of 
unauthorized workers who are a significant proportion of some U.S. ethnic groups. 
Their typically lower education, school enrollment, and earnings can reduce the real 
earnings trajectory of legally admitted persons (Jasso et al. 2000). Lindstrom and 
Massey (1994) find that this problem is particularly pronounced for Mexican 
immigrants in research done over time because an increasing share of Mexicans have 
been unauthorized. Relevant in this regard are studies of the assimilation of previously 
illegal workers who were awarded legalization in 1988. The Legalized Population 
Survey (LPS) of 1998 and 1992 is one of the only longitudinal studies of any class of 
immigrant in the United States. The LPS did not sample a comparison group so most of 
the studies can reach only tentative conclusions. Mostly the results indicated little post-
legalization improvements in earnings and a lot of occupational “churning.” However, 
when a sample of natives was included, drawn from the longitudinal NSLY, males were 
shown to experience moderate wage improvements in the 5 years following legalization 
(Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji 1996). Nevertheless, for workers who remain unauthorized, 
unlike legal pathways to permanent residency, their illegal status appears to impede 
successful assimilation and helps explain why measured “Latino” (both legal and 
illegal) immigrants do poorly in the U.S. labor market (Lindstrom and Massey 1994). 
Ultimately, there are various pathways from temporary and illegal statuses to eventual 
admission as a permanent resident. The Census fails to track an immigrant’s prior 
history in the United States and it asks only when the immigrant first “came to stay.” 
Massey and Malone (2002) analyze the pilot New Immigrant Survey, which includes a 
detailed pre-permanent admission history. When immigrants are first issued their green 
card, most (two thirds) have prior experience in the United States that exceeds the 
number of years reported in the standard Census. Interestingly, the researchers found 
that the standard human capital variables in an earnings equation were unbiased by the 
inclusion of pathways to permanent residency, so most of the Census and longitudinal 
research reviewed here is unbiased in that regard. But the inclusion of the various 
pathways by which immigrants entered the United States doubled the explanatory 
power of the model and demonstrates significant differences in earnings outcomes. For 
example, immigrants who first entered illegally before gaining legal admission earn 
much less than those who had previously entered as temporary foreign students. 
English Ability 
A substantial literature addresses the critical role that spoken English plays for most all 
immigrants who work regularly in the United States. Indeed, an analysis of the 1992 
National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS) finds that, because they were better educated, 
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bilingual workers earn more than monolinguals. But a regression analysis finds that 
bilingual skills do not make a significant contribution to weekly wages after holding 
constant workers’ human capital characteristics (Fry and Lowell 2003). Thus, the 
market little values and creates no incentive to acquire and/or maintain foreign 
language proficiency, doubtless contributing to the relatively rapid shift to 
monolingualism across generations.  
Research based on the 1990 U.S. Census indicates that there appear to be large wage 
gains to investments in language capital. Chiswick and Miller (1999) estimate that 
workers who speak English “not at all” and “not well” earn 14 percent less than 
workers who speak only English. Funkhouser (n.d.) reports that improvements in 
English speaking ability (or factors correlated with speaking ability) account for 
roughly half of the earnings assimilation experienced by male immigrants. Research 
supports the theory that English-speaking ability plays a key role in labor market 
success, although it affects some foreign-born groups more than others. For example, 
English proficiency increases the wages of Latinos and Asians proportionately more 
than it does for the European foreign-born population. Foreign-born Latino males who 
lack English skills earn 23 percent less than similar Hispanics who speak English well 
(Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Census data, however, asks only about self-reported 
speaking ability. Research using the NALS analyzed the ability to write, read, speak, 
and understand spoken English. Regression analysis found that employers pay higher 
wages to immigrants who “understand” spoken English well, while the other types of 
proficiency are not significantly associated with earnings. Immigrants who understand 
spoken English "very well" are paid about 30 percent more than similar workers who 
do not understand "well." 
Community Context 
The communities in which immigrants live can have a profound influence on their 
integration. The full range of such communities is beyond the mandate of this literature 
review, but note that one of the most interesting shifts has been the movement of 
immigrants from traditional receiving cities to “new settlement sites” in states that have 
not seen large numbers of immigrants for a century. Immigrants in these new areas face 
unique challenges that are receiving a growing amount of research attention (Lowell 
and Bump 2004). The image of residentially bound groups is no longer apt. Research 
on residential segregation by Census tracts finds that most immigrant groups live in 
relatively dispersed neighborhoods. Higher income and English proficient groups are 
most likely to live in neighborhoods with majority whites (Alba and Nee 1997). 
Census data do identify the geographic residence of immigrants, but they tell us little 
else about community context. The traditional place of immigrant integration, the urban 
enclave, has a number of characteristics that are simply not captured in standard data. 
Enclaves are most often thought of as places where co-ethnic entrepreneurs tend to be 
employers of first recourse. While the well-known Cuban enclave in Miami continues 
to thrive, and Spanish continues to be a dominant language, research tends to find few 
equivalent enclaves elsewhere. Those who fare best tend to be those who start their own 
business ventures. But for most co-ethnic workers the enclave is not a story of upward 
mobility and better earnings. Chinese immigrant workers are found to earn less than 
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Chinese Americans in low-end or secondary sector jobs in the open labor market in 
New York. Uneducated Chinese immigrants often appear to be trapped in a low-wage 
enclave economy (Wong 1987; Mar 1991; Farley 1996). Dominican and Columbian 
women in New York earn little and appear to be penalized for work in the enclave 
(Gilbertson 1995; Gilbertson and Gurak 1993). It is primarily job mobility out of the 
enclave that brings better working conditions and returns to human capital (Nee, 
Sanders, and Sernau 1994). Standard Census samples cannot replicate the findings of 
such fieldwork, but special purpose samples sometimes can.  For example, research 
using the NALS found that immigrants who reported living in a linguistic enclave 
received no earnings benefit from bilingual ability (Fry and Lowell 2003). That finding 
demonstrates that even the ethnic-specific human capital of enclave workers benefits 
them little.  
Employment niches occur where co-ethnic workers are employed within certain 
industries and employers tend to be of a different ethnicity. Some immigrants work in 
small employment niches and others dominate entire service and manufacturing sectors. 
Examples include Mexican-origin workers in the Chinese-owned garment industry in 
Los Angeles, Latino workers working in large meatpacking firms throughout the 
Midwest, and Mayans working for a retail grocery store chain in the Houston area 
(Hackenberg et al. 1993; Hagan 1994). Research finds reduced English proficiency and 
a reduced wage penalty for lack of proficiency in metropolitan areas with 
concentrations of co-ethnics (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Espenshade and Fu 1997). 
Some economists argue that population concentrations reinforce an ethnic effect that 
reduces inter-generational gains (Borjas 1995).6 Concurrently, immigrant workers 
experience a reduction in wages (substitutability) in metropolitan areas with large 
concentrations of immigrants (Smith and Edmonston 1997). So community context 
directly affects the economic progress of immigrants. However, simple measures like 
the relative number of immigrants in a metropolitan area, are in the final analysis open 
to many interpretations and tell us rather little. Community effects are difficult if not 
impossible to ascertain with Census data. 
Inter-Generational Progress 
In a recent review of updates to the 2000 Census, Card (2004: 18) notes some of the 
nuances in evaluating immigrant assimilation discussed here. He goes on to say, 
nevertheless, “a more interesting question is how well the U.S.-born children of 
immigrants are doing.” After all, even if immigrants never catch up to the earnings of 
similar natives, their children might do rather well as they graduate from U.S. schools, 
are fluent in the language, and are otherwise culturally tuned in. Card (2004) uses the 
Current Population Survey that is the only major U.S. sample that enables researchers 
to identify the birthplace of an individual’s parents. One thing in the favor of 
immigrants’ children — known as the second generation — is that they complete 
                                                 
6 Of course, one fundamental economic axiom is that, all else being equal, increases in supply will lower 
wages. And if immigrants tend to substitute for other immigrants, concentration effects would lower wages. 
In a like fashion, increases in supply may impact immigrants’ eventual integration as they move through 
entry pathways. For example, temporary skilled workers (H-1Bs or Fs) may compete with each other 
lowering their wages early on in the settling down process, as well as lowering wages of competing natives 
(Borjas 2004). 
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significantly more years of schooling than their parents. Adjusting for their young 
average age, the second generation has slightly more education, a greater likelihood of 
labor force participation, and higher earnings than third generation individuals (those 
whose parents are U.S. born).  
However, Card’s analysis of group differences does not adequately distinguish between 
the Asians and Latinos who have quite different educational and earnings patterns. 
While some research appears to support the finding that the children of immigrants are 
highly motivated and tend to do well in school (Rumbaut 1999), there is still a 
significant amount of evidence that second generation Latinos experience difficulties in 
completing high school and particularly post-secondary education (Trejo 2001; Fry 
2002, 2003). Further, when the analysis turns from education to earnings outcomes 
most research finds that the second generation, while doing better than their immigrant 
parents, still earn significantly less than non-Latino whites. What is more, their 
education is rewarded to a lesser degree.  
Research on Mexican generations shows that significant progress is made in the 
earnings of second as compared to first generation Mexican immigrants (Trejo 2001). 
But there remains a substantial wage gap between the second generation and native 
non-Latino whites, as well as a lack of further significant wage gains in the third 
generation. Of course, the third generation is largely comprised of individuals whose 
U.S. roots precede 1970, while the second generation is essentially all the children of 
post-1970 immigrants. So we might anticipate that the second generation would still 
have more of the “immigrant ethic” that drives them, a force that can be seen even 
between second-generation non-Latino whites.  
 
Figure 3. Percentage of Employed Adults with Less 
than High School Education by Generation, 2000 
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Figure 4. Unadjusted Wages by Generation, 2000











Fry and Lowell (2003) analyze the CPS and look at Central/South Americans (CSAs) 
as well as Mexicans. As Figure 3 shows, there are strong educational differences 
between these groups, with over two thirds of employed Mexican immigrants and two 
fifths of CSAs not having completed high school.  Degree completion is somewhat 
higher by “1.75” immigrants — immigrants who arrived as children before the age of 
five — although a large proportion still have not completed high school. The greatest 
educational jump is, indeed, seen in the second generation, members of which are more 
than twice as likely to have completed high school as were the first generation. But 
there is little further educational gain in the third generation. At the other extreme, 
about 10 percent of second and third generation Mexicans have completed a bachelor’s 
degree, but they are far less likely to do so than are third generation whites (30 percent). 
There is little surprise, given their low levels of education, that regardless of generation 
Latinos earn substantially less than non-Latino whites (Figure 4). 
 
How much of the earnings difference is due to the lesser human capital, i.e., education 
and experience of Mexicans and CSAs?7  Figure 5 shows the results of a multivariate 
analysis and decomposition of the total amount of wage difference between Mexican 
origin workers and third generation non-Latino whites (see Fry and Lowell 2003). The 
first generation Mexican immigrants earn over 50 log percentage points less than third 
generation non-Latino whites. About two thirds of the earnings difference can be 
attributed to the lower human capital of Mexican workers as compared with third 
generation non-Latino whites. What seems very clear is that the wage structure of 
                                                 
7 A standard decomposition analysis is used splitting the difference in the mean hourly wage differential 
due to the differences in the characteristics of workers (OLS log wage regression on education, experience, 
and state of residence); and differences in the returns to those characteristics. Note that the CPS does not 
permit the inclusion of English ability that would surely reduce the wage differential further. 
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native Latino workers is similar to that for whites. The Latino-white wage gap, unlike 
the Black-white wage gap, is primarily due to skill differences between these native-
born groups. Indeed, most of the Latino wage gap is due to differences in just a few 
basic skill characteristics, not differences in the returns that employers pay these groups 
for those skills. In short, the Latino second generation, particularly the Mexican second 
generation, does make significant educational progress compared with their immigrant 
parents, but they do not appear to be making huge strides.  
 
Conclusions 
How well do immigrants assimilate to the U.S. job market? Research to answer this 
question still relies heavily on U.S. Census data, as well as the Current Population 
Survey. But researchers in recent years have begun to explore existing, not-made-for 
immigrant data sets, some of which are longitudinal in design. These enable researchers 
to examine a much wider variety of outcomes than just wages, including labor force 
attachment/participation, incidence of poverty, use of welfare, homeownership, and 
tantalizing first forays into wealth differences. However, this recent spate of studies still 
encounters the basic problems noted above and a remarkable number of them still must 
rely on cross-sectional data; few even employ synthetic cohort analysis. What is more, 
earnings — especially in the United States with comparatively high labor force 
participation and low unemployment — are arguably the most fundamental measure of 
labor market assimilation. Immigrants’ earnings are the key determinant of 
homeownership, incidence of poverty, etc., and even wealth. 
 
Figure 5.  Log Wage Point Diffentials of Mexican 
Generations and Third Generation Non-Latino  Whites 
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A first conclusion is that there is wide disagreement in the interpretation of the 
available facts even when longitudinal data are analyzed. Not that longitudinal data are 
a panacea because they too have some serious problems: 
 Most longitudinal surveys that are not immigrant-specific sample too few 
immigrants for robust analysis, especially to capture the diversity of today’s 
immigrant groups. Bratsberg and Ragan (n.d.) include only 351 immigrants in 
their NLSY sample, perhaps one of the most valuable longitudinal data sets in the 
U.S. 
 Immigrant-specific surveys offer a great advantage to a large extent because they 
ask such important questions as the migrant pathways and retrospective period(s) 
of arrival prior to formal, legal admission (Massey and Malone 2002).  
 Immigrant-specific longitudinal data, however, often have limited sample size 
and astonishingly seldom include a comparative sample of natives, making 
meaningful assessments of assimilation extremely difficult (Cobb-Clark and 
Kossoudji 1996; Cobb-Clark 2001). 
 Attrition rates, for reasons of emigration but also because of inability to track 
such a highly mobile population, are extremely high. 
 Given what we know about the pace with which immigrants catch up to natives, 
tests of assimilation require not just a five-year panel, but as much as 20 years of 
information to resolve the most fundamental debates about ultimate assimilation. 
Perhaps the single most important need for longitudinal data is to answer questions 
about the “change in the earnings of immigrants will be an endless round of dueling 
statistics by academics” (Regets 2004). Fortunately, the U.S. has just funded a pilot and 
now an initial round of an immigrant-specific survey, known as the New Immigrant 
Survey, with plans for future follow-up panels (Jasso et al. 2002). However, although 
longitudinal data may be the gold standard for understanding immigrant assimilation, 
these data will not effectively cancel out the use of silver or even bronze standards.8  
Second, to further complicate matters there is tremendous diversity in the rate of 
economic progress across cohorts (Duleep and Dowhan 2003). There is also 
tremendous diversity within cohorts due to the pathways of entry, which remain 
unexamined apart from broad approximations of family versus skill/employment 
admission (Massey and Malone 2002; Lowell 1996; Fix and Passel 1995). These latter 
facts are not simply splitting hairs; if there are shifts in the outcomes of different entry 
cohorts, they can seriously confound prognostication for the very same reasons that 
make longitudinal data superior to cross-sectional data.  Even longitudinal data face 
serious problems if cohort outcomes change significantly. Differences in outcomes by 
pathway of entry, such as between skilled temporary workers who become permanent 
immigrants and long-term seasonal unauthorized workers who become family-based 
immigrants, remain largely unknown but are precisely the stuff of admission policy. 
                                                 
8 Furthermore, longitudinal data are extremely costly. A less expensive, less intrusive, and more finely 
dynamic alternative would be to collect administrative data that had analytic value and to do so in a way 
that permits different data sources to be linked. Canada, for example, has just such a rich source of data that 
complements its parallel collection of cross-sectional and longitudinal panels (DeVortz et al. 2004). 
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Third, there is tremendous diversity in the rates of economic progress across sending 
countries and education levels:  
“Europeans have entered with relatively high wages and have earned wages 
comparable to natives over their life course. Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese have 
entered with lower wages but have quickly caught up with native-born workers. 
Mexicans, on the other hand, have entered with low wages, and the wage gap 
between themselves and native-born workers has not shrunk. Central Americans 
have had a somewhat similar experience as Mexicans.” (Schoeni 1996: 27). 
Essentially, place of origin matters, perhaps even more than, or because of, admission 
policies.9 After all the vaunted superiority of the Canadian skills point system over the 
U.S.’s supposedly clunky employer-based labor market testing, the only significant 
differences in measured immigrant assimilation between the two countries occur 
because of the U.S.’s large population of Latino immigrants (Antecol, Cobb Clark, and 
Trejo 1999; Duleep and Regets 1992; Martin and Lowell 2004).  
Answers to the question of how migrants will assimilate vary from the cheerily 
optimistic (Card 2004) to the rather pessimistic (Borjas 1995), even when researchers 
are confronted with exactly the same results. Consider that some comparisons of cross-
sectional and longitudinal data uncover substantial agreement in assimilation outcomes 
and so embolden those who use synthetic cohort methods that more closely 
approximate longitudinal results (Bratsberg and Ragan n.d.; Duleep and Regets 1997; 
Lindstrom and Massey 1994; Hu 1999). 
Yet, the most consistent findings of longitudinal datasets are that cross-sectional data, 
and to a lesser extent synthetic cohort approaches, substantially overestimate the 
ultimate wage trajectories of the cohorts of immigrants from developing countries who 
have arrived in the U.S., Canada, and most European nations. Indeed, cross-sectional 
data are overly optimistic by 50 to 90 percent in terms of actual outcomes (Edin et al. 
2000; Longva, and Raaum 2003). The accumulating research base that uses 
longitudinal data in the United States largely supports that conclusion (Lubotsky 2000; 
Zeng 2003; Hu 1999). In a very real way then, the longitudinal data reaffirm and make 
more concrete the results of synthetic cohort studies that: 
• Most immigrants do not and will not ever reach earnings parity with the average 
and otherwise similar native-born worker (Edmonston and Smith 1997: 
LaLonde and Topel 1997).  
• It is possible to conclude from synthetic cohort studies of assimilation that ...the 
magnitude of the wage gaps is not enormous. After controlling for education, 
which explains about an 11 percent gap in immigrant earnings for both men and 
women, the gaps are under 10 percent – comparable to the wage gaps for blacks 
or native Hispanics (Card 2004).  
                                                 
9 Borjas (1995) has made significant contributions to the observation that place of origin is important to 
average immigrant assimilation, concluding that family-based admission has had the greatest impact on 
shifts to less-developed source countries. Those conclusions are echoed in European research (Longva and 
Raaum 2003; Rashid 2004). 
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• However, immigrants do reach earnings parity with otherwise similar same 
ethnic group native-born workers after 10 to 16 years (Lalonde and Topel 
1997).  
The more optimistic findings of truly longitudinal data have established that low-wage 
immigrant cohorts experience very fast earnings growth, and indicate that today’s 
various immigrant cohorts’ earnings tend to converge. But even after much more rapid 
wage growth than one might anticipate from prior research, after 5 to 10 years these 
cohorts still have nominal earnings that are 20 to 50 percent lower compared with all 
native-born workers. Adjusting for differences in human capital characteristics, after a 
decade, the point at which further growth begins to attenuate, the wage differential 
remains 20 percent (Duleep and Dowhan 2002).  
Under the circumstances the fairest conclusion seems to be that most European and 
many Asian immigrants will assimilate equitably into the U.S. labor market during their 
working lives and well before their retirement. Their children will, likewise, do rather 
well in pursuing higher education and will succeed, often better than natives. There is a 
range of success levels among Latinos, with Mexican immigrants showing the least 
evidence of labor market assimilation. However, even these Latino immigrants 
experience relatively rapid wage growth during their first 10 years in the United States, 
and their (second generation) children are making advances beyond their parents. This 
is the stuff of upward mobility and sheds an optimistic light on an otherwise gloomy 
prognosis. Mobility generates hope and militates against the “racialization” of 
immigrants’ future (Bean and Lowell 2004). Even if it may take a couple of 
generations, upward mobility does appear possible and immigrants do not appear to be 
stuck forever in the low-end jobs that they first take in the United States. 
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Select Longitudinal Studies Outside the United States 
Country:               Dataset:       
Australia               Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
                             General Customer Survey (GCS) 
                                           Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) I* 
                                                                  Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) II* 
Belgium   Belgian Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) 
Canada   Survey of Labor Income Dynamics (SLID) 
                                           Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC)* 
China   Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey (CLHLS) 
France   French Household Panel 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel* 
Hungary   Hungarian Household Panel 
Indonesia  Indonesia Family Life Survey 
Japan   Japanese Panel Study on Consumers (JPSC) 
Korea   Korean Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS) 
Luxembourg  Panel Socio-Economique “Liewen zu Lëtzebuerg” (PSELL) 
Mexico   Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) 
Netherlands  Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (ISEP) 
New Zealand  Longitudinal Immigration Survey* 
Poland   Polish Household Panel (PHP) 
Russia   Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
South Africa  KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) 
Sweden   Swedish Panel Study Market and Nonmarket Activities (HUS) 
                                           Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden, 1960-1998 (LINDA)* 
Switzerland  Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 
Taiwan   Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD) 
United Kingdom  European Community Household Panel Study (ECHP) 1 
                                                                   British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
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For more than two centuries most countries of Western Europe have primarily been 
countries of emigration. During the last 60 years, all countries of Western Europe have 
gradually become destinations for international migrants and asylum seekers. Today all 
West European countries and several new member states of the European Union (EU) 
have a positive migration balance. And it is very likely that sooner or later this will be 
the case in other new EU member states and accession countries. 
This paper discusses the size of Europe’s migrant population, its demographic structure, 
and the economic position of migrants. The European Labour Force Survey (LFS) is 
used as the main database. For the first time, the criterion “place of birth” is used to 
distinguish between foreign-born and native-born residents of the EU. The results are 
then compared with those of legal foreign residents (which so far, in the absence of 
better data, were equally called “migrants”). This exercise shows the concentration of 
immigrants and foreign nationals from middle- and low-income countries in certain 
sectors of the economy and in low-pay jobs.  
The picture is somewhat better when looking at the foreign-born population, which 
includes naturalized citizens of EU member states who on average are economically 
better integrated than those who remain third country nationals. Immigrants have higher 
employment rates and, on average, are occupied in better positions than legal foreign 
                                                 
1 This paper summarizes findings of five research papers for the European Commission (DG Employment 
and Social Affairs) authored by experts working at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
(Hamburg, Germany) and the Migration Policy Institute (Washington DC). It profited from discussions 
between the author and services of the European Commission as well as from discussions with a number of 
scholars and senior civil servants active in the fields of migration and integration. European Labour Force 
Survey data were provided by Eurostat and additional analysis by Heinz Fassmann (University of Vienna).   
2 Correspondence email address of the author: rainer.muenz@hwwa.de 
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residents. These findings suggests that in Europe the process of integration of 
immigrants differs to a lesser degree from that of traditional countries of immigration 
such as the US, Canada and Australia than has been previously assumed. 
However, further sustained efforts to enhance integration of immigrants and their 
children and to provide equal opportunities are necessary. Confronted with an aging 
and eventually shrinking domestic population, Europe also has to consider pro-active 
migration policies and measures to identify future labor and skills gaps. In the medium- 
and long-term the EU will have to compete with other OECD countries for attractive 
potential migrants. In this context Europe has a genuine incentive to compare its efforts 
and experiences with those of traditional countries of immigration—in particular with 
the US and Canada.  
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Definitions of Terms 
Geographic Entities  
 
EU 15:  The 15 states that comprised the European Union prior to May 1, 2004, including: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
 
EU 10:  The 10 EU member states admitted on May 1, 2004, including Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 
EU 8:   The Central European EU member states admitted on May 1, 2004, including Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 
EU 25: The current European Union, consisting of the EU 15 plus the EU 10. 
 
EU Accession States:  Countries scheduled for admission to the EU, currently Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia, and Turkey.   
 
European Economic Area (EEA):  The first full customs union in Europe, informally called the 
Common Market.  With the 1995 enlargement of the European Union, the EEA remained 
in existence to enable its 3 non-EU members (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) to 
participate in the Common Market. Switzerland decided not to join the EEA. 
 
Western Europe:  EU15, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  Although Switzerland is not a 
member of the EU or the EEA, is maintains links to these entities through bilateral 
agreements.   
 
EU West:  EU 15 (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland. 
 
EU South:  Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
 
CEEC:  Central and Eastern Europe Countries, including:  Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
 
CEE:  Central and Eastern Europe: the countries of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey and 
Central Asia, including: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
 
EECA-20: CEE countries plus Turkey. 
 
MENA-20:  the countries of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf States, including 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordon, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Palestine Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. 
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Immigration and Labor Terms 
 
International migrant:  (UN definition) a person living for 12 months or more outside of his/her 
country of birth or citizenship. 
 
Foreign-born:  (In both EU and US) a person born in a country other than the one in which 
he/she resides. (US) children of US citizens born elsewhere are automatically citizens 
themselves and not considered “foreign born”. 
 
Migrant:  (In the EU) is synonymous to “foreign-born.”  (In the US) All foreign-born residents 
are considered migrants; persons living outside their US state of birth are referred to as 
domestic or internal migrants. 
 
Immigrant:  (In the EU) is synonymous to “foreign-born” with the prospect of long term or 
permanent residence.  (In the US) this term is reserved for persons who are granted 
lawful permanent residence in the United States.  Persons often live in the US in 
“temporary resident” status before “immigrating,” i.e., receiving lawful permanent 
resident status. 
 
Foreign National:  (In both EU and US) defined as a person who is a citizen of a country other 
than the one in which he/she resides.  (In US) persons owing permanent allegiance to the 
United States; all US citizens are US nationals but a very small number of people 
(citizens of American Samoa and the Swains Islands) are US nationals without being US 
citizens. 
 
Legal Foreign Resident:  (In EU) synonymous with “foreign national;” includes not only 
foreign-born individuals but also many persons who were born in the country of 
residence but at birth acquired only the foreign citizenship held by their parents.  (In US) 
No comparable concept: all persons born in the United States are entitled to US 
citizenship. 
 
Irregular Migrant:  (In EU) Persons resident in a country without legal permission to be there.  
(In US) referred to as “unauthorized,” or “unlawful” or “illegal” migrants. 
 
Regularization:  (EU) A government program granting a large number of irregular migrants 
authorization to remain in their country of residence.  (US) Such programs are called 
“legalization.” 
 
Worker:  (EU) roughly equivalent to “blue-collar” workers.  (US)  any person who works or is 
looking for work. 
 
Employee:  (EU) roughly equivalent to “white collar” workers.  (US) any person who is directly 
employed by someone else; does not include the self-employed or contract workers. 
 
Gainful employment: Defined as workers/employees with salary plus self employed persons in 
the working age population (15-64) in the European Labour Force Survey (LFS). This 
figure excludes people working as dependent family members without pay or for benefits 
in kind in a family owned farm or business.) (US)  EU concept of gainful employment is 
equivalent to the US concept of (current) employment, rather than the concept of gainful 
employment, which in the US pertains to those who “usually” work.   
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Between 1750 and 1970 Europe was the prime source region of world migration 
sending some 70 million people—the equivalent of one third of its population growth—
overseas. During the last 50 years, however, all countries of Western Europe3 gradually 
became destinations for international migrants (Table 1). Several of the new EU 
member states in Central Europe and the Mediterranean also follow that pattern (Table 
2).4 It is very likely that, sooner or later, this will be the case in other new EU member 
states and accession countries5 as well. Many Europeans, however, still do not see their 
homelands as immigration countries—in particular not as destinations of permanent 
immigrants. Today, this contra factual perception of demographic realities has become 
a major obstacle to the development and implementation of proactive migration 
regimes and comprehensive integration programs. As a consequence it might be more 
difficult for the EU and its member states to attract the mix and kind of migrants this 
world region will need to recruit in the future for demographic and economic reasons.  
Migration and population  
In early 2004, the 25 countries that now constitute the European Union (EU 25)6 had 
456 million inhabitants, as compared with 290 million inhabitants in the United States. 
The 15 member states that constituted the EU prior to enlargement (EU 15) had 382 
million EU citizens and legal foreign residents. The remaining 74 million lived in one 
of the 10 new member states in Central Europe and the Mediterranean that joined the 
European Union on May 1, 2004 (EU 10).7 Of these 456 million people some 34-37 
million are international migrants—representing roughly 8 percent of Europe’s total 
population.8 If this estimate for the EU 25, elaborated below, is accurate, this means 
                                                 
3 Western Europe is defined as the EU 15, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, with 393 
million inhabitants. 
4 In 2003, Cyprus (Greek part only), the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia already have a 
positive migration balance. 
5 Accession countries with possible EU membership in 2007 are Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. The 
fourth accession country, Turkey, will not be admitted to the EU in 2007. 
6 The EU 25 encompasses the EU 15 member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) as well as the 10 member states admitted on May 1, 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). 
7 Another 105.2 million people were living in the EU accession countries Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Turkey. And 12.3 million people were citizens or foreign residents of  3 other countries belonging to the 
European Economic Area (i.e., Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) and of Switzerland. In 2004, the total 
population of all these 29 countries (EU 25, the rest of the EEA, and Switzerland) was 468.7 million. 
8 In many documents of the European Commission and of EU member states, so far, legal foreign residents 
or third country nationals have been used as “proxy” for immigrants not accounting for the rapidly growing 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Migration, Labor Markets and Integration of Migrants:  An Overview for Europe with a Comparison to the U.S.  Münz 
 IV-2
that in absolute terms the number of international migrants9 in Europe is of similar size 
but not strictly comparable10 to that in the United States (33.5 million foreign-born in 
2002). In any case, the foreign-born represent a larger proportion of total US population 
(12.5 percent in 2002).11  
Europe, like the US, faces demographic aging due to increasing life expectancy. But, 
unlike the US, almost all countries in Europe are experiencing below replacement 
fertility. As a result, the pace of demographic aging is much more rapid in Europe than 
it is in the US. Already in 2003, out of 33 European countries analysed (Table 2),12 15 
countries were experiencing higher mortality than birth rates. The other 18 countries 
still had natural (but declining) population growth. Net migration, however, was 
positive in 26 of the 33 countries analysed.13 Relative to population size, Cyprus14 had 
the largest positive migration balance (17.9 per 1000 inhabitants in 2003), followed by 
Spain (14.2 per 1000), Liechtenstein (10.0 per thousand),15 Italy (8.9 per thousand), 
Ireland (7.1 per 1000), Portugal (6.1 per thousand) and Switzerland (5.6 per thousand). 
Negative migration balances were only registered in Lithuania (-1.8 per 1000 
inhabitants), Iceland (-0.8 per 1000), Poland (-0.4), Latvia (-0.4), Romania (-0.3) and 
Estonia (-0.2). Several countries, in particular the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, 
Germany and Austria only had population growth due to migration.   
In 2002-03, among the four EU accession countries, Romania and presumably Bulgaria 
had a negative migration balance, but Croatia and Turkey experienced net gains from 
migration. 
Recent inflows 
In 2003, the 28 EU and EEA countries plus Switzerland had an overall positive net 
migration rate of 3.7 per 1000 inhabitants and a net gain of 2.0 million people. 
Migration accounted for almost 90 percent of Europe’s total population growth of 2.0 
million people in 2003. In absolute numbers the gross immigration was largest in Spain, 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of naturalized citizens of EU member states. While in the EU most legal foreign residents in fact 
are migrants it is no longer true to conclude that most migrants are foreign residents. This paper aims at 
giving information both on legal foreign residents and on the foreign-born (i.e., immigrant) population of 
Europe while trying to distinguish between these two overlapping groups. By doing so the paper allows for 
direct comparison with US data traditionally based on a distinction between native-born and foreign-born 
(i.e., immigrant) populations (see European and US concepts analyzed below). 
9 International migrant is defined according to a UN suggestion as people living for 12 or more months 
outside their county of birth or citizenship. 
10 The numbers for Europe and the US have to be compared with some caution as the figures for the EU 
include intra-EU mobility between member states as well as immigration from third countries. 
11 US census results for 2000; US census data on foreign-born residents include irregular migrants (see 
Passel 2002). 
12 Table 2 displays this information for the EU 25, the 3 additional countries that with the EU 25 make up 
the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway), one non-EEA state (Switzerland), and 
the EU accession countries of Bulgaria and Romania, 
13 This information was not available for Bulgaria. 
14 Government controlled, i.e., Greek part of Cyprus only. 
15 Liechtenstein and Switzerland are not EU member states; Liechtenstein is a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) but has retained the right to restrict the settlement of other EU and EEA nationals in 
its territory. 
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Italy, Germany and the UK.16 Comparisons with the US suffer from the lack of 
population registers in North America. But in fiscal year 2001 the US admitted 1.1 
million legal permanent immigrants (3.7 per 1000 inhabitants) and some 1.5 million 
temporary migrants.17 Net migration only accounted for one third of US population 
growth.  
Gates of Entry, Relevance of Labor Migration 
In many European countries for which data are available, recent regular immigration 
has been dominated by family reunion18 and family formation, the inflow of asylum 
seekers (455,000 applications in EU 25 in 2002),19 and the inflow of co-ethnic “return” 
migrants and their dependent family members.20 In Ireland and several countries of 
Southern Europe, economic migration still plays a major role.21  
For a selected number of EU member states, the relative importance of employment, 
family reunion, asylum and other reasons for immigrants to enter the Union is known. 
In 2001 for instance, in Sweden over 70 percent of residence permits were granted for 
purposes of family formation/reunion. In Belgium and Denmark this was the reason in 
over 50 percent of cases; and in Austria, Finland, France and Italy it applied to between 
                                                 
16 Total inflow of foreign migrants (with exception of seasonal workers) according to OECD/Sopemi 
(2004). 
17 Non-immigrant visas for foreign migrants arriving for business, pleasure, work, educational and other 
purposes. Many of these non-immigrant legal foreign residents later manage to adjust their status in the US 
and become permanent immigrants (Gozdziak and Martin 2004). Some are even able to adjust their status 
after irregular entry (Massey and Malone 2002). Statistically they only become visible as “immigrants” in 
the year that this adjustment takes place.  
18 The European Union sees ‘the right to family reunification (…) as an indispensable instrument for 
integration.” The European directive on Family unification adopted by the Council in September 2003 
therefore “recognises the right to family reunification for third-country nationals holding a residence permit 
of one year or more who have reasonable prospects of obtaining permanent residence. Member States will 
be entitled to require for the exercise of this right that third-country nationals comply with integration 
measures in accordance with national law. An essential provision for the integration of family members is 
that they be entitled, in the same way as the applicant, to access to employment, education and vocational 
training.” (European Commission 2003a) 
19 EU 25+EEA+Switzerland, among them 382.000 in the EU 15 and 30.000 in the 10 new EU member 
states (then still accession countries). The US, in FY 2001, admitted 97.000 refugees and 11.000 asylum 
seekers. The European directive on “minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country 
nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
contains a specific chapter regulating the content of international protection and specifying the rights to be 
enjoyed by a refugee or person granted subsidiary protection. These require Member States to provide 
programmes tailored to the needs of refugees to facilitate their integration into society.” (European 
Commission 2003a) 
20 These two related inflows are of particular relevance for countries like Germany (ethnic German 
Aussiedler), Greece (Pontian Greeks) and Hungary (ethnic Hungarians). 
21 In January 2005 The European Commission published a "Green Paper" on economic migration following 
a “proposal for a directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities” which failed to get sufficient support 
in the Council. The idea behind the proposal for the directive and the Green paper “is both to provide a 
pathway for third-country workers which could lead to a more permanent status for those who remain in 
work, while at the same time giving a secure legal status while in the EU to those who return to their 
countries of origin when their permit expires." (European Commission 2003a) 
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20 percent and 30 percent of all people taking legal residence in these countries.22 In 
2000 employment was the reason for legal entry in 61 percent of cases, in Italy, 46 
percent in Portugal and 36 percent in Spain. In Ireland and Greece admission for 
economic reasons played a dominant role. In the UK, employment was the reason for 
entry in only 27 percent of the cases, as was family reunion (also 27 percent).23  
Looking at the EU overall, nearly 40 percent of all residence permits were granted for 
the purpose of employment whereas 30 percent were granted for the purpose of family 
reunion. These figures, however, do not give the full picture.  For example, in several 
EU countries economic migration takes place to a larger extent in the form of seasonal 
and temporary labor migration (529,000 persons admitted in 2001 in EU 15)24 as well 
as in the form of irregular labor migration of at least the same magnitude. The latter 
only becomes statistically visible at the occasion of so-called amnesties and 
regularization programs. During the period 1995-2002 some 2.5 million migrants were 
regularized in EU 15.25 
In the US, permanent immigration is dominated by family members of foreign legal 
residents or US citizens (63 percent in FY 2001). Those admitted for economic reasons 
(17 percent) were the second largest group of recent immigrants and those entering for 
humanitarian reasons (12 percent) third.26 In the US irregular migration also plays a 
quantitatively significant role. In 2000-01, according to estimates, the US was home or 
host to some 6.9 million to 8.5 million irregular migrants.27 It is estimated that up to 5 
million of these people came during the 1990s.28 
Labor Migration in the New EU Member States 
In the new EU member states in Central Europe labor migration is still relatively small 
compared to population size. In Poland the number of work permits for labor migrants 
fluctuated between 15,000 and 18,000 per year between 1997 and 2002, but irregular 
labor migration has already become visible. In Slovenia the number of work permits 
fluctuated between 34,000 and 40,000.29 The Czech Republic counted 104,000 non-
nationals legally working within its borders in 2001. Including trade licenses, the 
number of legally established economic migrants for that year can be put at around 
168,000. In Slovakia their number was 9,000 in 2002. Relative to work force and 
population size Hungary has the largest number of legal foreign workers and 
employees30: 115,000 or 2.3 percent of the work force in 2002.31  
                                                 
22 European Commission (2004b). 
23 European Commission (2003b). 
24 Admitted by France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland (see OECD/Sopemi 2004). 
25 The US on the basis of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act legalized 2.8 million irregular 
foreign residents. For regularization in Europe and the US see Papademetriou et al. 2004. In 2005 Spain 
offered regularization to some 800,000 irregular migrants. 
26 See U.S. Department of Labor (2002), Papademetriou and O’Neill (2004). 
27 See Gozdziak and Martin (2004), Passel (2002). 
28 See Gozdziak and Martin (2004), Passel (2002). 
29 See IOM (2004). 
30 In most European countries labor law distinguishes between "workers" (usually synonymous for blue-
collar), employees (usually synonymous for white-collar); and the self-employed. Within the same firm 
workers and employees may, e.g., have different pay systems and may be represented by different unions. 
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In the new EU member states, the great majority of migrant workers and employees 
come from neighbouring countries and regions. In Slovenia, more than 90 percent of 
the foreign workers come from other successor states to former Yugoslavia. Foreign 
workers from Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation represent the majority in 
Poland and some 30 percent in the Czech Republic. In Hungary 43 percent of the 
foreigners were Romanian citizens, followed by citizens of Serbia (11 percent) and 
Ukraine (8 percent), most of them ethnic Hungarians. Around 10 percent had come 
from the EU. The Czech Republic and Poland also have a sizeable share of migrant 
workers from Asian countries, notably Vietnam, whereas Hungary hosts the largest 
Chinese Diaspora community in Central Europe (2002: 6 percent of all legal foreign 
residents).32 
In most new EU member states migrant workers and employees represent a relatively 
small segment of the work force (Table 3). Only in the government-controlled, i.e. 
Greek, part of Cyprus is the share of foreign labor above the EU average and 
continuously growing.33 
Foreign Residents vs. Foreign-Born: EU and US concepts 
The exact number of migrants residing in Europe is unknown. This is partly due to the 
fact that, unlike the United States, many European countries continue to use nationality, 
rather than place or country of birth as a standard criterion in their demographic, 
economic and social statistics.  Nationality merely distinguishes natives from legal 
foreign residents, i.e., people living in Europe as citizens of another EU member state 
or as third country nationals. The concept of legal foreign residents includes both 
immigrants and native-born children/grandchildren of immigrants, who at birth only 
acquired the (foreign) citizenship of their parents. In many documents of the European 
Commission and of EU member states, until now, legal foreign residents or third 
country nationals have been used as “proxy” for immigrants, not accounting for the 
rapidly growing number of naturalized citizens of EU member states.34 While in the EU 
most legal foreign residents in fact are migrants, it is no longer accurate to conclude 
that most migrants are foreign residents. At the same time, those holding citizenship of 
their country of residence are not all native-born. Some of them are naturalized 
immigrants. Others were already citizens of the destination country when they 
immigrated. 
In countries with high naturalization rates and/or ius soli birthright citizenship,35 the 
official number of legal foreign residents substantially underestimates the immigrant 
population. This is obvious for the US and Canada, but can also be demonstrated for a 
few EU countries with high naturalization rates. In 2001, for example, Sweden’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 See OECD/Sopemi (2004). 
32 See IOM (2004). 
33 In 2003, relative to population size, Cyprus (government-controlled, i.e. Greek part only) had the highest 
positive migration balance (Table 1). 
34 In the decade 1992-2001 some 5,855,000 people were naturalized in one of the EU 15 countries 
(OECD/Sopemi 2004). 
35 Ius soli birthright citizenship primarily defines nationality through place of birth thus giving some, most 
or all children (or grandchildren) of foreign immigrants automatic access to citizenship of the receiving 
country. 
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foreign-born population was 1,028,000 while only 476,000 people were legal foreign 
residents. In the Netherlands, the respective figures for 2001 were 1,675,000 foreign-
born residents, but only 690,000 legal foreign residents (Table 4). 
 
Basic Concepts in Europe and the USA 
 
European concept: Citizenship US concept:  Place of birth  applied to the EU context 
 Native-born population Foreign-born population 
Citizens of a particular EU member 
state 
Majority of domestic population in 
receiving countries; native-born 
children and grandchildren of foreign 
immigrants who acquired the 
receiving countries’ citizenship at 
birth (ius soli) or through 
naturalization 
Naturalized immigrants; 
people who immigrated as 
citizens of the receiving 
country 
Other EU citizens Children/grandchildren of EU 
immigrants who did not acquire the 
receiving countries’ citizenship at 
birth or through naturalization  
Immigrants from other EU 
member states 
Third country nationals Children/grandchildren of third 
country immigrants who did not 
acquire the receiving countries’ 
citizenship at birth or through 
naturalization 




Little is known about the characteristics of foreign-born citizens of EU countries, since 
in many government statistics, other official data and surveys based on nationality 
(rather than place of birth), naturalized citizens are difficult to distinguish from native 
citizens. By the same token native-born children of immigrants holding their parents 
nationality remain registered as “foreigners” unless they naturalize or acquire ius soli 
citizenship of the receiving country at birth. As a result data referring to “third country 
nationals” include not only foreign-born residents, but also native-born residents of EU 
countries who do not hold EU citizenship. Furthermore only a few countries try to deal 
in their official statistics with irregular migrants. Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain have offered quantitatively significant regularization programs. Smaller numbers 
of irregular migrants were regularized in Germany, Luxemburg and the UK. Since the 
1970s the EU member states listed in this paragraph collectively regularized a little less 
than 3.5 million irregular foreign residents.36 Of them 2.5 million were regularized in 
                                                 
36 Including irregular labor migrants, unsuccessful asylum applicants, and people admitted under temporary 
protection status (TPS). See Apap et al. (2000), Niessen and Schiebel (2002), OECD/Sopemi (2004), 
Papademetriou et al. 2004. 
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recent years (1995-2002).37 Most of them were irregular labor migrants. Spain 
continues to give irregular migrants access to basic medical services if they register 
with local municipalities. As a result Spain, in 2002-03, had 2,664,000 registered 
foreign-born residents,38 but only 1,109,000 legal foreign residents (Table 3). 
Europe’s Immigrants:  How many? 
According to national population statistics, population registers, and census data 
collected around 2000-02, the EU 15 states were home or host to some 18.7 million 
legal foreign residents (Table 4).39 This is the number also reported by Eurostat’s 
Chronos database. Of these, fewer than 6 million people were EU citizens living in 
another EU member state, and some 13 million were third country nationals.40 By 
contrast, data collected by national correspondents of OECD’s Sopemi network put the 
number of foreign nationals in EU 15 during the same period at 20.1 million. The 
differences were particularly visible for Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal. The 18.7 
million to 20.1 million legal foreign residents of the EU in 2000-02 included both 
foreign-born individuals and natives not holding the citizenship of the EU country in 
which they lived. 
As only some EU member states register the country of birth of their residents, the 
European Labor Force Survey (LFS) is the sole Europe-wide data source that provides 
information on people born outside their country of residence. In 2002, according to the 
LFS, an estimated 22.7 million people (for whom the duration of stay is known) were 
born in another EU or third country. For a partially overlapping group of 14.8 million 
people (except foreign-born residents of Germany and Italy),41 there is information on 
their country of birth.42  
In order to calculate the total number of foreign-born in the EU, it is necessary to 
include estimates for Germany and Italy (derived below).43 Adding these estimated 11.4 
million to the number of immigrants with country of birth identified in the LFS (14.8 
                                                 
37 See OECD/Sopemi (2004), Papademetriou et al. 2004. 
38 Regular and irregular migrants based on the local municipalities’ registers. 
39 Not all of them are foreign-born (i.e., immigrants). Some are native-born, holding the citizenship of their 
parent’s country of origin only. 
40 Another 1.7 million legal foreign residents live in Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
41 Data on foreign-born residents of Germany and Italy (by country of birth) are not available from the LFS.  
In Germany country of birth is not asked while Italy does not consent to the publication of this information. 
42 The two groups are only partially overlapping; as for some people we only know either their county of 
birth or their duration of stay. For some we know neither their county of birth nor their duration of stay. 
The latter have been excluded from the calculation though some of them might actually be immigrants. 
43 For Germany, the best estimate combines the number of legal foreign residents not born in the country 
(5.7 million), a certain percentage of the persons naturalized (some 65% out of 1.4 million) and the number 
of ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler with German citizenship still alive in 2002: 3.2 million). The 
estimated number for Germany therefore is 9.7 million (see Münz and Ulrich 2003). The assumed number 
for Italy is 2.2 million based on the number of residency permits (2003, various categories) and an estimate 
for foreign children not required to hold residency permits (Einaudi 2004). 
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million) puts the foreign-born population at 26.2 million.44 A similar figure (26.4 
million) is published by the UN Population Division for EU 15 in 2002.45  
For 10 of the EU 15 states, data on the foreign-born (i.e., immigrant) population are 
available from either population registers46 a recent census,47 or from other sources.48 
The aggregated results put the number of foreign-born residents in these 10 countries at 
24.6 million (Table 4). Combining the information from the LFS49 with that produced 
by the UN Population Division and data from national censuses and population 
registers (looking only at the highest available figure or estimate), the number of first 
generation immigrants in the EU 15 in 2002 can be put at 33.0 million. As published 
and unpublished data for some countries still underestimate the size of the foreign-born 
population,50 one can assume the presence of 33-36 million legal immigrants—both 
foreign nationals and citizens—and irregular migrants51 in EU 15 (2001-02). Adding 
another 1.8 million immigrants living in the other EEA states and Switzerland52 and 
some 1.5 million immigrants living in the new EU member states in Central Europe53 
brings the size of Western and Central Europe’s migrant population to 36-39 million 
people. Given available information and the shortcomings mentioned, this could be 
seen as a best estimate. 
                                                 
44 Despite the restrictions described some data on foreign-born people in Germany and Italy (with duration 
of stay known) can be obtained from the LFS.  
45 Standard UN criteria define international migrants as persons residing outside their country of birth or 
citizenship for 12 months or more. But for its statistics the UN Population Division has to rely on national 
data sources. Some countries define migrants according to different criteria; others publish data on legal 
foreign residents, but not on the foreign-born population. 
46 Denmark, Finland, Spain, Sweden. 
47 Austria, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands. 
48 Data for Germany are from foreigner’s registers, naturalization statistics and an Allbus survey estimate 
for ethnic German Aussiedler (see Münz and Ulrich 2003); data for Italy are based on residency permits 
(see Einaudi 2004). 
49 This calculation takes the foreign-born population by duration of stay or country of birth (whatever is 
higher). 
50 Such an undercount has to be assumed both for foreign immigrants with short duration of stay and/or 
irregular status as well as for naturalized immigrants with a fairly long duration of stay, in particular 
privileged co-ethnic immigrants (e.g., ethnic German Aussiedler, Pontian Greeks) and colonial return 
migrants (e.g., French pieds noirs). 
51 Prior to recent regularization programs in Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain the irregular migrants 
seemingly was above 10 percent of the total foreign-born population: for the UK 10% might be a good 
estimate: figures for Denmark, Sweden and Finland could be lower than 10%. We can estimate such 
differences both from recent regularization and amnesty programs (see Papademetriou et al. 2004) as well 
as from discrepancies between local registers and general census results or national registers (see the case 
of Spain; Table 4). 
52 Migration between the EU 25 and Switzerland is regulated through bilateral agreements.  
53 New EU member states in Central Europe are: Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; other new member states are: Cyprus, Malta. In the new EU member states, 
most labor migrant apparently come from neighboring countries such as the Balkans, Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine. Several countries are also home or host to labor migrants from Asian countries, 
notably China and Vietnam. 
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Education Levels 
The skills profile of the foreign-born population is markedly different from that of the 
total EU population (Table 5). Both people with low formal education54 (immigrants: 
52 percent; EU 15 average: 43 percent) and with high formal education55 (immigrants: 
20 percent; EU 15 average: 17 percent) are overrepresented among immigrants. People 
with medium formal education56 are underrepresented (immigrants: 28 percent; EU 15 
average: 39 percent). This is mainly a result of labor markets primarily creating demand 
for high and low skilled migrants. Immigrants from Southern Europe living in another 
EU country as well as immigrant populations from Turkey, North Africa/Middle East 
and sub-Saharan Africa have relatively high proportions of people with low skills. In 
contrast immigrant groups from North-Western Europe living in another EU country 
and, in particular, immigrants from other industrialized world regions (North America, 
Australia/New Zealand) have higher proportions of highly skilled people.  
Work Force 
In 2002 there were some 250 million working age (15-64) people living in the EU 15. 
Of them, 161 million were actually employed, for an overall employment rate of 64.2 
percent (Table 6). Another 13.5 million were seeking a job, for an overall 
unemployment rate of 5.4 percent. Between 1997 and 2002 the number of people 
employed57 in the EU 15 increased by about 12 million, out of which 9.5 million were 
EU nationals and more than 2.5 million third-country nationals. While the share of 
third-country nationals in total EU employment was just 3.6 percent in 2002, they 
contributed to employment growth by 13 percent during the period 1997-2002 (Tables 
6 and 7).58 If we account for foreign-born naturalized EU citizens the contribution of 
immigrants to employment growth is on the order of 20 percent (Table 6). For 
comparison, between 1996 and 2000, foreign-born workers accounted for nearly half of 
the net increase in the US labor force.59  
In 1997, the employment rates of EU nationals already had reached 79 percent for the 
medium skilled and 88 percent for the high skilled. In 2002 they had further risen to 82 
percent and 89 percent respectively. A similar development is true for legal foreign 
residents in EU 15.  
The number of medium skilled increased by 50 percent and that of high skilled 
doubled, amounting to more than 60 percent of the total increase in employment.60 This 
reflected cyclical growth in employment and the migrants’ over-proportional 
contribution to the increase during 1997-2002, a period of economic and employment 
                                                 
54 Only primary education completed. 
55 Tertiary education completed. 
56 Lower or higher secondary education completed. 
57 Defined as the number of people gainfully employed (i.e. workers/employees with salary plus self 
employed persons) in the working age population (15-64) in the European Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
This figure excludes people working as dependent family members without pay or for benefits in kind in a 
family owned farm or business. 
58 European Commission (2004c). 
59 See Mosisa (2002).  
60 European Commission (2004b). 
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growth. The situation for the low skilled is less favorable, with more modest 
employment increase, but was nonetheless stronger for third-country nationals than for 
EU-nationals.61 
Employment and Unemployment Rates 
The employment rate of working age adults (15-64 years) varies according to the place 
of origin (Table 8). EU working age adults had an overall employment rate of 64.2 
percent and an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent in 2002. Immigrants from Western 
and Southern Europe living in another EU country and from other industrialized 
countries have higher employment rates (Western and Southern EU: 67 percent; North 
America, Australia: 76 percent) and lower unemployment rates (Western EU: 4.7 
percent, Southern EU: 4.2 percent, North America/Australia: 3.5 percent) than those of 
the total EU. The opposite is true for immigrants from other parts of the world. 
Employment is particularly low and unemployment correspondingly high among 
immigrants from Turkey (50 percent and 9.2 percent), Middle East/Africa (51 percent 
and 9.8 percent), and Asia (59 percent and 5.2 percent).  Immigrants from the new EU 
member states, the Balkans and Eastern Europe (collectively the Central and Eastern 
Europe Countries, or EU 8 plus CEE) and from Latin America have almost the same 
employment rate (63 percent) as the EU 15 average, but higher unemployment 
(Balkans, Eastern Europe: 7.8 percent, Latin America 8.3 percent).  
Foreign-born men only have a slightly lower employment rate (71 percent) and higher 
unemployment (7.3 percent) than the total EU 15 male population (73 percent; and 5.4 
percent, respectively). Employment is high among male immigrants from other EU 
member states, the Americas and Australia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (75 
percent, 86 percent, and 74 percent respectively). Only male immigrants from Turkey 
and also Africa and the Middle East have significantly lower employment rates (65 
percent and 63 percent respectively) and much higher unemployment (11.6 percent and 
11.4 percent respectively. 
Differences are larger among women. Female immigrants from Turkey, and from 
Africa and the Middle East have particularly low employment rates (34 percent and 39 
percent respectively) and high unemployment rates (6.9 percent and 8.0 percent 
respectively) relative to all EU women (55 percent and 5.3 percent respectively) .The 
opposite is true for women from Western EU countries (61 percent and 4.3 percent) and 
from N. America and Australia (68 percent and 3.4 percent). Women from Asia have 
particularly low employment and unemployment rates (46 percent and 4.7 percent, 
respectively.  Women from Latin America have particularly high unemployment (11.1 
percent).  
When comparing legal foreign residents with the EU 15 average, the differences are 
much larger (Table 9). The overall employment rate of other EU citizens residing in the 
EU 15 but outside their country of citizenship, and of third country nationals, is only 59 
percent as compared with an average of 64 percent for the EU 15 as a whole.  The 
unemployment rate of foreign residents is 7.7 percent as compared with an average of 
5.4 percent for the EU 15 as a whole. Among foreign men the employment rate is 69 
                                                 
61 European Commission (2004b). 
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percent and the unemployment rate is 9.1 percent, as compared with EU 15 averages of 
73 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. Among foreign women, the employment rate 
is 48 percent and the unemployment rate 6.3 percent, compared with averages of 56 
percent and 5.3 percent respectively for all EU 15 women. 
A comparison of rates of employment computed for the foreign-born and those 
computed for the legal foreign resident population (Table 10) shows clear 
discrepancies, especially regarding persons associated with the new EU member states, 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe, Turkey, Africa and the Middle East (Table 11). Such 
discrepancies, however, vary by country of residence. This is exemplified in a cross-
country comparison of immigrants from and nationals of the Maghreb62 and Turkey 
(Table 12). In most EU countries, which in the past received immigrants from the 
Southern and/or Eastern Mediterranean, the immigrants born in Turkey and the 
Maghreb have higher employment rates than Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian and 
Turkish citizens living in these countries. For Turks this is true in Belgium, Denmark, 
Austria, Sweden, and the UK.  For Maghreb citizens the differences are visible in 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. This can be interpreted as a result of 
particularly exclusionary mechanisms in labor markets of these countries affecting 
foreign nationals more adversely than naturalized citizens. But such discrepancies are 
almost nonexistent when comparing immigrants from other EU member states, North 
America and Australia as well as Latin America with nationals of the same regions 
living in EU 15 (Table 10). 
In the US, the foreign-born population is also extremely heterogeneous with respect to 
labor market performance as measured by labor force participation and unemployment 
rates. Among persons between the ages of 15 and 64, the US-born population as well as 
North/West European, Canadian, and African immigrants to the US have labor force 
participation rates of over 72 percent. In contrast, Mexican, Caribbean, West Asian, 
Caribbean and Central American immigrants have considerably lower rates of labor 
force participation (between 62 and 66 percent).63   
Likewise, in the US there is strong variation in unemployment rates between groups. 
North/West European and Canadian immigrants have the lowest unemployment rate 
(3.1 percent); moreover, the rate for several other immigrant groups is less than that for 
the US-born population (5.6 percent).  Other groups have unemployment rates that are 
almost double that of the American born population: rates for Mexican (9.4 percent), 
Caribbean (9.3 percent) and Central American (8.4 percent) immigrants are particularly 
high.64   
Occupational Structure and Industry Structure 
On the whole the occupational structure of foreign-born workers in Europe (as 
identified in the LFS) is different from the EU 15 average (Table 13). Immigrant 
workers are underrepresented in medium-skilled non-manual positions (immigrants: 9 
percent; EU 15 average: 13 percent) and over-represented in non-skilled manual 
                                                 
62 Algeria, Morocco, Tunesia. 
63 US Census results of 2000; see Ray (2004). For a critical review of these findings see Lowell 2004. 
64 US Census results of 2000; see Ray (2004), Lowell 2004. 
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positions (immigrants: 24 percent; EU 15 average: 18 percent). Immigrants from 
northwestern Europe living elsewhere in the EU, as well as immigrants from other 
industrialized countries (North America, Australia/New Zealand), predominantly 
occupy highly skilled non-manual positions (Western EU immigrants: 50 percent, 
North American immigrants: 65 percent, EU 15 average: 37 percent). Immigrants from 
southern Europe living elsewhere in the EU (skilled manual: 32 percent, unskilled 
manual: 27 percent), as well as immigrants from the Balkans, Central and Eastern 
Europe (skilled manual: 22 percent unskilled manual: 36 percent) and from Turkey 
(skilled manual: 23 percent, unskilled manual: 35 percent), are disproportionately 
active in skilled and unskilled manual positions (EU 15 average skilled manual: 18 
percent, unskilled manual: 18 percent). Immigrants from North Africa/Middle East and 
sub-Saharan Africa as well as from Asia have an average representation in highly 
skilled non-manual positions65 but are disproportionately active in unskilled manual 
positions (Africa: 24 percent, Asia: 28 percent). 
In comparison with the overall EU population (Table 14), legal foreign residents on 
average are less concentrated in highly skilled non-manual positions (29 percent, EU 15 
average: 37 percent), but they are over-represented in skilled manual (20 percent, EU 
15: 18 percent) and particularly in unskilled manual positions (29 percent, EU 15: 18 
percent). These differences between the foreign-born and foreign nationals are 
significant for the following regions of origin and groups of foreign nationality: Turkey, 
North Africa/Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Such differences are less pronounced but still visible for migrants from/nationals of 
southern Europe and Asia. And there are only very small differences for migrants from 
or nationals of northwestern Europe and North America, Australia/New Zealand.  
Differences between the industrial distribution of immigrant and overall EU 15 
workforce are accentuated when comparing the latter with the legal foreign resident 
workforce. Foreign nationals are more frequently employed in manufacturing, 
construction, hotels and restaurants, and research and development than the EU 15 
average (Table 15). At the same time they are less likely to work in the public sector, in 
particular public administration and education (Table 16). Such differences point to the 
fact that many foreign residents take up less stable jobs in manufacturing, construction 
and tourism. And it clearly reflects the exclusion of third country nationals from 
important parts of the public sector while naturalized immigrants have access to this 
segment of the labor market. 
In the US, Mexican and Central American immigrants are heavily concentrated in 
manufacturing, construction, and accommodation and food services industries, both 
relative to the US-born population and other immigrant groups. In contrast, African and 
Caribbean immigrants are strongly represented in education, health, care and social 
services, and like Mexicans and Central Americans, in accommodation and food 
services.  Other immigrant groups, namely those from Northern/Western Europe and 
Canada and Eastern Europe are more strongly represented than the US-born population 
                                                 
65 This could well be influenced by an over representation of skilled migrants in the LFS. 
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in some high-skill industries: professional, science, management and administration, 
finance, insurance and real estate, and information technology.66   
Economic Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants 
In Europe, over the last decade, third-country nationals' unemployment has remained 
higher than EU nationals' unemployment (Table 9). Third-country nationals (designated 
“Rest of the World”) have much lower employment rates than EU-nationals (12 
percentage points lower in 2002), in particular, in the prime-age group (20 percentage 
points lower) and for the high skilled. The gap is, on average, wider for women than for 
men, within all working age groups.67  
In more than half of the EU 15 this gap has been shrinking over the last decade. From 
1994 to 2002, the employment rates of non-EU nationals improved significantly in 
Portugal (+28 percentage points), Spain, (+22 percentage points), Denmark (+18 
percentage points), the Netherlands (+16 percentage points), Ireland (+13 percentage 
points) and Finland (+12 percentage points).68 Smaller increases were recorded in the 
United Kingdom, Sweden and Greece. The employment rates for non-EU nationals 
remained below average in France and Belgium, and there was a decline in the 
employment rates of non-EU nationals in Austria (-3.5 percentage points),69 
Luxembourg (-3.1 percentage points) and Germany (-2.0 percentage points).70 
Migrant workers and employees originating from non-Western and non-EU countries 
are not only concentrated in a few sectors, but within them, in the lower skilled 
segments. A growing number of them are employed in the health and care sector as 
well as in education. Domestic services also play an important role, though not always 
visible in available statistics due to the high proportion of irregular migrants working in 
this sector. By contrast young people of foreign origin tend to be increasingly working 
in jobs closer to the native profile.71   
Whether these changes mean a better starting point for migrants' longer-term 
integration in the labor market is questionable, as they still tend to remain concentrated 
in low quality service jobs offering little room in terms of adaptability and mobility. 
The distinction, however, tends to be less marked if one compares native-born with 
foreign-born workers and employees (Table 16). This is to be expected as naturalized 
citizens tend to be better integrated than legal foreign residents. However discrepancies 
exist between immigrants from non-industrialized countries and Europe’s majority 
populations.  
Those third country nationals who entered the EU in recent years tend, on average, to 
have a higher skill level than those established in the EU for a decade or longer. Yet 
their activity rates are lower and their unemployment rates higher than for longer 
established immigrants. In 2002, the employment rate of migrants originating from 
                                                 
66 US Census results of 2000; see Ray (2004). 
67 European Commission (2003b). 
68 Finland since entering EU in 1995. 
69 Austria since entering EU in 1995. 
70 See European Commission (2003b), Ray (2004). 
71 See OECD/Sopemi (2003, 2004). 
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non-EU countries who arrived in 2001 (45 percent) was nearly 20 points below that of 
those who arrived 10 years earlier.72 
Differences in employment, economic performances and integration of third country 
nationals are strongly correlated with the country of origin. The employment rate of 
legal foreign residents from North Africa and Turkey is systematically lower than for 
EU nationals at any skill level (Table 17). This gap is more marked for women. Again 
the differences are somewhat less pronounced if native-born vs. foreign-born 
populations are compared (instead of citizens vs. foreign residents).73 In contrast, 
citizens of Balkan countries have employment rates that are equal to or exceed EU 
nationals' levels both for men and women. The same is true for North Americans and 
Australians residing in Europe as well as for citizens of northwestern Europe residing in 
another EU member state. 
In order to get a more accurate and complete picture of the economic position and 
performance of migrants in Europe, the focus has to shift beyond the foreign 
resident/foreign national population, as they constitute a sub-segment of the overall 
migrant population. Naturalization in many EU 15 countries has drastically increased 
during the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, leaving foreign nationals less 
and less representative of the migrant population. As a result, the economic position of 
the foreign-born population in EU 15 differs less on average from that of the total 
European population than does the economic position of the foreign resident 
population. The latter are in a less favourable economic position.   
If one only looks at foreign nationals, i.e., disregarding persons who have naturalized in 
the receiving country, one could derive an overly negative picture. And one might even 
get the impression that the economic position of migrants is deteriorating, particularly 
in EU countries with a longer tradition of immigration and higher naturalization rates.74 
But the analysis of European Labour Force Survey data shows that immigrants in 
Europe are apparently more successful than is suggested by the surveys and data that 
focus on foreign nationals. Thus, differences between traditional countries of 
immigration—such as Australia, Canada and the US75—and European countries are 
probably smaller than assumed.76 Nevertheless for certain immigrant groups—in 
particular those coming from middle- and low-income countries—considerable 
employment gaps remain. The analysis of LFS data also makes clear that immigrants 
who do not naturalize within the first 10-15 years are especially likely to remain in low-
skill and low-paid employment. This sectoral concentration of foreign residents can 
partly be explained by labor shortages and lower requirements in terms of specific 
skills. Such circumstance may provide immigrants and their children with an 
opportunity to enter the EU labor market. However, relatively large numbers of non-EU 
nationals in some sectors with limited rights or scope for labor market mobility will not 
be in a strong position regarding wages and job-quality.77   
                                                 
72 Calculations kindly provided by European Commission services. 
73 See Münz and Fassmann (2004). 
74 In the decade 1992-2001 some 5,855,000 people were naturalized in the EU 15 (OECD/Sopemi 2003). 
75 See Lowell (2004), Papdemetriou and O’Neill (2004). 
76 See Münz and Fassmann (2004). 
77 See European Commission (2003a). 
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Therefore integration of third-country nationals newly arriving and residing in Europe 
remains an important issue for the EU, its member states and European civil society.78 
In recent years a growing number of EU member states have introduced integration 
programs, ranging from language training courses to civic education.79 
In contrast to many EU Member States, economic integration of newcomers in the US 
is primarily based on the power of labor market absorption. In the rapidly expanding 
economy of the 1990s, this seemed to be justified as immigrants found employment in a 
wide range of occupations and industrial sectors, and many groups had both high rates 
of labor force participation and low to modest unemployment levels. It is also clear that 
some groups fared far better in these vigorous economic circumstances than others, and 
that many individuals, even after many years of residence in the United States, remain 
in low-skill and low-paid employment.80 The absence of integration policies and 
programs seemingly had few immediate negative consequences in the context of an 
expanding and, by European standards, much less regulated labor market open to 
regular and irregular immigrants. But it has also been argued that the lack of attention 
to utilizing and/or developing the human capital of newcomers so that they might 
effectively participate in a knowledge-based economy may simply create a more 
daunting set of long term problems for immigrants and their children.81  
The analysis for Europe clearly shows the importance of citizenship for the process of 
integration. There is, however, no simple causality. On the one hand naturalization may 
help to gain access to certain segments of the labor market and to reduce 
discrimination. On the other hand it is evident that successful economic integration of 
immigrants makes it more likely that they become citizens of the receiving country.82  
In any case the results clearly show that sustained efforts for the economic and civic 
integration of immigrants and their native-born children (i.e., the so-called second 
generation) are necessary.83 This goes along with efforts of the EU to implement anti-
discrimination and equal opportunities legislation in all its member states.84 
                                                 
78 See European Commission (2000, 2003). 
79 For a summary of such integration programs see Bade, Bommes and Münz (2004), Ray (2004), 
Tijdelijke Commissie onderzoek Integratiebeleid (2004), Heckmann and Schnapper (2003). 
80 The US-born population also experienced varying degrees of socio-economic mobility during the 1990s. 
81 See Ray (2004), Portes and Rumbaut (2001). 
82 This can be demonstrated for Canada (see DeVorez and Pivnenko 2004) and for Sweden (see Bevelander 
2000). 
83 “Since the launch of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in 1997, the integration of disadvantaged 
groups, including migrant workers and ethnic minorities, as well as combating discrimination, have been 
key features of the employment guidelines. In its Communication of 17 July 2002, the Commission 
reviewed the experience of five years of the EES and identified major issues for the debate on its future. 
These include reducing the employment gap between EU nationals and non-EU nationals, promoting full 
participation and employment for 2nd generation migrants, addressing the specific needs of immigrant 
women, fighting illegal immigration and transforming undeclared work into regular employment.” 
(European Commission 2003a) 
84 “The EU has also put in place a legal framework to combat discrimination – which can seriously impede 
the integration process – and in particular common minimum standards to promote equal treatment and to 
combat discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation. Directives approved at EU level in 2000 will give important new rights both to arriving 
migrants and to established ethnic minorities in the EU. The scope of Community legislation banning racial 
discrimination is wide and covers employment, education, social security, health care, access to goods and 
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Demographic Imbalances 
In the following section on divergent demographic trends and their likely consequences 
for migration, for the sake of brevity, Europe and its neighboring regions are analyzed 
according to three groups of countries:85 (a) Western and Central Europe,86 (b) Eastern 
Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and Central Asia (EECA-20),87 (c) the Middle East, North 
Africa, and the Gulf states (MENA-20).88  
As outlined above, Europe’s demographic situation is characterized by low fertility, an 
increasing life expectancy, and the prospect of shrinking domestic populations in the 
decades to come. The data for 2003 already show that the number of countries with a 
shrinking domestic population is growing; the number of countries with a negative 
migration balance is now very small. This contrasts with the situation in neighboring 
regions to the south and southeast, where fertility is much higher, albeit declining, life 
expectancy is also increasing, and overall population is projected to continue to grow at 
a high pace.  
Low fertility and increasing life expectancy in Europe both reverse the age pyramid, 
leading to a shrinking number of younger people, an aging work force, and an 
increasing number and share of older people. According to Eurostat data and 
projections by the United Nations, Western and Central Europe’s total population size 
will remain virtually stable during the next 20 years (2000: 464 million, 2003: 467 
million, 2025: 466 million) and start to decrease only during the following decades to 
442 million by 2050. But in the absence of massive recruitment of economically active 
migrants, the number of people between ages 15 and 64 will decrease from 312 million 
in 2000 to 295 million in 2025 (a 5.5 percent decline) and to 251 million by 2050 (a 
drop of 19.6 percent). The old age dependency ratio is likely to increase from 23 
percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2025 and to 45 to 50 percent by 2050.  
Even more worrisome is the change in the ratio between persons who are economically 
active and those who are retired. If the overall employment rate remains about 70 
percent, this ratio (economically active vs. retired) will decline from 2.7 in 2010, to 2.2 
in 2020, to 1.8 in 2030 and level off at 1.5 in 2040. If, after reaching the Lisbon target, 
                                                                                                                                                 
services and to housing. Although the directives do not cover discrimination on grounds of nationality, and 
are without prejudice to the conditions relating to the entry and residence of third country nationals and to 
any treatment, which arises from their legal status, they do apply to all persons resident in the Member 
States, including third country nationals. In addition, several activities aiming at exchange of experiences 
and good practice are carried out under the accompanying programme to combat discrimination. The 
Commission also supports the work of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism.” (European 
Commission 2003a) See also EUMC (2003). 
85 This typology derives from similar exercises published by the World Bank and the UN (see Holzmann 
and Münz 2004, UN Population Division 2003). 
86 The 28 EU+EEA countries and Switzerland. 
87 The EECA-20 countries consist of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed., 
Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
88 The MENA-20 countries consist of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Migration, Labor Markets and Integration of Migrants:  An Overview for Europe with a Comparison to the U.S.  Münz 
 IV-17
the overall employment rate were to rise further to 75 percent between 2010 and 2020, 
the decline in this ratio would be attenuated, reaching 2.4 in 2020.89 
The situation in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and Central Asia (EECA-20) is 
similar to the one in the EU-25. In the EECA-20, the population will also remain stable 
during the next 25 years (in 2000, 405 million; by 2025, 407 million) and then start to 
decrease during the following decades to 381 million by 2050 (a drop of 6.2 percent). 
Continuing population growth is expected for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and most parts of 
Central Asia, but most Balkan countries, Russia, and Ukraine face considerable 
demographic decline.90 In the EECA 20, the number of people between ages 15 and 64 
will slightly increase from 270 million in 2000 to 277 million in 2025 (2.6 percent) 
before rapidly decreasing to 235 million by 2050, (a drop of 13 percent). 
In contrast, the situation in Europe’s southern and southeastern neighbors (the Middle 
East, North Africa, and the Gulf states [MENA-20]) is characterized by higher—but 
declining—fertility, rising life expectancy, and sustained demographic growth. Total 
population in the MENA-20 will grow steadily from 316 million in 2000 to 492 million 
by 2025 (a 55.7 percent increase) and to 638 million by 2050 (an increase of 102.0 
percent). During this period, the number of people between ages 15 and 64 will more 
than double, from 187 million in 2000 to 323 million by 2025 (72.7 percent) and 
continue to grow at almost the same rate to 417 million by 2050 (for an overall increase 
of 123.0 percent).91   
Labor Force 
The change in the economically active population, however, will be smaller than the 
projected changes for the age group 15 to 64, because only 60 to 80 percent of this age 
group are currently employed or self-employed. After 2010, Western and Central 
Europe (the EU-25) can expect a decrease in the active population. A decline of 16 
million can be anticipated between 2000 and 2025. During the same period (2000–25), 
the active or job-seeking population will still increase by 7 million people in the EECA-
20 and by 93 million in the MENA-20.92 In the EECA-20, this increase will mainly take 
place in Turkey and Central Asia; in countries such as Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Montenegro,93 Moldavia, and Romania the active or job-seeking population is already 
shrinking. 
Throughout the 21st century, Europe will be confronted with a rapidly shrinking native 
work force. It is expected to decline by 46 million by 2050. At the same time, the 
potentially active population in many of Europe’s southern and southeastern neighbors 
will continue to grow (MENA-20, +157 million; Turkey and parts of Central Asia, +17 
million).94 To absorb those currently unemployed and those entering the labor market, 
                                                 
89 European Commission (2003a). 
90 Some EECA-20 countries—for example, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Romania—already have a declining 
population. 
91 Data from the United Nations Common Database. 
92 Data from authors’ own calculations, based on projections from the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) Economically Active Population database and United Nations Population Division (2003). 
93 Without Kosovo. 
94 At the same time, the rest of the EECA will follow Europe’s decline in population, losing 45 million. 
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the MENA-20 countries would have to create 45 million new jobs by 2010 and more 
than 100 million by 2025 while Europe is confronted with choices concerning higher 
pensionable age, higher labor force participation of women, and the recruitment of 
immigrants. The current labor market conditions in the MENA-20 countries raise 
doubts whether these economies will be able to absorb the significant expansion of the 
labor force. As a consequence of persistent, large-scale unemployment, migration 
pressures on the contracting labor markets in Europe will increase. 
Outlook 
Europe's demographic situation is characterized by longevity and low fertility. This 
leads to aging and eventually shrinking domestic populations and work forces. Given 
the high levels of employment already reached by skilled EU-nationals, recruitment of 
migrants from third countries is increasingly appearing as the main way of responding 
to the growing demand for medium and high skilled labor. At the same time, Europe 
experiences a continuing demand for low skilled labor.95 For these demographic and 
economic reasons, during the 21st century, all present EU+EEA member states and 
accession countries will either remain or become immigration countries.  
After 2010, many countries will have to develop pro-active migration policies to meet 
burgeoning demographic and economic needs. For a relatively short period of time, 
European East-West migration will continue to play a role.96 But in the medium and 
long term, potential migrants will inevitably be recruited from other world regions. In 
this context, Europe will have to compete with traditional countries of immigration—in 
particular Australia, Canada, and the USA—for qualified migrants to fill labor gaps. 
The main challenge will be to put Europe in a position that allows the EU and its 
member states to actually attract and recruit migrants matching EU labor market needs 
and to sustain economic growth as well as support for the public pension system. In this 
context a pro-active approach to immigration can play a crucial role in tackling 
shortages of labor and skills, provided the qualifications of immigrants are 
appropriate.97 
The demographic projections are relatively robust, clearly indicating for the foreseeable 
future a decline of Europe’s working age population. There are, however, significant 
impediments to deriving accurate projections to help with the middle and long-term 
planning of policies to meet labor supply requirements. This partly is linked to 
problems with predicting phenomena that are influenced by complex, often volatile 
economic factors, and that may also be significantly affected by unforeseeable policy 
developments in years to come. Accurate projections are also difficult to disaggregate, 
especially regarding occupations and skills requirements. In any case, while 
demographic projections give a clear picture for the next 40 years, projections of 
emerging skills gaps cannot realistically cover more than a 15-year time frame at most. 
                                                 
95 See European Commission (2004). 
96 See Fassmann and Münz (2002), Krieger (2004). 
97 See European Commission (2003), Holzmann and Münz (2004). 
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More accurate or disaggregated projections may not even be possible for such a time 
span.98  
The migrants most likely to help match shortages of labor and skills and with the best 
chances to integrate are probably those who are able to adapt to changing conditions, by 
virtue of their qualifications, experience and personal abilities. Future selection 
mechanisms of a pro-active migration policy must be put in order to assess both 
qualifications and adaptability of potential immigrants.99 Given international 
competition for talent and skills, European countries and the EU as a whole will not 
only have to establish selection and admission mechanisms, but will also have to offer 
the migrants sufficiently attractive conditions. 
At the same time, given the political sensitivity of immigration, it is likely that 
governments will find it difficult to justify introducing programmes in the absence of 
already existing acute labor shortages. Even if projections predict quantitative and 
qualitative shortages with a sufficient degree of certainty, governments may require 
more tangible “proof” in order to convince their electorates of the need for additional 
foreign labor. This implies that while projections may provide a basis for policy 
planning in the areas of education, labor market, welfare or social reforms, because of 
the special political sensitivity linked to immigration, it is likely that migration policy 
will remain subject to more short-term, ad hoc planning.100 In this context the EU is 
well placed to develop medium and long-term migration policies able to cope with the 
demographic and economic challenges for Europe described in this paper. 
Today both Europe and North America are home or host to about one fifth of the 
world’s migrant population each. Along with the US and Canada, Western Europe has 
become one of the two most important destinations on the world map of international 
migration. And, given foreseeable demographic and economic imbalances, it is not only 
likely but also necessary that Europe remain on that map and continues to manage 
economically motivated migration for its own benefit. In this context future labor 
market needs will lead to increased competition among EU member states and between 
OECD countries as they will try to recruit attractive potential immigrants. Such a 
competition calls for policy co-ordination and for sustained efforts in the area of 
integration to ensure equal opportunities for the actors involved. When putting this in 
historical perspective, we might conclude that for Europe, in contrast to the US, net 
gains from migration and the possibility of moving towards pro-active migration policy 
are relatively new phenomena.  
 
 
                                                 
98 See Boswell et al. (2004). 
99 See Holzmann and Münz (2004); for the experiences of traditional countries of immigration see 
Papademetriou and O’Neil (2004). 
100 See Boswell et al. (2004). 
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Table 1: Net Migration to Western Europe, 1960-2000 
Annual Average Cumulative Net Migration 


















Austria 3.6 1.9 294 3.6 602 7.5 
Belgium 1.5 1.0 153 1.5 400 3.9 
Denmark 2.5 1.1 129 2.4 226 4.2 
Finland 1.3 -0.5 64 1.2 -76 -1.5 
France 1.0 1.8 585 1.0 3,855 6.5 
Germany 4.4 2.6 3,638 4.4 8,495 10.4 
Greece 4.2 1.0 442 4.2 469 4.4 
Iceland -0.4 -1.1 -1 -0.4 -10 -3.5 
Ireland 2.4 -1.6 91 2.4 -194 -5.1 
Italy 2.0 0.0 1,177 2.0 273 0.5 
Luxembourg 10.0 6.5 42 9.7 100 22.8 
Netherlands 2.3 1.7 360 2.3 1,004 6.3 
Norway 2.0 1.1 88 2.0 186 4.2 
Portugal 0.3 -3.4 35 0.4 -1,162 -11.6 
Spain 0.9 0.0 358 0.9 72 0.2 
Sweden 2.2 2.0 194 2.2 670 7.6 
Switzerland 3.3 3.1 235 3.3 804 11.2 
United  Kingdom 1.5 0.4 827 1.4 941 1.6 
  
Source: UN. World Population Prospects - The 2000 Revision; Brücker (2002); Laczco 
and Münz 2003 
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Table 2: Indicators of Population Change in Europe, 2003 




















EU-25        
Germany 82,537 8.6 10.4 -1.8 1.8 0.0 82,539 
France 59,635 12.7 9.2 3.5 0.9 4.4 59,901 
UK 59,329 11.6 10.2 1.4 1.7 3.1 59,516 
Italy 57,321 9.5 10.0 -0.5 8.9 8.4 57,804 
Spain 41,551 10.4 9.1 1.3 14.2 15.5 42,198 
Poland 38,219 9.2 9.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 38,191 
Netherlands 16,193 12.4 8.7 3.7 0.2 3.8 16,255 
Greece 11,006 9.3 9.4 -0.1 3.2 3.1 11,255 
Portugal 10,408 10.9 10.5 0.4 6.1 6.5 10,475 
Belgium 10,356 10.7 10.2 0.5 3.4 3.9 10,396 
Czech Rep. 10,203 9.2 10.9 -1.7 2.5 0.8 10,212 
Hungary 10,142 9.4 13.5 -4.1 1.5 -2.5 10,117 
Sweden 8,941 11.0 10.4 0.6 3.2 3.8 8,976 
Austria 8,082 9.5 9.5 -0.0 4.0 4.0 8,114 
Denmark 5,384 12.0 10.7 1.3 1.3 2.6 5,398 
Slovakia 5,379 9.6 9.7 -0.1 0.3 0.2 5,380 
Finland 5,206 10.9 9.4 1.5 1.1 2.6 5,220 
Ireland 3,964 15.5 7.3 8.2 7.1 15.3 4,025 
Lithuania 3,463 8.8 11.8 -3.0 -1.8 -4.8 3,446 
Latvia 2,332 9.0 13.9 -4.9 -0.4 -5.3 2,319 
Slovenia 1,995 8.6 9.6 -1.0 1.7 0.7 1,996 
Estonia 1,356 9.6 13.3 -3.7 -0.2 -4.0 1,351 
Cyprus* 715 11.3 7.7 3.6 17.9 21.5 731 
Luxembourg 448 11.8 9.1 2.7 4.6 7.3 452 
Malta 397 10.1 8.0 2.2 4.3 6.5 400 
Total EU 25 454,560 10.4 10.0 0.4 3.7 4.1 456,449 
EEA, non EU 25        
Iceland 289 14.2 6.2 8.0 -0.8 7.2 291 
Liechtenstein 34 8.8 5.0 3.8 10.0 13.8 34 
Norway 4,552 12.0 9.4 3.1 2.4 5.5 4,578 
Total EEA 459,435 10.4 10.0 0.4 3.7 4.1 461,352 
Switzerland 7,318 9.7 8.5 1.2 5.6 6.8 7,368 
EU Accession Countries        
Croatia 4,442 9.0 11.4 -2.4 2.0 -0.4 n.a. 
Bulgaria 7,846 8.4 14.3 -5.7 - -5.7 7,799 
Romania 21,773 9.6 12.2 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 21,716 
   Turkey 70,173 21.0 7.1 13.9 1.4 15.3 71,254 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 2004 
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Table 3: Foreign Labor Force in Selected European Countries in 2000 
 Country 
Foreign Labor Force  
As Percent of  
Total Labor Force 
Foreign Labor Force 
Total 
Austria 10.5 398,622  
Belgium 8.9 378,243 * 
Czech Republic 2.0 115,431  
Denmark 3.4 100,076  
Finland 1.5 39,109 * 
France 6.0 1,603,185  
Germany 8.8 3,599,877  
Hungary 0.9 43,645  
Ireland 3.7 59,619  
Italy 3.6 926,271  
Luxembourg 57.3 107,091  
Netherlands 3.4 248,452 ** 
Norway 4.9 114,431  
Portugal 2.0 101,681  
Slovak Republic 0.2 5,864 * 
Spain 1.2 211,736 * 
Sweden 5.0 239,951  
Switzerland 18.3 707,294  
United Kingdom 4.4 1,293,649  
 * 1999 values                
 ** 1998 values 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Migration, Labor Markets and Integration of Migrants:  An Overview for Europe with a Comparison to the U.S.  Münz 
 IV-27
Table 4: Estimates of Total, Legal Foreign Resident and Immigrant Populations, 
EU 15, 2000-2002: Data Sources Compared 
 (in 1,000s) 












































Belgium 10,356 853 847 784 879 n.a. 974 1,034 
Denmark 5,384 256 267 166 304 322 225 227 
Germany5 82,537 7,344 7,319 5,444 7,349 9,700 n.a. 8,915 
Greece 11,018 161 762 362 534 n.a. 489 480 
Spain 40,683 801 1,109 450 1,259 2,664 858 664 
France6 59,629 3,263 3,263 2,724 6,277 5,868 4,605 1,327 
Ireland 3,964 127 151 118 310 n.a. 232 263 
Italy 57,321 1,271 1,363 n.a. 1,634 2,200 n.a. 511 
Luxemburg 448 148 167 161 162 145 127 119 
Netherlands 16,193 652 690 555 1,576 1,675 1,179 1,593 
Austria 8,067 754 764 695 756 893 899 798 
Portugal 10,408 191 224 106 233 n.a. 1,119 1,313 
Finland 5,206 88 99 50 134 145 81 86 
Sweden 8,941 487 476 295 993 1,028 681 933 
UK 59,329 2,298 2,587 2,026 4,029 n.a. 3,307 4,467 
Total (in 1000s) 379,484 18,692 20,088 13,936 26,429 24,640 14,776 22,730 
1Eurostat, year end population 2002; 2European Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002 (data for Italy are not available); 3UN Population Division, Data for 2000 
or latest available year (see UN 2002); 4Data for Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are from national population registers, data for Austria, 
France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are from the most recent national censuses, data for Spain (2003) are from local municipalities' registers; data 
for Germany are rough estimates based on foreigners’ registers, naturalization statistics and an Allbus survey estimate for ethnic German Aussiedler’ 
taking only immigration after 1950 into account (see Münz and Ulrich 2003), data for Italy are based on the number of residency permits (2003, various 
categories) and an estimate for foreign-born children not required to hold residency permits (see Einaudi 2004);  5 European Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
2002 (data for Germany and Italy are not available); 6 Chronos data, Sopemi data and Census data for France are from 1999. 
 
Source: Münz and Fassmann (2004), Eurostat Chronos DB and European Labour Force Survey, OECD/Sopemi 
(2004), UN Population Division (2002), various national sources. 
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Table 5: Immigrant Population (15+ years) of Known Origin by 
Education Level and Country of Birth, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 























Low5 30.9 76.8 40.8 69.2 58.6 11.6 33.9 41.0 51.8 43.4
Medium6 37.8 15.6 39.5 22.5 24.5 34.7 33.0 31.5 28.2 39.4
High7 31.3 7.6 19.7 8.4 17.0 53.8 33.0 27.5 20.0 17.2
Total  
(Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total   
(in 1,000s) 2,774 2,801 1,628 766 3,084 346 224 966 12,589 312,639
1LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available;  2EU 15 residents born in another EU 15 country (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain) or born 
in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland;  3EU 15 residents born in Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain but living in another EU 15 country; 
4EU 15 residents born in new EU member states, accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia; 5Completed primary education only; 6Completed lower or upper secondary education only; 
7Completed at least tertiary education. 
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Table 6: Immigrant Population of Working Age (15-64 years) and Known Origin 
by Labor Force Status, Gender, and Region of Birth, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 
Immigrant Population by Known 
Region of Birth Labor Force  
Status 





















Unemployed 4.5 5.2 8.2 6.6 5.4 
Inactive 28.2 32.8 34.8 32.1 30.4 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 71.8 67.2 65.2 67.8 69.6 
Unemployment Rate 




















Unemployed 4.7 4.8 9.2 7.3 5.4 
Inactive 20.1 25.4 22.3 21.5 21.7 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 79.9 74.6 77.7 78.5 78.3 
Unemployment Rate 



















Unemployed 4.3 5.5 7.1 5.9 5.3 
Inactive 36.1 37.9 47.5 42.5 39.2 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 63.9 62.1 52.5 57.5 60.8 
Unemployment Rate 








Total (in 1,000s) 2,319 272 3,262 5,853 124,993 
1LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available; 2 EU 15 residents born in another EU 15 
country or born in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland; 3EU 15 residents born in the 
new EU member states (EU 10). 
 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Migration, Labor Markets and Integration of Migrants:  An Overview for Europe with a Comparison to the U.S.  Münz 
 IV-30
Table 7: Distribution of Employment Growth by Region of Origin or Nationality 
and Gender of Worker, EU 15,1 1997-2003:  Two Concepts Compared 
(Percentages) 
Citizenship or Nationality of Persons in the Additional Workforce  
Male Female Total Nationality or 


















Other EU 15 1.32 2.23 1.82 3.23 1.82 2.63 
EU 8 + CEE6 3.9 2.7 5.6 4.1 3.3 4.8 
Other Europe 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.6 0.1 1.0 
North Africa 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.9 
North America, 
Australia 0.4 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 
Other 7.3 5.5 13.4 10.1 6.3 11.6 
Nationals/Natives 85.94 88.45 78.14 81.85 87.34 80.15 
Unknown 0.7 0.5 -1.2 -0.7 0.6 -1.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1Data for Germany and Italy not available; 2EU 15 legal residents with citizenship of another EU 15 member state; 3 EU 15 residents born 
in another EU 15 member state; 4 EU 15 nationals residing in their country of citizenship; 5 EU 15 natives residing in their country of birth; 
6Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2003
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 Table 8: Immigrant Population of Working Age (15-64 years) and Known Origin 
by Labor Force Status, Gender, and Country of Birth, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 
Immigrant Population by Known Country of Birth 













































Unemployed 4.7 4.2 7.8 9.2 9.8 3.5 8.3 5.2 6.6 5.4 
Inactive 28.1 28.4 29.0 40.8 38.7 20.2 29.0 36.2 32.1 30.4 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 71.8 71.5 71.0 59.2 61.2 79.8 71.0 63.8 67.9 69.6 
Unemployment 






























Unemployed 5.2 4.1 7.6 11.6 11.4 3.2 5.4 6.0 7.3 5.4 
Inactive 19.9 20.5 19.7 23.4 25.9 10.9 20.7 20.8 21.5 21.7 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 80.2 79.4 80.3 76.7 74.0 89.2 79.3 79.2 78.5 78.3 
Unemployment 






























Unemployed 4.3 4.4 7.9 6.9 8.0 3.4 11.1 4.7 5.9 5.3 
Inactive 35.2 37.3 37.0 59.2 53.3 29.1 34.9 49.8 42.5 39.2 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active Percent) 64.8 62.7 63.0 40.8 46.7 70.9 65.1 50.3 57.4 60.8 
Unemployment 








1,405 1,010 820 375 1,264 234 126 619 5,853 124,993 
1LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available;  2EU 15 residents born in another EU 15 country (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain) or born 
in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland;  3EU 15 residents born in Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain but living in another EU 15 country; 
4EU 15 residents born in new EU member states, accession countries, other countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia. 
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Table 9: Legal Foreign Resident Population of Working Age (15 to 64) by Labor 
Force Status, Gender and Region of Nationality, EU 15, 20021  
(Percentages) 
Legal Foreign Resident Population  

























Unemployed 5.1 6.7 9.7 7.7 5.4 
Inactive 27.7 33.0 37.8 33.6 30.4 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





























Unemployed 5.7 6.8 11.7 9.1 5.4 
Inactive 19.7 19.3 23.7 22.0 21.7 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active (Percent) 8.3 80.7 76.3 78.0 78.3 
Unemployment 



















Unemployed 4.4 6.6 7.6 6.3 5.3 
Inactive 36.6 41.8 52.4 45.8 39.2 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active (Percent) 63.4 58.2 47.6 54.2 60.8 
Unemployment 







Total (in 1,000s) 1,997 273 2,972 5,242 124,993 
1LFS 2002, Data for Italy not available; 2 EU 15 nationals + nationals of Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland living in (another) EU 15 country; 3 Nationals of 
EU 10 (new member) states living in an EU 15 country. 
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Table 10: Employment Rates of Working Age Legal Foreign Resident Population 
and Immigrant Population with Country of Birth Known, by Nationality or 
Country of Birth, and Gender, EU 15, 2002  
Employment rate 
Male Female Total Nationality or 













EU15 3 74.6 75.3 59.1 59.6 67.2 67.3
Non EU 64.6 68.5 40.1 45.3 52.5 57.0
North Africa 55.3 62.6 24.8 38.7 41.5 51.4
North America 85.9 86.0 67.5 67.5 76.8 76.3
Turkey 61.3 65.1 31.6 33.9 47.5 50.0
Total 4 68.9 71.2 47.9 51.5 58.6 61.3
EU 15 average 72.9 72.9 55.5 55.5 64.2 64.2
1 LFS 2002, data on foreign nationals for Italy not available; 2 LFS 2002, data on foreign born for Germany 
and Italy not available; 3 EU 15 nationals/people born in EU 15 living in EU 15, but outside their country of 
citizenship or birth; 4 All foreign nationals/all migrants. 
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Table 11: Legal Foreign Resident Population of Working Age (15-64) by Labor 
Force Status, Gender, and Country of Nationality, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 
Legal Foreign Resident Population by Nationality 
Labor Force  
Status 
EU-West2 EU-South3 





































Unemployed 4.0 5.9 8.9 10.1 12.8 3.1 9.6 5.9 7.7 5.4 
Inactive 28.5 27.1 30.4 42.4 45.7 20.1 27.8 37.5 33.6 30.4 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active (Percent) 71.5 72.8 69.6 57.6 54.3 79.9 72.2 62.5 66.3 69.6 
Unemployment 



























Unemployed 4.6 6.4 9.4 13.0 15.6 3.6 4.2 7.5 9.1 5.4 
Inactive 19.9 19.7 20.3 25.7 29.0 10.4 18.8 18.4 22.0 21.7 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active (Percent) 80.1 80.3 79.7 74.3 70.9 89.5 81.3 81.6 78.0 78.3 
Unemployment 



























Unemployed 3.5 5.3 8.4 6.9 9.5 2.6 13.4 4.5 6.3 5.3 
Inactive 36.4 36.6 38.7 61.5 65.7 29.8 34.3 53.5 45.8 39.2 
Total  (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Active (Percent) 63.6 63.4 61.2 38.5 34.3 70.1 65.6 46.5 54.2 60.8 
Unemployment 





Total (in 1,000s) 1,052 1,016 1,018 989 624 191 67 286 5,243 124,993 
1 LFS 2002, Data for Italy not available; 2 EU 15 nationals (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain)+ nationals of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or 
Switzerland living in (another) EU 15 country; 3 Nationals of Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain living in another EU 15 country; 4 Nationals of new EU 
member states, accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, or 
Central Asia living in an EU 15 country. 
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 Table 12: Employment Rate of Working Age (15-64 Years) Population Born in                                  
or Nationals of Maghreb and Turkey and Resident in Selected EU Countries, 
20021:  Two Concepts Compared  








Nationals of  
Turkey  
Belgium 34.5 21.6 31.9 26.2 
Denmark 43.5 36.4 46.7 30.8 
Germany n/a  47.1 n/a   48.5 
Greece 63.2 75.0 57.1 57.1 
Spain 56.3 57.0 n/a   37.9 
France 50.8 39.1 42.2 50.6 
Netherlands 53.2 41.9 55.9 57.0 
Austria 55.6 42.9 59.8 33.3 
Sweden 44.3 34.5 50.0 44.4 
UK 65.3 60.4 55.9 26.2 
1LFS 2002; 2Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia. 
 
Table 13: Immigrant Workforce of Known Origin by ISCO1 Skill Level and 
Country of Birth, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 
Immigrant Workforce by Known Country of Birth 
ISCO 
Skill 
Level  EU West2  
EU 
South3 

























11.7 6.9 5.4 6.6 11.1 12.6 12.4 9.4 9.3 12.9 
Low skilled 
non-manual 13.0 13.1 16.0 14.2 12.5 7.5 20.4 17.5 13.7 14.0 
Skilled 
manual 10.4 32.0 22.1 22.6 15.7 5.8 11.7 6.5 17.7 17.7 
Non-skilled 
manual 14.5 27.0 36.4 34.7 24.2 7.5 19.0 27.6 24.0 17.9 
Armed 
Forces 0.5 0.1 -- 0.5 0.7 2.0 -- 0.1 0.4 0.7 
Total  
(Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 
(in 1,000s) 1,758 1,527 959 380 1,391 348 137 691 7,191 161,906 
1 International Standard Classification of Occupations; 2LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available; 3 EU 15 residents 
born in another EU 15 country (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) or born in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or 
Switzerland; 4 EU 15 residents born in Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain but living in another EU 15 country; 5 EU 15 residents 
born in the new EU member states, accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia. 
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Table 14: Legal Foreign Resident Workforce by ISCO1 Skill Level and 
Nationality, EU 15, 20022 
(Percentages) 
Legal Foreign Resident Workforce by Nationality 
ISCO 
Skill 
Level EU West 3 
EU 
South4 

























11.5 6.8 5.3 6.1 7.8 11.9 12.3 5.4 7.8 12.9 
Low skilled 
non-manual 12.6 16.0 16.1 12.3 13.8 6.5 23.3 25.3 14.5 14.0 
Skilled 
manual 9.6 24.6 24.7 27.7 24.2 4.4 15.1 7.7 19.9 17.7 
Non-skilled 
manual 12.5 31.5 36.0 41.7 34.2 7.5 21.9 29.0 28.6 17.9 
Armed 
Forces .1 --  --  .1 .2 1.7 --  --  .1 .7 
Total  
(Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total   
(in 1,000s) 1,378 1,541 1,122 995 567 294 73 297 6,267 161,906 
1 International Standard Classification of Occupations; 2LFS 2002, Data for Italy not available; 3 EU 15 nationals (except Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, or Spain) + nationals of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland living in (another) EU 15 country;      
4 Nationals of Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain living in another EU 15 country; 5 Nationals of new EU member states, 
accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Caucasus, Central Asia who are living in an EU 15 country. 
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Table 15: Immigrant Workforce of Known Origin by Sector/Industry (NACE) 
and Country of Birth, EU 15, 20021 
(Percentages) 
Immigrant Workforce by Country of Birth 
NACE 
Sector or 
Industry EU West2 
EU 
South3 





















mining 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 -- 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Manufacturing 16.4 18.2 19.4 25.3 15.6 11.2 14.9 18.1 17.4 20.9 
Construction 6.4 18.8 15.7 12.3 8.8 3.3 7.5 2.2 10.4 8.2 
Wholesale, retail 
trade 13.5 13.0 11.8 16.6 14.7 9.1 11.9 16.2 13.6 15.2 
Hotels, 
restaurants 5.9 7.8 10.1 10.4 5.9 3.6 15.7 13.5 7.9 4.4 
Trans., storage, 
communication 6.2 5.1 5.0 5.7 7.1 3.9 6.0 9.4 6.2 6.5 
Financial 




14.4 9.8 12.1 10.4 13.2 22.7 14.2 10.9 12.8 9.7 
Public administ., 
defense 4.8 4.1 1.6 2.7 8.1 5.7 3.0 3.7 4.7 7.9 
Education 8.9 4.3 3.9 4.9 7.8 11.8 5.2 5.6 6.6 7.2 
Health, social 
work 12.8 6.5 9.2 6.0 10.7 10.6 8.2 12.7 10.1 10.2 
Personal 
services 5.6 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.2 9.7 8.2 3.5 4.6 5.0 
Private 
households 0.5 6.6 5.9 0.5 1.7 0.3 3.0 1.0 2.8 1.08 
Total    (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total  (in 1,000s) 1,706 1,365 933 367 1,351 331 134 680 6,867 155,470 
1 LFS 2002, Data for Germany and Italy not available; 2 EU 15 residents born in another EU 15 country (except Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, or Spain) or born in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland; 3 EU 15 residents born in Italy, Greece, Portugal, or 
Spain but living in another EU 15 country; 4 EU 15 residents born in new EU member states, accession countries (except 
Turkey), other countries in Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia. 
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Table 16: Legal Foreign Resident Workforce by Sector/Industry (NACE) and 
Nationality, EU 15, 20021  
(Percentages)  
Legal Foreign Resident Workforce by Nationality 
NACE 
Sector or 
Industry EU West2  
EU 
South3 
EU 8 + 




















fishing, mining .4 .2 .4 1.4 .2 .7 --  --  .5 0.3 
Manufacturing 17.5 25.6 22.9 38.4 19.4 11.8 12.7 18.8 23.8 20.9 
Construction 5.9 13.5 15.8 10.0 16.1 2.5 8.5 2.4 10.8 8.2 
Wholesale, retail 
trade 12.8 11.5 12.6 13.9 14.8 8.2 14.1 16.1 12.8 15.2 
Hotels, 
restaurants 7.1 12.6 10.5 7.2 7.9 3.9 19.7 21.9 9.9 4.4 
Trans., storage, 
communications 6.4 5.0 4.5 5.9 7.0 4.3 5.6 6.2 5.6 6.5 
Financial 
intermediation 4.7 1.8 1.3 .9 1.5 7.2 1.4 2.4 2.4 3.5 
Real estate, 
renting, Research 15.3 10.6 10.8 9.4 12.8 23.7 12.7 10.3 12.2 9.7 
Public administ., 
defense 3.2 2.1 1.1 1.8 3.0 3.6   1.4 2.2 7.9 
Education 8.5 3.0 2.6 1.8 4.3 12.2 4.2 4.1 4.5 7.2 
Health, social 
work 11.2 5.5 8.2 4.3 7.2 10.4 5.6 11.3 7.7 10.2 
Personal services 6.6 4.3 4.1 4.5 3.3 11.5 12.7 3.8 5.1 5.0 
Private 
households .5 4.3 5.3 .4 2.6   2.8 1.4 2.5 1.1 
Total    (Percent) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total  (in 1,000s) 1,343 1,518 1,103 994 541 279 71 292 6,141 155,470 
1 LFS 2002, Data for Italy not available; 2 EU 15 nationals (except Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) + nationals of Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland living in (another) EU 15 country; 3 Nationals of Italy, Greece, Portugal, or Spain living in 
another EU 15 country; 4 Nationals of new EU member states, accession countries (except Turkey), other countries in 
Central/Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia. 
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Table 17: Employment Rates of Working Age Legal Foreign Residents and 
Immigrants of Known Origin by Nationality or Country of Birth, Gender, and 
Educational Attainment, EU 15, 2002  
Foreign Nationals (LFRs)1 













Turkey 55.5 73.3 ─ 27.9 49.7 ─
North Africa 49.3 65.0 67.5 18.9 32.7 49.1
North America ─ 79.6 87.3 ─ 60.6 76.9
EU 8 + CEE 61.3 76.1 77.8 45.7 60.2 53.3
EU-West5  59.5 78.5 87.8 35.0 61.3 78.0
EU-South5 66.9 80.3 84.3 52.3 67.8 69.8
EU 15 average 60.9 76.3 85.8 36.9 63.3 78.6
 
Foreign Born (Immigrants)6  













Turkey 58.4 75.3 ─ 25.5 49.3 76.9
North Africa 51.6 68.4 79.9 25.1 48.5 66.0
North America ─ 82.3 87.6 ─ 58.9 78.5
EU 8 + CEE 64.5 77.1 80.5 46.5 59.9 63.1
EU-West 7 59.7 74.4 86.1 41.7 61.6 76.8
EU-South7 71.6 76.2 85.6 53.4 62.4 77.4
EU 15 average 60.9 76.3 85.8 36.9 63.3 78.6
1 LFS 2002, data on foreign nationals for Italy not available; 2 Primary education only; 3 Lower or upper 
secondary education completed; 4 Tertiary education completed; 5.EU 15 nationals living in EU 15 but outside 
their country of citizenship; 6 LFS 2002, data on foreign born for Germany and Italy not available; 7People 
















Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Canada – 
Existing Services and New Initiatives 
 
Elizabeth Ruddick 
Director, Strategic Research and Statistics 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
 
This paper focuses on the services provided by the Canadian federal government to 
integrate immigrants into Canada’s society and economy. It provides a very high level 
overview of Canada’s immigration flows, of the jurisdictional responsibilities for 
immigrants and refugees and of the specific existing programs and new initiatives. 
Although Canada has conducted extensive research on labour market outcomes, using 
Census and longitudinal databases, the report includes only key findings. A number of 
recommended web sites, with additional information on research and on integration 
programs are included in the Annex. 
Immigration to Canada 
Canada admits roughly 225,000 immigrants each year under the family reunification, 
economic, and refugee categories. In 2003, of the total 221,352 immigrants, 31 percent 
were in the family class, 12 percent were refugees and 55 percent were economic 
immigrants (and accompanying family members). 
This annual flow amounts to about 0.7 percent of the population. According to the 2001 
Census, immigrants in Canada account for 18.4 percent of our population and about 20 
percent of our labour force. In addition, Canada presently admits close to 90,000 
foreign workers, 70,000 foreign students and 33,000 asylum seekers, each year.1 
Shared Responsibilities and Partnerships 
As shown in Table 1, responsibility for immigration cuts across a range of jurisdictions, 
each with differing mandates and interests in immigration. The federal government 
establishes criteria for eligibility and admissibility of individuals and manages 
enforcement and removal functions. The federal government also provides targeted 
funding to the provinces to support immigrant integration.  
                                                 
1 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/menu-fact.html  
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As set out in the Canadian constitution, immigration (along with agriculture) is a shared 
federal provincial jurisdiction. The federal government has a range of immigration 
agreements with the provinces, the most extensive being the Canada Quebec Accord. 
These agreements cover such things as the provinces’ role in selecting economic 
immigrants or immigrants to meet their specific provincial interests and the 
responsibility of a province in the delivery of integration services, using federal funds.2 
All levels of government take an active role in supporting immigrant integration, from 
the federal to provincial to municipal governments. 
Citizenship is a federal jurisdiction. 
Provinces are responsible for providing health care, education (including language 
training for immigrant children), social assistance and other social services. In addition, 
provinces provide social assistance to refugee claimants (although they are permitted to 
work while their claims are being processed.) 
 
Table 1: Shared Responsibility and Partnerships 
Government of Canada: 
 Responsible for entry, processing and 
removal  




 Deliver settlement programs and want to 
be included in the policy development 
 
Provinces/Territories: 
 Varying bilateral agreements to design, 
deliver and administer immigrant 
selection and settlement programs with 
federal compensation  
 
Regulatory/Licensing Bodies: 
 Responsible for certification/ recognition 




 Provide health, education, social and 
other services  




 Employers face labour shortages but 




 Some want more, some less 
 
General Public: 
 Respect and acceptance builds social 
cohesion and minimizes risk of exclusion 
 
Integration Services and Support 
The federal government funds three major integration programs. The Immigrant 
Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) covers a range of needs, from job search 
and labour market readiness, to assistance finding housing, counselling, assistance in 
accessing services, e.g.,getting a health card, etc. Language Instruction for Newcomers 
to Canada (LINC) accounts for about 75 percent of the federal integration funds spent 
on these three programs outside the province of Quebec (about $100 million). It 
provides language instruction to adult newcomers. (Language instruction for children is 
                                                 
2 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/agree.html  
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a provincial responsibility and is administered through the school system.) The 
language instruction is designed to provide immigrants with a functional knowledge of 
English or French, but does not extend to specific occupational or professional labour 
market language needs in most cases. 
The Host Program matches immigrants to volunteer Canadian families and individuals 
who provide non-financial support to newly arrived immigrants. 
Federal funding is provided to provinces on a formula basis and settlement programs 
are delivered through the non-governmental sector. The Provinces have differing 
arrangements with the federal government for the administration of federal funds – 
Quebec receives a grant which it administers entirely; British Columbia and Manitoba 
have agreements with the federal government, which give them a lump sum based on a 
formula, which they administer subject to certain guidelines. In other provinces, the 
federal government manages the delivery of services, through agreements with service 
providers or others in the government, private and non-governmental sectors. 
 
Table 2: Programming for Refugees 
Government Sponsored Refugees 
 Resettlement Assistance Program – income support, reception, temporary accommodation 
and basic orientation services for government-sponsored refugees. Access to all other 
programs – LINC, ISAP. 
 
Privately Sponsored Refugees 
 Private sponsors are responsible for resettling refugees from abroad – providing financial 
and emotional support. Access to LINC and ISAP.  
 
Resettled refugees are provided with specific programming and support. Government 
sponsored refugees receive income support until they become self-sufficient or for up 
to one year. On arrival they are provided with reception services, temporary 
accommodation and orientation assistance. They also have access to the ISAP and 
LINC programs described above. Privately sponsored refugees receive financial and 
emotional support from the private sponsors. They also have access to the LINC and 
ISAP programs. 
 
Table 3: Asylum Seekers 
 Have the right to work in any job, once a credible basis for their claim is established 
 Can access provincial social assistance 
 Can access federal programming only if their claim is successful and they receive 
permanent resident status 
 
Asylum seekers (or refugee claimants) are provided with a work permit once a credible 
basis for their claim has been established. This gives them the right to work in any job 
for which they meet the requirements. They also have access to provincial social 
assistance. Successful asylum seekers who have been granted permanent residence can 
then access the LINC and ISAP programs. 
Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce:  North American and European Experiences June 28-29, 2004 
Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Canada – Existing Services and New Initiatives  Elizabeth Ruddick 
 
 V-4
Labour Market Outcomes - Research Findings 
Recent research on the economic outcomes of immigrants has identified a number of 
trends in earnings from 1980 through the year 2000 (presently the most recent available 
data). This analysis is based on a longitudinal database of immigrant tax filers, which 
permits research on earnings at arrival and earnings growth through time in Canada. 
Socio-demographic characteristics, including immigrant entry category are also 
available.3 
Focussing on skilled worker principal applicants (those assessed for their skills), 
employment earnings shortly after arrival have declined in real terms from 1980 
through the mid-1990s. Using the Canadian average as a benchmark, earnings of skilled 
workers one year after arrival were 123 percent in 1981, 75 percent in 1991 and 85 
percent in 2000. For skilled workers who had been in Canada for five years, the pattern 
was 129 percent in 1985, 105 percent in 1990 and 118 percent in the year 2000. 
 
Graph 1 is based on data from our longitudinal immigrant database (IMDB), a database 
which links immigrant records to their tax returns from 1980 forward. 
It shows employment earnings for skilled worker principal applicants at one year after 
arrival over time for all landing year cohorts, from 1980 to 1999. For selected cohorts 
(1982, 1986, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998) the earnings trajectory over time in 
Canada is also plotted from the “one-year” point. Canadian average employment 
earnings in each year are shown for reference purposes. 
The graph shows a steady decline in earnings one year after arrival until the mid-1990s. 
Turning to the pattern of earnings growth over time, we see that by the year 2000, 
                                                 
3 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/papers/menu-imdb.html  
Graph 1.  Employment Earnings of Skilled Worker Principal 
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skilled worker principal applicants who arrived in 1982 were earning roughly $50,000. 
Those who arrived in 1986 had employment earnings of just over $40,000.  
The data suggest that immigrants who came to Canada during the severe recession at 
the beginning of the 1990s may have experienced “scarring” with respect to their 
longer-term labour market outcomes. This is evident for those who arrived in 1991 and 
whose employment earnings were surpassed in about 1998/99 by those who arrived in 
1995. 
It remains to be seen whether the upturn in earnings in the latter half of the 1990s will 
bring economic performance back to the pattern, which existed in the early 1980s. 
Other economic and labour market research points to deteriorating trends in immigrant 
earnings.  Research by Statistics Canada,4 based on the Census, shows that the rate of 
low income has increased for immigrants from 1980 (17 percent) to the year 2000 (20 
percent). At the same time the comparable rate for Canadian-born has decreased from 
about 17 percent in 1980 to about 14 percent in 2000. Recently arrived immigrants (five 
years or less) have been the most impacted;  their rate increased from 1.4 times the rate 
for Canadian-born in 1980 to 2.5 times by the year 2000. (See Graph 2.) 
Source: Picot, Garnett and Feng Hou “The rise in low income rates among immigrants in Canada” 
Statistics Canada 2003. 
 
As mentioned above, those who arrived during the recession of the early 1990s, 
regardless of the category of arrival (skilled, refugees or family), were “scarred” by the 
prevailing economic conditions. Either they have seen very slow growth in their 
earnings over time or they have had higher reliance on social assistance. (During the 
recession of the early 1990s, there was a decline in employment, while Canadian 
universities graduated record numbers of new highly educated labour market entrants.) 
                                                 












Graph 2.  Low Income Rates in Canada
Born in Canada All Immigrants Recent Immigrants (<5 years)
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Source:  CIC, Facts and Figures 
 
Research based on a number of different data sources has reached similar conclusions 
on the factors contributing to these outcomes. Source countries changed from the early 
1980s to the mid-to-late 1990s. Outcomes for immigrants from Western Europe, from 
the U.S. and from Australia and New Zealand do not exhibit these unfortunate trends. 
There is also a consensus across recent research that immigrants receive no return to 
their foreign experience and that returns to foreign education have declined. 
While researchers feel that official language ability plays a key role in economic 
outcomes, there is as yet no objective assessment of knowledge of English or French, a 
key-missing element of this analysis.5 A number of surveys are underway to address 
this shortcoming. 
Two new sources of information include an examination of barriers to employment, 
from both the employer and the immigrant perspectives. The Longitudinal Survey of 
Immigrants to Canada,6 which interviewed immigrants six months after their arrival in 
Canada, shows that finding employment was one of the major challenges for 
immigrants, regardless of their arrival category (Graph 4). In addition, those who 
reported having difficulty cited lack of Canadian experience, recognition or transfer of 





                                                 
5 Research is forthcoming on the importance of official language literacy and numeracy in earnings 
differentials between immigrants and Canadian-born. See the Statistics Canada “Daily” of September 7, 
2004. (www.statcan.ca) 
6 http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/030904/d030904a.htm  
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Graph 4.  Proportion of Immigrants Facing 
Challenges six months after arrival




Source: Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada. 
 
In the Canadian Labour and Business Centre’s “Viewpoints 2002 Leadership Survey,” 
employers cited similar challenges in hiring immigrants, i.e., language, credential 
recognition and lack of Canadian experience. (Graph 5) 
 
Source: Canadian Labour and Business Centre “Viewpoints 2002 Leadership Survey”. 
Graph 5.  Employers Views on Hiring Immigrants
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Given these research results, the Government has announced new funding to address 
foreign credential recognition and to enhance language training to better meet the needs 
of the labour market. 
 
Table 4: New Initiatives 
Immigration Portal A web portal is in the early stages of a 5-year 
development plan to provide timely and tailored 
information and online services that will help 
immigrants to prepare for the labour market and 
society prior to their arrival. 
Foreign Credentials and Experience 
Recognition 
A Pan-Canadian model is being developed towards 
long-term standard processes for foreign credential 
assessment and recognition for targeted 
occupations. 
Enhanced Language Training A labour market language training and bridge-to-
work initiative has been launched, to provide skilled 
immigrants with the job-specific language skills 
needed to obtain and retain work commensurate 
with their skills and qualifications. 
 
Foreign credential recognition and improved labour market integration of immigrants is 
the concern of a number of federal departments, led by Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada (HRSDC), which is responsible for labour market policy and 
programming, with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Health Canada, Industry 
Canada and Canadian Heritage. In Canada, responsibility for credential recognition 
rests with the Provinces, so progress on this front must include provinces and 
professional associations as key partners. 
Funds for enhanced language training will focus on labour market language, job-
specific language skills commensurate with immigrants’ skills and credentials. Often 
immigrants lack the more complex language and communications skills needed by the 
Canadian labour market for them to make full use of their education and experience. 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada are developing an Internet portal, which will provide timely information to 
potential immigrants, to help them prepare for their move to Canada. The portal will 
include an objective on-line language test, information on credential recognition, 
including relevant professional licensing bodies, and information on communities that 
have opportunities for immigrants, but that may not be well known outside of Canada. 
The site will provide linkages to other levels of government and other relevant sites for 
immigrants to better prepare and inform themselves before arrival. 
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Selected Best Practices in Ontario 
There are a large number of highly successful new practices and services to assist 
immigrants with labour market integration. The challenge at present is that they are 
small in scope.  
While there are many good examples of innovative practices across Canada, this 
section describes only three projects, all in Ontario. (Website links are provided at the 
end of this report.) 
The Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council is a multi-stakeholder council 
that will work to improve access to employment for immigrants in the Toronto region. 
The Council was launched in September 2003. Its particular focus is labour market 
access because employment is such a significant part of successful settlement for 
immigrants.  The goal of the Council is to find and implement local solutions that lead 
to more effective and efficient labour market integration of immigrants in the Toronto 
Region. The Council includes representation from private and public sector employers, 
colleges and universities, community organizations, assessment service providers, 
organized labour, occupational regulatory bodies, foundations, and all three levels of 
government; federal, provincial and regional/municipal. 
Career Bridge is the first initiative of the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment 
Council (TRIEC). Partial funding for Career Bridge has been provided by the Ontario 
Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, Access to Professions and Trades Unit. 
Career Bridge is an innovative program that offers paid internships for internationally-
qualified recent immigrants with a minimum of 3 years international work experience, 
who are newly arrived in Canada, and are ready and qualified to apply their skills to the 
Canadian workplace. Career Bridge interns have an average of 8 years work 
experience. All are university graduates; about half have masters degrees; some PhDs. 
Internships are four-months or six-months long and can be extended up to 12 months. 
The cost to an organization is under $10,000 for a 4-month internship and under 
$14,000 for a 6-month internship. This includes a stipend for the intern, source 
deductions and fees. Career Bridge does the payroll, paperwork and pre-screening and 
the intern is not part of the host organization’s headcount, or on their payroll. 
In partnership with educational institutions, Access to Professions and Trades (within 
the Ontario Ministry of Education) has designed a number of bridging programs for 
specific occupations – including, e.g., precision machinery and tooling, foreign trained 
health professionals (medical radiation and laboratory science technologists, respiratory 
technologists, midwives, pharmacists) and teachers.  These programs include prior 
learning assessment and specified courses to achieve Ontario standards in these 
occupations. (Web sites are included in the Annex.) 
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Canada‘s immigration program includes an explicit focus on active measures to 
integrate immigrants and refugees into Canada’s economy and society. All levels of 
government are involved and funding is provided to support a range of services.  
Economic outcomes for immigrants through the 1990s have raised some concerns. 
Employment earnings have declined, and the rate of low income has risen, particularly 
for recent arrivals. And while there has been an improvement in the latter half of the 
1990s and economic growth at the beginning of this century has been promising, it is 
too early to say whether the trend of the 1990s has been reversed.  
Research and surveys on this phenomenon have reached a strong consensus on the 
reasons behind this decline. Changing source countries, lack of Canadian experience, 
recognition of foreign credentials and experience and knowledge of Canada’s official 
languages are all cited as key contributors to the labour market success of immigrants.  
As a result a number of new initiatives have been undertaken recently at the federal and 
provincial levels: a pronounced focus on addressing foreign credential recognition; new 
funding for enhanced (labour market) language training; internships, bridging programs 
and other focussed efforts to assist immigrants in specific occupations to access the 
training needed to use their skills in Canada. 
 
 
Annex:  Selected Web Sites 
 
Research sites: 
 http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/index.html (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada research) 
 www.metropolis.net (Metropolis Project) 
 
Immigrant Integration sites: 





 http://www.equalopportunity.on.ca/eng_g/apt/index.asp (Ontario) 
 http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/amip/IQP/summary_pilots_intivs.htm (British 
Columbia) 
 
NGO/Educational institution sites: 
 http://www.algonquincollege.com/hcs/hs/ftn/ (Algonquin College – nursing) 
 http://www.maytree.com/ (Maytree Foundation) 
 http://www.bowvalleyc.ab.ca/courses_programs/esl/index.htm (Bow Valley 
College, Calgary AB) 
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